

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

GoogleTM books

<https://books.google.com>







600042071K

33.

426.

THE TRUE DOCTRINE
OF THE
LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

✓
THE TRUE DOCTRINE
OF THE
LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD,
PROVED
UPON
THE AUTHORITY OF THE BEST
LATIN CLASSICS.

BY
THE REV. R. BATHURST GREENLAW, M.A.
OF WORCESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD.

“There is, I doubt not, a clue to this, as to every other mazy dance of human thought, which we trace in the texture of language.”—*Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford.*

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR
JOHN BOHN, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN;
SIMPKIN AND MARSHALL, STATIONERS' HALL COURT;
J. AND J. H. PARKER, OXFORD;
AND J. AND J. J. DEIGHTON, CAMBRIDGE.

1833.

426.



**PRINTED BY RICHARD TAYLOR,
RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.**

TO
THE RIGHT REVEREND
EDWARD COPLESTON, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF, &c. &c.

MY LORD,

THE sentiments which you are generally supposed to hold respecting the doctrine of the LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD, induce me to dedicate to Your Lordship the following Work.

As I have not the honour of being personally known to you, I have not presumed to request your permission for the step which I am now taking. It will not, therefore, be supposed, that I introduce my Work to the public under the high sanction which the authority of your name would give it.

As a member of the University of Oxford, I am sensible of the great debt of gratitude which is due to Your Lordship, for the exertions which on all occasions you have made for the advancement of classical learning. And as the following Work rests itself upon the connexion which subsists between Logic and Grammar, I am anxious to introduce it to the notice of ONE, who shines pre-eminently in his refined and accurate knowledge of both those subjects.

With the sincerest respect, I have the honour to subscribe myself

Your Lordship's

Very humble and devoted Servant,

R. B. GREENLAW.

BLACKHEATH, KENT.

January 1, 1833.

P R E F A C E.

SO great a length of time has elapsed, since the following pages were first advertised for publication, that I consider, some apology is necessary for the delay which has taken place. Little will be required by those, whose experience has made them acquainted with the various occupations of persons employed in the instruction of youth.

While endeavouring to simplify the rules, which are usually given to students for the use of the subjunctive mood, I observed that a common property subsisted in several examples of different rules. It occurred to me, that this property might furnish a clue for the discovery of a single principle, upon which the Latins used the mood ; as it evidently appeared to be a key to the right use of the subjunctive in a great

variety of cases. I prosecuted my inquiry by a careful examination of different Latin classics, with my attention fixed on *one* point, namely, the bearing which the subjunctive might have in each particular sentence. The great obscurity in which the subject was involved, and the acknowledged failure of all who have endeavoured to generalize upon the subject, were sufficient to destroy any confidence in my own powers for resolving this difficult question.

Having, however, once obtained a clue, I suffered nothing to deter me from prosecuting my research. Obstacles continually beset me, and oftentimes I feared that I should not succeed beyond simplifying the subject, by embodying under one the various rules which are given for the construction of the relative with the subjunctive. One grand difficulty presented itself, which arose from my being impressed with the common and prevailing notion, that conjunctions govern mood. I determined, therefore, to examine the ground on which this theory rested, and to trace it back

to its origin. I found that it really was built on no solid foundation, and that it arose from a fanciful application of some Greek idioms to the resolution of Latin sentences. I then perceived clearly, that to discover the true principle of the Latin subjunctive mood, it would be necessary to pursue a course which had not been trodden before, and to disregard almost every direction, which those who were acknowledged to be best acquainted with the ground, had given. Having, at length, convinced myself by actual examination, that all cases of the subjunctive might be brought under one rule, I determined to publish the doctrine, and accordingly prepared the following sheets for the press. Having completed the examination of cases in the spring of 1831, I advertised the following volume for early publication; but I found that my labours of tuition would not allow me any time for superintending the press. A portion of the work has consequently remained in type many months, and it is only by a few weeks re-

spite from labour, that I am now enabled to give it to the public.

Having instructed my own pupils in the application of the rule, and having conversed with many persons upon the benefit which the Latin student is likely to derive from it, the knowledge of the simple doctrine developed in the following pages has spread to an extent which I cannot calculate. I nevertheless consider it advisable to present it to the public in its present form.

In regard to the Work itself, I may observe, that I thought it right to take a brief view of what had been written by different authors on the subject. This I have done in the INTRODUCTION. The SECOND CHAPTER contains the grounds upon which I conclude that the potential and subjunctive moods are the same. Many readers will perhaps be prepared to admit this ; yet it was necessary to prove it, since it is still imagined by many, that the subjunctive *form* of verb possesses a sort of double property, and that consequently the

potential mood differs from the subjunctive.

It was also necessary to determine to what mood the tense, commonly called future subjunctive, properly belongs. This is done in the **THIRD CHAPTER**. To those, therefore, who are prepared to admit, first, that nothing satisfactory has been hitherto written upon the subject of the Latin subjunctive ; and, secondly, that the potential and subjunctive moods are really one and the same ; and, thirdly, that the tense which ends in *ero* is the future perfect indicative, it may be recommended, that they should at once turn to the fourth chapter, in which the true doctrine of the subjunctive mood is developed.

Of the importance of the subject, not only to the Latin student, but also to the advanced scholar, it is superfluous to speak. I shall merely subjoin the words of the late Dr. Gabell on the point, as in fact they express the sentiments of every scholar upon the subject. “ It has been truly observed, that nothing perplexes the mind

of the reader more than complex terms, when their complication is not observed. This has happened with the Latin subjunctive mood, combined with indefinite words ; and therefore, not only to the tyro, but even to the veteran scholar, it has been an everlasting stumbling-block*.”

* Dr. Parr's Correspondence, vol. vii.

EDITIONS OF WORKS QUOTED AND REFERRED
TO IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES.

- M. Tullii Ciceronis Opera *Oxonii* 1783
M. Tullii Ciceronis Opera, ex recensione J. Aug. Ernesti.
Oxonii 1810
- P. Virgilius Maro, a Chr. Gottlieb. Heyne . . . *Londini* 1821
- C. Julii Cæsaris Commentarii. Oberlinus . . . *Londini* 1825
- C. Julii Cæsaris Commentarii, cum Notis Var. et Oudendorpii.
Lugduni Batavorum 1737
- C. Crispi Sallustii Quæ extant cum Notis Var. cura S. Haver-
campi *Amstelodami* 1742
- Q. Horatius Flaccus R. Bentleii *Amstelodami* 1713
- Q. Horatii Flacci Opera. F. G. Doering *Oxonii* 1831
- Terentius Zeunii *Londini* 1820
- M. Acci Plauti Comœdiæ. J. Aug. Ernesti . . . *Lipsiæ* 1760
- C. Cornelii Taciti Opera, ex recensione J. Aug. Ernesti. J. J.
Oberlinus *Oxonii* 1813
- T. Livii Patavini Historiarum Libri, ex recensione Arn. Dra-
kenborchii *Oxonii* 1818
- C. Plinii Cæcilii Epistolæ, Cortius et Longolius.
Amstelodami 1734
- M. Fabii Quintilianiani Libri, per P. Burmannum.
Lugduni Batavorum 1720
- Justini Historiæ, curante Abrahamo Gronovio.
Lugduni Batavorum 1760
- P. Ovidii Nasonis Opera. Petrus Burmannus.
Amstelodami 1727
- Sext. Aurelius Propertius, ex recensione Vulpii. *Patavii* 1755

C. Valerius Catullus, Vulpii *Patavii* 1737
 Albius Tibullus, Vulpii *Patavii* 1749
 M. Annæus Lucanus, cum Commentario P. Burmanni.

Leidæ 1740

C. Suetonii Opera, Pitisci *Leopardiæ* 1714
 Corpus Poetarum Latinorum. Walker 1828
 Euripidis Heraclidæ et Medea, ex recensione Petri Elmsleyi
 M.A. *Oxonii* 1828

Facciolati Lexicon, Forcellini *Patavii* 1771

Novus Linguae et Eruditionis Romanæ Thesaurus, a J. M.

Gesnero *Lipsiæ* 1749

Opera Græcorum, Latinorum et Italorum Rhetorum.

Venetiis 1644

Prisciani Opera. Krehl *Lipsiæ* 1819

Grammaticæ Latinæ Auctores Antiqui, Putschii *Hanoviae* 1605

Gerardii Joannis Vossii Aristarchus . . . *Amstelodami* 1662

Auctores Latinæ Linguae, Dionisii Gothofredi.

Coloniæ Allobrogum 1622

Institutiones plenissimæ Latinæ Linguae, opera Georgii Hen-

rici Ursini *Ratisponæ* 1701

Thomæ Linacri De emendata Structura Libri Sex.

Venetiis 1557

Pascasii Grosippi Rudimenta *Amstelodami* 1686

Vossii Latina Grammatica *Leopardiæ* 1717

Franc. Sanctii Brocensis Minerva, cum notis Gasp. Scioppii et

J. Perizonii. C. L. Bauerus *Lipsiæ* 1793

J. Fred. Noltenii Lexicon . . . *Berolini et Stralsundiae* 1780

Pompeii Commentum Artis Donati Fred. Lindemann . 1820

J. J. G. Schelleri Observationes in Priscos Scriptores Quosdam.

Lipsiæ 1785

J. J. G. Schelleri Præcepta Styli bene Latini. . *Lipsiæ* 1797

Grammatical Commentaries, by Richard Johnson, M.A.

London 1706

Scheller's Latin Grammar, translated by G. Walker, M.A.

London 1825

- A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against
Oxford *Oxford* 1810
- Gymnasium, by the Rev. Alexander Crombie, LL.D. Fourth
Edition *London* 1830
- Zumpt's Latin Grammar, translated by Rev. J. Kenrick,
Second Edition 1827
- Rules for the Construction of *Qui* with the Subjunctive Mood,
by A. R. Carson, A.M. &c. &c. Second Edition . . 1821
- Elements of Rhetoric, by R. Whately, D.D. Second Edition.
Oxford 1828
- Elements of Logic, by R. Whately, D.D. Third Edition.
London 1829
- The Etymology and Syntax of the English Language, by the
Rev. Alexander Crombie, LL.D. &c. &c. Third Edition 1830

CONTENTS.

Chapter.	Page.
I. Introduction	1
II. Potential Mood	30
III. Future Perfect Tense	54
IV. Subjunctive Mood	62
V. The True Doctrine proved	93
VI. The True Doctrine proved	109
VII. Conjunctions	146
VIII. Conjunctions	165
IX. Quod	182
X. Dr. Parr's Theory	197
XI. Conclusion.	243

THE TRUE DOCTRINE
OF THE
LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE doctrine of the Latin subjunctive mood, being confessedly involved in obscurity, presents to the student one of the greatest difficulties with which he has to contend. For observing the other niceties of the language he is furnished with fixed and general directions ; but he will search his grammar in vain for any clear and definite rules to guide him in the use of this mood. Until he has acquired a critical taste by perusing the purest Roman authors, he is left to wander in a perplexing maze, through which the most experienced scholar can scarcely trace his way.

This, however, does not arise from any paucity of rules for the direction of the student ; for there is no point of grammar upon which

critics and grammarians have written more largely. But the rules are generally so vague and indefinite, so complicated in their nature, and uncertain in their application, that, instead of explaining the subject, they rather bewilder the attention. Yet, that the Latins, when they employed the subjunctive form of a verb, were guided by some fixed and easy principle, is a position which few will attempt to controvert. It does not at all militate against the existence of a general principle, that many passages in the best authors are, either directly opposed to, or not to be classed under, the rules which grammarians have hitherto framed for the use of the mood. The only legitimate inference to be drawn from the circumstance is, that the true principle has not been discovered. It remains, then, a fit and interesting subject of inquiry ; and the advantage which will arise from its discovery will be proportionate to the difficulty and obscurity in which the subject is involved.

As the question has hitherto baffled the research of the most learned, it cannot reflect disgrace upon me, should I add to the number of those who have failed in discovering its solution. The doctrine now proposed has been submitted to a broad and extensive trial, and, I trust, is established upon as firm a foundation as the

nature of the subject will admit. The principle which is considered to have given rise to the subjunctive form of the verb, and to have regulated its use, is simple in itself and easy of application ; but it has not been a matter of ease to establish its truth. It has been necessary to rest it upon a broad basis of induction ; and this necessity must be my apology for a frequent and perhaps tedious repetition of the same observations. Numerous examples of the use of the mood in every form of sentence were to be adduced from a variety of Latin authors ; as the more numerous and varied in character the examples might be, the more legitimate would be the inference to which they lead ; the strength of the inductive process depending upon the number of examples, which are shown to bear upon the point to be proved.

It is not my intention to combat in detail the different rules which grammarians have laid down for the direction of students. To take a general view of them, however, it may be objected to some of these rules, that they are inconsistent with each other ; to others, that they are swelled with an endless list of exceptions ; to all, that they are defective and only partially applicable.

The learned author of the *Gymnasium* has

proposed the clearest and most comprehensive system ; but the rules which he has given are so numerous, and depend so much upon different meanings to be attached to connecting particles, that the *student* requires some clearer guide for his direction, and the *more advanced scholar* will rather trust to his own taste, formed and corrected by a careful perusal of Latin authors.

Dr. Parr appears to have brought the energies of his great and active mind to the elucidation of this subject. The principle which he lays down as the result of careful study is one, indeed, which could only have been propounded after the most extensive and accurate research. But as a guide for students it is defective. The position may be founded in truth, and is, doubtless, of general utility : but it is partial ; since it does not include a variety of cases in which the subjunctive form of the verb must be used. It informs us, that in particular cases (composing certainly a very numerous class) the indicative mood must not be used. “ The indicative mood must not follow indefinite words*.” But this

* “ I did not know before, nor do I believe, that any scholar in the kingdom, besides yourself and those to whom you have made the communication, could have informed me, that no instances are to be found in prose writers, down to the brazen age, of the indicative mood following indefinite words.”—*Parr's Works ;—Correspondence, —Letter of Dr. Gabell to Dr. Parr*, vol. vii. p. 479.

concise rule, valuable as it is, does not supply the learner with all the information that is requisite. He needs to be told when, and when alone, he must use the subjunctive form of the verb ;— he requires a simple test, by the application of which he may prove his Latinity, and determine its character.

But no rule or body of rules, that I am aware of, has been devised which will answer this purpose. The difficulty, therefore, still remains ; and so, I apprehend, it is likely to remain, unless we can entirely divest ourselves of the erroneous notion, handed down from grammarians of the earliest date, that the use of the subjunctive mood is regulated by the sense in which some connecting particle of the sentence is to be understood. This, in my opinion, is the grand and fatal error which has bewildered almost every writer on the subject. I am persuaded that the labyrinth which has so long perplexed critics and grammarians has been framed by themselves ; and he who would discover the hidden treasure, must first endeavour to break through the wall that has been fenced about it by the idea of conjunctions governing moods.

The author of *A reply to the calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford*, seems to have been sensible of this, and to have had it in view

when he proposed a theory founded upon an entirely different basis. His acute and penetrating mind perceived that the doctrine of the subjunctive mood must rest upon higher and more philosophical principles, and that Roman writers could not have employed the different moods so consistently, unless they had been guided by general principles. He declares his opinion in sufficiently clear terms, that whoever expects to solve this mystery must apply himself to a philosophical principle,—“to that true logic* which enables a man to sort, discriminate, and abstract ideas, to know them again under all the changes of dress and posture, and to keep a steady eye upon them, as they mingle with the confused and shifting crowd.” In accordance with this view, I have discarded from my thoughts the

• My attention has lately been directed to a very valuable little treatise upon the construction of the relative *qui*, *quæ*, *quod*, with the subjunctive mood, written by A. R. Carson, A.M. and Rector of the High School of Edinburgh. The writer's views seem to be in accordance with my own; but the principle which, I maintain, regulated the use of the subjunctive mood under every circumstance, is considered by the acute writer of the treatise as subsidiary only to a right application of other rules for the construction of *qui*. It is surprising that Mr. Carson should have entertained such correct views of the construction of *qui* with the subjunctive mood in particular cases, and not have pursued his inquiries further. Had he laid the foundation for which he possessed the materials, he might have raised a system as general as that which is now offered to the opinion of the literary world.

opinions which have been hitherto entertained upon the subject, and have endeavoured to discover the principle which regulates the use of the mood, by comparing sentences with each other, and by considering the several parts of which they consist.

The necessity of such a course will be evident from a short review of the opinions which have been maintained upon this subject. They may be traced to a common source, of great antiquity indeed, but yet not so near to the age of pure Latinity as to entitle it to that universal submission which it appears to have received.

Priscian is the earliest Latin grammarian to whom succeeding writers have generally appealed, and his work is the basis upon which their different systems are founded. He endeavours to trace the use of the subjunctive mood to an imitation of Attic writers ; upon the erroneous supposition, that the moods of verbs in the Greek and Roman languages were regulated by the same or similar laws. This, however, only shackled him with trammels, and prevented him from taking a free and enlarged examination of his subject. By endeavouring to accommodate the Latin to the Greek idiom, he framed a system for the use of the subjunctive in his own language as fanciful as might be expected,—or rather, the *systems* which

he framed were as numerous, as the particles which the Latins employed to connect the different clauses of a sentence. In his definition of the subjunctive mood he is confused, and lays the foundation of his future mistakes: "Subjunctivus dicitur, vel quod subjungitur conjunctioni, vel quod alteri verbo omnimodo subjungitur, vel quod subjungit sibi alterum verbum*." *Prisc. Inst. Gram.* lib. 18. cap. 10.—Perizonius remarks upon this definition, that the second reason is the only one which is founded in truth. If this learned commentator means that the subjunctive mood is sometimes subjoined to a verb, he is right; but if he supposes that it is always so subjoined, he is in error: "Adeone erat stultus, ut illam vitam esse arbitraretur?" Would Perizonius have said that "arbitraretur" in this sentence is subjoined to "erat"? It is a question whether the term *subjunctive* is the most fitting word that might be employed to designate the character of this

* The following are the examples which Priscian gives of the subjunctive mood subjoining another verb to itself: "Cum doceam legere discipulum expono ei," and "Cum docerem legere, exponerem." In these and such-like examples, the clause in which we find the subjunctive mood is certainly prior in order of position; but I apprehend it will not be maintained that such is the logical order of the sentence. The terms of the first are "ego" the subject, and "expono discipulo, cum doceam eum legere" the predicate. So that the learned grammarian's definition is founded on an erroneous view of the parts of a sentence.

mood. But as the name has become established by general usage, it will answer our purpose better than another, as there cannot be any doubt respecting the particular inflexion of verb intended.

In opposition to Priscian, I maintain that the subjunctive mood is *never subjoined to a conjunction as such ; and never to a verb simply as such ; still less does it possess any property by which it subjoins another verb to itself*. It is always used consecutively, in clauses which occupy a certain logical position in a sentence. It was, doubtless, framed originally for the purpose of perspicuity ; and therefore, when we meet with this modal inflexion, we may infer that the usage of the language required it, and admitted of no other.

It will be my object to elucidate and establish this proposition, however much it may be at variance with the opinions hitherto maintained and upheld by the highest authorities among our own or foreign grammarians. I consider that we are indebted to Priscian principally for the embarrassing notions with which the subject is hedged about. He took the lead in founding the use of the mood on the meaning to be attached to conjunctions. Though he is more full in treating of this than of the other moods, yet he passes over its use after the relative *qui*, *quæ*, *quod**,

* I do not consider the short observation which he makes respecting the use of *qui*, *quæ*, *quod*, following a subjunctive mood

thus omitting a class of cases generally considered as presenting the greatest difficulty. He moreover gives no definite rules for it, when the verb follows conjunctions: his observations are almost confined to the subjunctive mood following *si*. Attaching to this conjunction the meanings of the Greek *εἰ* and *ἐάν*, he endeavours to derive rules from the different meanings which these conjunctions bear. The fallacy of this method will be shown hereafter; but, we may ask, what sound and useful information is to be gained from a section in which we meet with the following incongruities. “*Sed indicativo sæpe conjunctum (si) ostendit magis confirmari et credi rem sic esse, vel fieri posse, quam dubitari. Virgilius in Æn. 2. : Di, si qua est cælo pietas, confirmative enim potius, quam dubitative dicitur.*” But in a previous chapter he had said, “*Indicativus, quia essentiam plerumque ipsius rei significat, hoc nomine nuncupatur. Ideo autem diximus plerumque, quia invenitur sæpissime*

which had been preceded by *si* or *ut*, as contravening my assertion; notwithstanding the fact, that the examples which he adduces are such, that the verb of the relative clause is necessarily required to be in the subjunctive mood. Lib. 18. cap. 10: “*Sciendum, tamen, quod tam ut conjunctione causali, quam si sequentibus, cum verbis subjunctivis, vel antecedentibus, etiam antecedentia vel sequentia quoque frequentissime per subjunctivum modum proferre solent Romani, et maxime qui adjuncto, vel quæ, vel quod, rationem colligentes, vel dubitationem ostendentes, ut rogabam, ut te ostenderes qui fueris, et placebas, si diceres quod feceris.*”

etiam dubitative; ut Terentius, Ph. 3. 2. 42. *Sic sum, si placeo, utere*; and in Virg. *Æn.* 3. 604. *Si sceleris tanta est injuria nostri.*" In the tenth chapter, again, we meet with the following; "*vetabit pro vetet metri causa*,"—a doctrine never to be admitted; "Iste, igitur, modus, id est subjunctivus (ut breviter ejus vim colligam), apud Latinos est quando dubitationem, quando probationem, quando possibilitatem significat." If the Romans fancifully framed a modal inflexion solely to express these different modifications of an action, while the same might be expressed by the indicative form of the verb, it is not surprising that the use of this mood should present unconquerable difficulties to the modern student in Latin literature.

Priscian had been preceded by Sosipater Charisius, Probus, and Diomedes. In Probus we find nothing upon the subject. Sosipater reckons seven moods, which he considers to express the affections of the mind. He says little of their use, and in the declension of verbs speaks of only five,—the indicative (*finitivus*), the imperative, the optative, the subjunctive, and the infinitive. In the chapter upon conjunctions he divides them into different classes, and mentions those which are joined to the indicative, and those which are joined to the subjunctive forms of verb.

He, moreover, mentions that a conjunction bears a different signification, according to the mood with which it is joined. Thus in the case of *cum* : “ *Cum* jungitur modo finitivis, modo subjunctivis ;—sed interest utrum finitivis, an subjunctivis jungatur. Finitivis enim jungitur, quotiens ad id tempus quo agebam refertur. *Cum* declamo, venit, id est, ipso tempore quo declamo. Subjunctivis vero, cum post factum aliquid significat, ut, *cum venisset, declamavi*, significat enim prius venisse et sic cœpisse declamare.”—*Sosip. Charis. Instit. Gram.* lib. 1. p. 200. Putsch. His opinion, however, is not always borne out by authority. He observes, “ *si* finitivis jungitur hoc modo quotiens res factas significat.” But this will not apply to such examples as the following : *Si impetro, quid alias malim quam hodie has fieri nuptias.*—*Ter. And.* 3. 2. 48.

Diomedes reckons five moods ; in which number, he says, almost all grammarians agree. Like Charisius, he too denominates one of them optative. In speaking of the subjunctive he says : “ Subjunctivus, sive adjunctivus, ideo dicitur quod non per se exprimat sensum, nisi insuper alius addatur sermo, quo superior patefiat. Subjungit enim sibi, vel subjungitur necessario alteri sermoni, hoc modo,—*cum dixero, audies.*” But as this sentence does not contain a subjunctive

mood, no argument can be founded upon it. His remarks upon the conjunctions are only a transcript of those of Charisius, the same expressions and the same quotations being used.

Linacer, *De Emend. Struct.* lib. 5. p. 145, confutes the position of Diomedes in regard to *si*, and his remarks of course apply equally to Charisius. “De *si* Diomedes præcepit diminute*, ut arbitror, non secus ac de *cum*, quippe quo auctore finitivis jungitur quoties res facta significatur, ut Cic. *Si illustrantur, si erumpunt omnia*. Nec enim dubitat, an illustrentur, sed quia illustrantur, suadet ut mutet Catilina mentem. Et Virgilius, *Si te fata vocant*; item, *Si potuit manes arcessere conjugis Orpheus*. Affirmat enim potuisse. Subjunctivis vero quoties conditionalis et incertus est sermo, veluti *si facias, si faceres*. Qui enim sic loquitur non factum interim declarat. Sic Diomedes. Ego tamen finitivis junctam in conditione subinde lego, ut Ter. *Si illum relinquo, ejus vitæ timeo, sin opitutor, hujus minas*. Idem, *Pamphile, si id facis, hodie me postremum vides*. Sallust. *Equidem ego regnum trado firmum, si boni eritis; si mali, imbecillum*. Num igitur ita potius præcipiendum? Cum res facta significatur, finitivis adjici, ut in memoratis exemplis. Cum potentialis in apodosi, id est

* Linacer uses the word “diminute:” I never met with it in any Latin author, and I cannot find it mentioned by any Lexicographer.

reddita ejus subjicitur, potentiali vel subjunctivo jungitur.” And after several examples he proceeds: “Aliter vero, nisi pro *quavis* accipiatur, finitivis, subjunctivisque indifferenter, idque merito cum duarum Græcarum *εἰ* et *ἐάν* apud nos locum expleat, quarum altera sæpe finitivis, altera subjunctivis astruitur.”

The opinions of these grammarians are directly opposed to each other. That both have mistaken the principle of the Latin mood will be shown in the sequel; for it is not to be supposed that the Latins used the indicative and subjunctive forms of the verb indifferently. It is, indeed, surprising how such an idea could have entered the mind of so critical a scholar as Linacer. It would have been more candid in him to confess that he could not discover the principle upon which, in certain cases, the moods were used. I do not deny that *si*, bearing precisely the same meaning, is joined by the Latins to the indicative and subjunctive moods. On the contrary, I maintain that it is, and that the same is the case with other conjunctions. But the point for which Linacer contends is this, that the use of moods depends upon the meaning of conjunctions; and yet he admits, that in many cases the moods are used indifferently. This doctrine, however, I deny. Linacer's admission “that the moods in many cases are

used indifferently," is sufficient to overthrow his theory, and should incline us to build upon a more solid foundation than the varying and uncertain meanings of particles.

Servius, Cledonius, and a host of grammarians follow Diomedes ; but their treatises contain nothing upon the subject, or are only a repetition of what had been more fully expressed by previous writers.

Alcvinus, or Albinus, says, that the subjunctive mood requires not only an adverb or conjunction, but also another verb, that it may convey a perfect sense. His treatise is remarkable for an absence of the common error, that conjunctions govern moods. He divides them into five "species," according to Donatus, and remarks afterwards "*fiunt et adjunctivæ, cum verbis subjunctivis adjunguntur, ut si, cum, ut, dum, quatenus.*" His work contains no rules respecting the use of the moods.

We now advance upon an age fruitful in philologists. The first whom I shall mention, though not the first in order, is the very learned Vossius. His treatise *Aristarchus* is an epitome of the writings of all preceding grammarians, enriched by his own luminous and valuable observations. He never subscribes to the opinion of any writer, however high the authority may be ; but first forms his own judgment

upon a careful examination of the purest Roman writers, and then supports it by powerful and convincing reasons. Yet he seems to have entertained no clear notions respecting the use of the subjunctive mood. He tacitly admits his ignorance of the subject, when, on the one hand, he declares that he cannot subscribe to the doctrine of Sanctius in rejecting moods ; and, on the other, asserts, in accordance with Grosippus, that the Romans appear to have often employed the indicative and subjunctive indifferently. “ De modo etsi non possim subscribere Sanctio Brocensi, juxta quem, *qui finxere modos ratione modoque carebant; etsi etiam non diffitear sæpe promiscuum esse indicativi et subjunctivi usum, quod magna serie exemplorum luculente Grosippus comprobavit, longeque majori evincere possumus ; tamen neutiquam junioribus, veteribus longe minus, in eo assentior, quod tantam nobis peperint modorum copiam.*”—*De Analog.* lib. 3. cap. 8. He very properly limits the number of moods to three. The first of these, he observes, is called by Varro “ ro-gandi ac respondendi species ;” and by Quintilian, “ modus fatendi.” It escaped his observation that Varro had designated this mood by the same name as Quintilian*.

* In accounting for the different number of tenses of which different moods consist, Varro observes, “ Si enim natura non omnes formæ verborum terna habeant tempora, ternas personas : non habent totidem verborum divisiones ; quare cum imperamus naturæ,

Of the construction of the subjunctive mood Vossius says nothing. In speaking of conjunctions, Vossius declares that for which I contend, namely, that they have no regimen. "In conjunctione regimen nullum, sed sola convenientia attenditur." In enumerating the different conjunctions he shows, that, with scarcely a single exception, they are joined to verbs of both the indicative and subjunctive moods;—thus affording us his most powerful testimony, that moods cannot be under the government of conjunctions. It appears to me, that he has studiously avoided grappling with the use of the subjunctive: for though he is copious and accurate in treating every other point of grammar, he has omitted to notice this. His observations justify a belief, that he dissented from the doctrines of other writers, but at the same time felt unequal to propose any system satisfactory to himself.

As Sanctius carried his love of novelty so far as to reject all moods, we must not expect that his *Minerva* will afford us any information on the

quod infecta solum habet, cum et præsentī et absenti imperamus, fiunt terna, ut *lege, legito, legat*; perfectum enim imperat nemo. Contra quæ sunt fatendī, ut *lego, legis, legit*, novena fiunt verba infecti, novena perfecti."—*Varro de Ling. Lat.* 8. *sub fin.* The three moods which he admits are, *modus fatendī*, otherwise called *species rogandī ac respondendī*,—*imperativus*,—et *subjunctivus*, under which he includes the potential and optative. That these are really the same mood will be shown in the following chapter.

subject. And though his learned commentator Perizonius maintains the more general and correct opinion that there is a diversity of moods, it does not fall within the scope of his observations to give any definite rules for their use. As far, however, as I am able to collect from his general remarks, it appears, that he considers verbs of the subjunctive form to depend upon conjunctions; though he admits that the same conjunctions, conveying the same meaning, are joined to different moods*.

The next philologist, and one whose work merits our attention, is the very acute and learned G. H. Ursinus. He treats fully of every subject connected with the construction of the Latin language, but his observations upon the subjunctive mood are indefinite and unsatisfactory. He, like his predecessor Vossius, tacitly admits that the doctrine is involved in great obscurity; an obscurity which his remarks tend rather to increase than dispel. “ 1. Certis igitur rebus quoque indicandis inservit quidem aliquando subjunctivus: at incertis de rebus cum sermo est, vix locus esse

* Sanctius may be quoted to the same effect; for his rejection of moods in reality extends only to the name, and to the notion that they were used by the Latins to express different feelings and affections of the mind. He divides verbs into first and second tenses, and says that the same conjunctions are joined to each of these classes.

nisi subjunctivo potest. 2. Videas tamen non raro indifferenter indicativo ac subjunctivo usos, præsertim vetustiores.—Quæ ad quatuor genera revocare licuerit, &c.”—*Ursin. G. H. Plen. Instit. Lat. Ling.* sect. 5. cap. 8. The chapter upon conjunctions supplies us with no rules more definite in their character. Numerous examples are adduced from various authors, to show the different meanings that are to be attached to the same conjunctions. This collection appears to be valuable, principally, because it furnishes conclusive evidence against the use of the subjunctive depending upon the meaning to be assigned to conjunctions.

Pompeius*, though he mistakes the modal character of a tense, expresses himself in regard to the subjunctive mood in terms to which I readily subscribe. The law which he lays down should be well remembered, as it will afford no small degree of assistance towards ascertaining the truth of the doctrine, which it is my business to establish. This points to a right path, while the rules of others lead astray: “Conjunctivus modus sine indicativo nunquam profertur.”

The age at which we have now arrived was distinguished for philologists, who were not con-

* *Pompeii Commentum Artis Donati, &c. edidit Fridericus Lindemann, Lipsiæ 1820.*

tent to follow blindly in the beaten track of their predecessors. They examined for themselves, and followed only where the authority of Roman writers directed them. Among these, our own countryman R. Johnson deserves to be particularized. His *Commentaries* are distinguished for soundness of reasoning and originality of conception ; and his definition of a verb, though not free from objection, gives a more correct insight into its nature than is to be obtained from the writings of others : “ A verb is that part of speech by which something is applied to another as its subject.” This definition may stand for the logical verb or copula, but the grammatical verb contains something more, being of a mixed nature, as we shall have occasion to show in the succeeding chapter. Notwithstanding, however, the general correctness of his views, he is in error respecting the use of the subjunctive. A single example will justify this observation. Arguing against Sanctius’s rejection of moods, and his division of tenses into first and second, he observes, “ the reason they bring for it will not bear the weight they lay upon it, namely, that these words may be used promiscuously. For that they cannot be upon all occasions, and that they can be upon some, is no better reason against difference of moods, than it is against

difference of tenses that the use of some of them also in some cases is promiscuous. And though in conjunctive sentences it may be said indifferently,—for instance *Istum Phædriam dico qui amat Thaidem*, or *qui amet*,—yet this does not prove that the indicative and subjunctive moods in Latin are not different, which it is plain they are in the first instance, but that in some cases they are indifferent.”—*Grammatical Commentaries, Animadversion*, 105. This is a position which I am convinced is untenable. The moods are never used indifferently, and no authority can be produced from Cicero for such Latin as *Istum Phædriam dico, qui amet Thaidem*. The relative clause in the example before us can be used only to define more accurately the antecedent to which it refers; and in all such cases the verb of the clause must be in the indicative mood, unless the subjunctive mood be required from the circumstance of the sentence being what is called oblique. The reason why the subjunctive mood is used in oblique sentences will be shown hereafter. *Istum Phædriam dico, qui amet Thaidem*, offends against the law which calls for the indicative. There is nothing in the principle of the subjunctive to require its use here, and therefore as a Latin sentence the words convey no meaning. The Romans employed the different modal in-

flexions of their verbs consistently : and if we admit this to be the fact, we must not expect any sound information in Johnson's *Commentaries* respecting the principle upon which the subjunctive mood was used.

There remain only two grammarians of note whose works I have been enabled to examine. They are both of more modern date, and belong to that country to which we are indebted for the best grammars, and the greatest number of valuable works upon philological subjects. The grammars in common use in England are without any exception singularly defective ; while the intrinsic merit of those which are imported from our German neighbours obtains for them that high esteem in which they are justly held. But though we must concede the palm of superiority to German grammars in general, they do not afford us clearer conceptions of the use of the subjunctive mood than the works of our own critics. Upon this difficult subject, we do not find in them that critical discrimination and useful information with which the profound learning of Parr, the acute penetration of Copleston, and the varied research of Crombie have furnished us. The latter, especially, in his most useful work the *Gymnasium*, has digested a body of rules, which in most cases will direct the student aright in the choice

of moods. The learned author has done more for the Latin student than any other writer, having placed within his reach advantages for the prosecution of his classical studies, which no other work of the kind furnishes. The *Gymnasium* contains not only an ample and valuable fund of original remarks, but also the opinions of almost every critic of note, upon the most abstruse and difficult points of the Latin language. I shall not enter in the present chapter upon the systems which have been proposed by these learned men for the use of the subjunctive mood ; it being my intention in the course of the following pages to examine in detail the various authorities which they have adduced in support of their several opinions.

Scheller, in his valuable work *Præcepta Styli bene Latini*, treats of the subjunctive mood more systematically and satisfactorily than any preceding writer. His directions will seldom lead the student astray, though they may not give him that clear view of his subject which he requires. The learned author's ideas respecting the subjunctive, may be gathered from a sort of negative law respecting the use of the indicative : " Indicativus ponitur, ubi vel de re certa simpliciter dicitur, vel nulla particula subjunctivum regens præcedit, vel alia contextus

ratio hunc modum non postulat.”—*Scheller, Præcept.* Pars I. cap. 2. sect. 17. His directions for the use of the subjunctive, which are numerous, may be said to be founded on this double basis,—the sense in which the verb is to be understood,—and the meaning of the connecting particle with which it is used.

Each of these methods is uncertain, and frequently gives rise to a fanciful interpretation of an author. All rules, indeed, which are founded upon the precise and accurate meanings of particles must be vague and unsatisfactory: they leave too much to the student's imagination, and even call upon him to decide upon minute matters of taste, before he can have acquired that critical knowledge and experience, which is necessary for a nice discrimination of the tints and shades which particles receive from being compounded with other words in a sentence. With regard to the accurate meanings of words, learned critics themselves frequently differ; and numerous passages may be adduced from the purest Latin authors, in which conjunctions, bearing precisely the same meaning, are connected with verbs in both the indicative and subjunctive moods. But Scheller has made one observation upon the subject, of greater value than the rest united;—of greater value, indeed, than the

learned author himself was aware. Had he seen the extent of its application, he would have availed himself of it to have established a sound but simple theory for the use of the subjunctive. "*Qui, quæ, quod*, de quo in libellis grammaticis vulgo parum accurate traditur, et cujus tamen usus in primis ob brevitatem commendandus est, sæpissime conjunctivum postulat; post *esse, reperiri, inveniri*, et similia, si hæc verba prædicati personam induunt, atque ita *quod qui* cum sua enunciatione subjecti vim habet; v. c. *Est, qui dicat*, rectius esse creditur quam *dicat**."

As we proceed, we find the rules, which have been framed to determine when the subjunctive form of verb is required, more definite, but more numerous. In the very excellent grammar of Zumpt†, equal, if not superior, to every other, they amount nominally to fifteen. But this number is considerably increased by many subdivisions. The rule, for instance, to determine when the subjunctive is to follow the relative, is divided into eleven parts; and separate rules are also given for different conjunc-

* *Est, qui dicat*, and *est, qui dicit* are equally correct Latin, though they bear different significations. The former expression means, "there is some one who says," equivalent to "some person says;"—the latter signifies, "the man who says is."

† I am not in possession of the original work. The following extracts are made from the second edition of Kenrick's translation.

tions, the mood being asserted to vary according to the sense in which the conjunction is to be understood. Comprehensive as these rules are, their value is considerably diminished by such qualifications as the following : “ they are *commonly* followed by a subjunctive,”—“ with the present and perfect the indicative and subjunctive are equally used.” The absence of positive rules to guide the student will be apparent from the following extract : “ The chief source of the difficulty of laying down a rule to determine when the indicative is to be used and when the subjunctive, after contingent and hypothetical particles, is, that events really contingent are sometimes represented as actual, in the same way as future events are spoken of as present. No ambiguity can arise from this, when the contingent nature of the event is already marked by the hypothetical particle, the use of the subjunctive doubly expresses this contingency ; which, however, is sufficiently understood from the indicative. There is, therefore, no essential difference between the indicative and the subjunctive in such constructions ; they vary only by a shade of meaning, which the mind throws at pleasure, as the idea of contingency is more or less strongly present. *Hence the impossibility of laying down any rules to determine when the one or the other should be*

used.” What the learned grammarian wishes to impress upon students I am really at a loss to divine. If I rightly understand the meaning of the Latin subjunctive mood, there is nothing in it which *per se* expresses contingency; and, at the same time, it is in its character and use as distinct from the indicative as it is possible to conceive. In this point I am at issue with the learned grammarian. If my view of the matter is correct, a Latin would as soon have thought of using the genitive and dative cases indifferently, as he would the indicative and subjunctive moods.

I have now reviewed the different opinions which the most eminent writers have held respecting the use of the subjunctive; and the conclusion to which I am necessarily led is,—that no critic or grammarian has laid down any certain and definite rules upon the subject. The difficulty which exists in regard to this obscure point of grammar arises, I am persuaded, not from any changeableness or want of uniformity in the Latin use of the mood, but solely from our want of acquaintance with the principle upon which that use was regulated*.

* The reasoning of Varro in favour of analogy in the Latin language may fairly be used to prove that some known principle regulated the use of the *moods*. “Cum (inquit aliquis) utilitatis causa introducta est oratio, sequendum non quæ habet similitudinem, sed quæ utilitatem. Ego, quidem, utilitatis causa orationem factam

Whether I have succeeded in reducing the cases in which we meet with the subjunctive form of the verb to a general principle, and in establishing the doctrine which I propound, must be determined by others. If my research has failed, I have at least the satisfaction of knowing that I am not singular in my failure. If in deviating from the common track, and forming a new path for myself, I am still in error, I must console myself with the reflection, that I have failed in the discovery of *that* which has baffled the research of the most learned. If, however, I have succeeded in tracing this up to its first spring and source, I shall derive no small degree of satisfac-

esse concedo, sed ut vestimenta. Quare ut hic similitudines sequemur, ut virilis tunica virili similis, item toga togæ: sic stola stolæ, proportione, pallium pallio simili."—*Varro de Ling. Lat.* 8. p. 109. Analogy would be destroyed if particles govern moods; for the same particle at one time would govern one mood, and at another a different. It is nothing to the purpose to say, that these connecting particles bear different meanings, and that they govern moods according to their signification. The analogy for which Varro contends would be destroyed. Conjunctions and other connecting particles are the ligaments by which the several members of a sentence are attached to each other. They exercise this force, and no other. They possess no magic power, no spell or enchantment to convert an indicative into a subjunctive, or a subjunctive into an indicative. To discover the real use of the subjunctive, a number of sentences in which the verb appears in the subjunctive form should be analysed, and the several parts be examined in their simple uncompound state. Experiments of this sort frequently repeated would discover the first principles of the subjunctive mood, and justify general conclusions explanatory of its object and use.

tion from having resolved a most difficult question, and having removed one of the greatest obstacles to the Latin student's progress. A path, it is hoped, will thus be opened for him through what critics and grammarians have considered and acknowledged to be a perplexing labyrinth.

CHAPTER II.

POTENTIAL MOOD.

BEFORE I proceed to explain the use which the Latins made of the subjunctive form of verb, it will be necessary to inquire into the nature and number of moods in general. My object in entering upon the inquiry is, as well to guard myself against being misunderstood, if I should speak of a verb in a particular mood, when in reality the mood does not exist ; as to show the harmony which runs through verbs of the same modal inflexion. It may happen, for instance, that according to the phraseology which commonly passes, I may speak of the potential or infinitive mood ; though the former would be more appropriately designated *subjunctive*, and the latter has, in reality, no existence at all. Again : I may fairly assume it to be a powerful argument in favour of the doctrine which it is my object to establish, if I show that it reduces verbs of the same modal inflexion to the same government and principle. Various definitions of moods have been proposed by different grammarians, but they may be all classed under two heads ; being founded either upon the form of inflexion, or the signifi-

cation which they are supposed to bear. This discrepancy of opinion induced the learned Sanctius to reject moods altogether, and to class the different forms of a verb under first and second tenses. He considered these to be expressive of the different modifications of an action, according to the different times of which it was predicated. That moods are not an essential property of verbs, is evident from the circumstance of languages existing without them. There is, indeed, nothing in the nature of a verb to require them. Aristotle confines the parts of speech to two,—noun and verb; these alone being necessary to constitute a perfect sentence. The reason assigned by Quintilian for this is, “*alterum est quod loquimur, alterum de quo loquimur.*” But assuming the parts of speech in the Latin language to be eight, we may define a verb to be, *a part of speech which predicates an act or state of its subject.* It is necessarily of a mixed nature*, inasmuch as it exer-

* “A verb (all except the substantive verb used as the copula) is a *mixed* word, being resolvable into the copula and predicate, to which it is equivalent; and indeed is often so resolved in the mere rendering out of one language into another; as “*ipse adest,*” “he is present.” It is to be observed, however, that under “verb” we do not include the infinitive, which is properly a noun-substantive, nor the participle, which is a noun-adjective. They are *verbals*; being related to their respective verbs in respect of *the things they signify*: but not *verbs*, inasmuch as they differ entirely in their *mode of signification.*”—Elements of Logic by Richard Whately, D.D. &c.

cises a double office. It expresses an act or state, and predicates the same of its subject.

This definition, I am aware, does not include that which is called the substantive verb, *sum, es, est*, unless where it is used to signify existence. When it is employed as the word *by which* the predicate is said of its subject, it is in reality a different part of speech. It differs as much from a grammatical verb as does a participle. This distinction is overlooked in grammars; though on various accounts it deserves to be noticed*. One grand

chap. ii. part 1. sect. 3. A participle is, in the acceptation of Dr. Whately, a *noun-adjective*, i. e. in a logical sense; for, equally with a grammatical adjective, it cannot of itself be the subject of a proposition. The difference between a grammatical adjective and participle is shown in this chapter. An infinitive can be the subject of a proposition, but cannot be the whole predicate, unless another infinitive is the subject.

* Ursinus (Geo. Henr.), whose views upon the subject of grammar appear to be generally correct, expresses his approbation of a distinction between the substantive verb and other grammatical verbs, similar to that for which I am contending; though I cannot agree with him that it is of small consequence and use in grammar. "Ex dictis patet non improbari adeo a nobis divisionem verbi, quam auctor methodi, et ex ipso alii tradunt, in verbum substantivum et adjectivum: ex quibus substantivum simplicem notet affirmationem sive existentiam rei, ut *sum, fio*: adjectivum huic aliam superaddat sibi propriam, ut *amo*, quod idem atque *amans sum*; *curro*, quod *currens sum*. Sed quoniam divisio hæc exigui in grammatica usus est, magisque adeo logica, quam grammatica; præterea propter receptam in nomine substantivi et adjectivi appellationem ambiguitate sua, aut certe insolentia non caret, turbatque tenera discentium, ingenia, satius mihi videtur, usitatum quidem substantivorum nomen verbis, *sum, forem, fio*, relinquere, cætera autem verba, ut

and important reason will be evident from the sequel; for, if I mistake not, the whole doctrine of the subjunctive mood hinges upon it. The logical copula, or substantive verb, is a pure and distinct part of speech. It is neither “quod loquimur,” nor “id de quo loquimur,” but that by which the predicate is said of its subject*. R. Johnson, in his Grammatical Commentaries, has omitted to mark this distinction. His definition of a verb, if accurately considered, applies only to the co-

vulgo fit, in ordines quæque suos dispertiri.”—*Ursini Pleniss. Instit. Lat. Ling. sect. v. cap. 1. p. 403.* He had before this remarked, “Sunt, qui unicum principium caput et fontem verborum quorumvis agnoscunt solum verbum *sum*.” This work of Ursinus deserves to be much better known, than the extreme scarcity of the book will admit. It was some months before I could succeed in obtaining sight of a copy. Mr. Bohn of Henrietta Street made every inquiry for it in vain. There does not exist a copy in the British Museum. Having, at last, been informed that Dr. Parr’s copy was in the possession of E. H. Barker, Esq. of Thetford, I made application to him, and I beg thus publicly to express to that gentleman my sincere thanks for his kindness in lending me that and other rare books; and also for his offer of any which his extensive library might contain.

In regard to the last quotation which I have made, I may remark, that, if Ursinus had been acquainted with the true principle of the subjunctive mood, he would have written *agnoscant*, and not *agnoscunt*.

* The difference between the pure copula and the verb of existence, in Greek, is marked by the accent, the former being *ἴστι* or *ἰστι*, the latter *ἔστι*. “Verbum *ἰστι* enim duas habet significationes, unam, quæ simpliciter copulæ, quam Logici vocant, munere fungitur, et prædicati alicujus accessionem requirit, ut τοῦτο ἰστι ἀληθές. alteram quæ ipsa in se conclusum habet prædicatum, ut *ἔστι* Σιδῶς.”—*Hermann. De Emend. Rat. Gr. Gram. cap. xxiii. p. 84.*

pula; "A verb is a part of speech by which something is applied to another as to its subject." It is not sufficiently clear from this definition, that a grammatical verb not only expresses the thing that is applied to the subject, but is also the means by which the application is made. It differs from a participle in no other respect than that it is the means by which an act or state* is predicated of its subject.

The distinction between a participle and an adjective is worthy of being noticed: as it will

* I question much, whether a verb ever predicates a *quality* of its subject, and, consequently, I doubt whether it is ever resolvable into an *adjective* and copula. Dr. Whately says, all verbs (excepting the copula) "are resolvable by means of the verb 'to be,' and a participle or adjective: *e. g.* 'the Romans conquered:' the word 'conquered' is both copula and predicate, being equivalent to '*were* (cop.) *victorious* (pred.)'"—*Elements of Logic*, chap. ii. part 1. sect. 2. The more true logical division of the proposition is, "the Romans are persons having conquered." In common parlance "victorious" is synonymous with "conquering." Johnson gives three meanings to the word, and each of them is expressed by a participle. 1. Conquering; having obtained conquest; superior in contest (*an adj.*). 2. Producing conquest. 3. Betokening conquest. This explanation is admissible, and perhaps from the poverty of language even necessary, in a dictionary; but in a treatise upon logic, every approach to looseness of expression should be avoided. It is, however, with the greatest diffidence that I presume to remark, in any terms but those of the highest admiration, upon the unequalled treatise in which the passage occurs. A grammatical adjective, properly speaking, signifies an immanent quality only of its subject, without reference to any act, energy (*τὸ ενεργεῖν*), or suffering, and also without reference to time. A participle expresses an act or state, either progressive or perfect, of its subject, and is always significant

assist us in obtaining a clearer insight into the nature of verbs. A participle signifies an act or state in relation to some subject, and is expressive of time: an adjective denotes some immanent quality or property necessarily or accidentally belonging to some subject, without any regard to time. The former, by consequence, must *per se* be expressive of time; and if a language were complete in all its parts, it would contain participles significant of an act or state of time. The difference between the two is not so clearly perceived in imperfect sentences, and the distinction, moreover, is somewhat obscured by the looseness of conversational diction. "Conquered" is not logically resolvable into "were victorious;" for "were" is not the copula. It conveys with it the idea of time, to which the copula has no relation. The idea of time is inseparable from a verb; so that when it is resolved by means of the copula and another part of speech, the idea of time must continue with that part of speech. I affirm, therefore, that the verb is never resolvable into the copula and the grammatical adjective. Latin neuter passive verbs are frequently translated into English as though they were so resolvable; but this is a loose method of giving an author's meaning. Those Latin words which end in "*ans*" or "*ens*," and which are frequently called in dictionaries adjectives, (I do not include such words as are compounded of nouns, as "*amens*," "*demens*," &c.) are really participles, and signify an acting, state, or suffering, of the subjects to which they are applied; and if we study their close meaning, they never signify the simple immanent quality, but the active exercise (*τὸ ἐνεργεῖν*). Thus *prudens vir* is properly, one who exercises that power of intelligence by which he foresees, *quasi providens*, from which, no doubt, by an easy transition it was formed. "*Prudens, qui intelligentiâ suâ aliquid sentit*"—"Sciens, qui aliquis indicio rem cognoscit" (Donatus), i. e. *becomes* acquainted with. Lastly, a participle is equivalent to, and may be expressed by the pronoun relative and verb; the adjective never can.

both progressive and perfect. The latter has nothing in itself which conveys an idea of time. In one respect they agree, namely, that when they are joined to their subjects they express the same operation of the mind. *Homo ambulans*,—*campus arenosus*, express each “a simple apprehension,” or conception of an object in the mind. A grammatical verb, however, when joined to its subject, by consequence of its mixed nature, expresses “a judgment,” or the mind’s decision upon the applicability or non-applicability of a predicate to its subject.

Now it is easy to conceive, that the Latins in framing their language would, for the sake of perspicuity, give such different terminations to their verbs as would mark whether the subject of which the verb predicated, were the party speaking, the party spoken to, or the person or thing spoken of. This doubtless was the origin of the particular inflexion which marks what in grammar is called “persons.” The idea of number might also suggest another form of inflexion. The same may be said respecting the different divisions of time in relation to which a verb might predicate. Another form might be adopted, to mark whether the act or state were progressive or perfect. Varro speaks of this division as between “*res infecta*” and “*res perfecta*.” The com-

bination of these different modifications of an action has produced the inflexions which mark number, person, and tense. There can be little doubt, that the various terminations, which we find in the Latin verb, were originally suffixes*, indicative of the different modifications which I have mentioned. They are not essen-

* "Nothing, I conceive, can be more evident, than that the inflexions of nouns and verbs, how inexplicable soever they may now prove, were not originally the result of systematic art, but were separate terms, significant of the circumstances intended, and afterwards, by celerity of pronunciation, coalesced with the words of which they now form the termination."—*Crombie's Etymology*. That this was the case in verbs, is not only conceivable, but highly probable; but in nouns the terminations of the same case and number are, I think, too various to admit of such an hypothesis. This, however, is not the case in verbs. Yet against the supposition in regard to verbs, it has been asked,—if the pronoun *ego* be suffixed to the verb, why do not all the tenses of the first person singular end in *o*. Dr. Crombie endeavours to remove this objection by remarking, that the Latin language appears to be a commixture of Greek and one of the northern languages; and that this commixture will account for the first person singular sometimes ending in *o*, in imitation of the Greeks, and at other times in *m*, in imitation of the Celts. That this may be the case I cannot take upon myself to deny; but, in my opinion, the variation may be accounted for more satisfactorily, by the supposition that the suffixes of all the tenses, except the present indicative, were originally compound words, significant of time, and other ideas, as well as person. Analogy seems to favour this hypothesis; for the tenses which speak of the *res infecta* and the *res perfecta* in regard to present time, terminate in a vowel, the present in *o*, the perfect in *i*. The tenses of past time end in a consonant, *m*; the one in *abam* or *ebam*, the other in *eram*. The tenses in regard to future time ended originally in a vowel *o*, being *bo* and *ero*. There is little doubt, that all the futures of imperfect action ended in *bo*, though afterwards in the two last conjugations they became changed into *am*. The analogy might be pursued

tial properties of verbs, for every language does not possess all these different forms of inflexion; but they conduce to perspicuity. Arguing then from analogy, we are bound to conclude that the particular inflexion which I have not described, and which we designate by the term "moods," is intended to mark some distinct property *necessarily* or *accidentally* belonging to verbs.

That this property is not necessary, may be inferred from the fact, that some languages do not require this particular inflexion. But our business is, not to inquire in what manner it was possible for a Latin to express his thoughts, but to take the language as it is, to consider what forms of expression exist, and to discover their object and use. Language is undoubtedly antecedent to grammar. It is, therefore, the business of a grammarian to consider language as it exists, to endeavour to reduce it to general principles, and to lay down rules which shall be applicable to the forms of expression that usage has established*.

further. The second persons singular and plural in the active voice, and the singular of the passive voice end in *s*. The third person in like manner, in *t* active, or *r* passive, &c. The uniformity is too striking not to lead to the conclusion, that the suffixes originally were words which expressed the modifications of person, time, &c.

* "The grammar of every language is merely a compilation of those general principles or rules, agreeably to which that language is spoken. When I say a compilation of rules, I would not be understood to mean, that the rules are first established, and the lan-

Now, since we find the Latin verb exhibiting a form of inflexion, besides the varieties which mark a difference in person, number, time, and progressive or perfect action, we are bound to ascribe to it a particular use, and to assign it a distinctive appellation. The learned Sanctius, therefore, is not justified in excluding moods from the Latin language. The reason which he assigns for thus differing from other grammarians is futile. “*Modus non attingit verbi naturam, ideo verborum attributum non est.*” In other words, Moods are not necessarily a property of verbs, therefore they are not to be considered as existing in the Latin language. The same argument would apply with equal force against the existence of tenses; for the Latins might have expressed the different times of an action by the aid of separate words. The subject is placed in a better point of view by his annotator, Perizonius. “*Atqui eodem plane modo se habent modi in verbis, quo casus in no-*

guage afterwards modelled to these: the very reverse is the fact; language is antecedent to grammar. Words are framed and combined to express sentiment before the grammarian can enter on his province. His whole business is, not to dictate forms of speech or to prescribe law to our modes of expression; but, by observing the modes previously established, by remarking the similarities and dissimilarities, his province is to deduce and explain the general principles and the particular forms, agreeably to which the speakers of that language express themselves.”—*Crombie's Etymology and Syntax.*

minibus. Utrique consistunt in diversis terminationibus pro diversitate constructionis. Utrique ab illa terminationum diversa forma nomen suum acceperere, ut illi dicantur terminationum varii *casus*, hi *modi*. Denique utrorumque terminationes singulares appellantur a potissimo earum usu, non unico, veluti *Nominativus*, *Genitivus*, &c. tum *Indicativus*, &c. Neque vero *modorum* in verbis appellatio ad significationem refertur, ut per quos significetur, quo modo quidque quod singulis verbis denotatur, factum sit, quod sane, ut vult et incassum monet Sanctius per adverbia, vel etiam per sextum casum nominum, explicari debet ; sed ad rationem variarum terminationum diverso modo diversis elocutionibus et constructionibus aptandarum refertur.”

This will assist us in determining the number of moods ; for it is evident that the term should be confined to the modal inflexion of verbs. There are grammarians, however, who do not admit of this as their guide, and define “moods” to be different inflexions of verbs indicative of different affections of the mind. It is not surprising that they, who thus interpret “moods,” should disagree about the number. They may be as numerous* as the affections themselves ;

* Ursinus, sect. v. cap. vii. p. 543. “Nam si verbi finiti tot sint modi statuendi, quot animi dantur affectiones, quibus ad loquendum impellimur, jam et interrogativus, sive percontativus, item

and there is no more reason for excluding the *modus precativus* or *modus concessivus*, than there would be for rejecting the *modus indicativus*. But assuming the modal variation to be the only sure criterion, we may declare, that the Latin language contains only three moods. 1st, *Modus indicativus*, called by Varro and Quintilian, *faten-dus* ; by Probus and Donatus, *pronunciativus* ; by Diomedes, *finitivus* ; by Priscian, *definitivus*. 2nd, *Modus imperativus*, including that called by some grammarians *precativus*. 3rd, *Modus subjunctivus*, called by Diomedes and Probus, *adjunctivus* ; and by other writers, *conjunctivus*. In this mood is comprised that which Varro and others called *optativus* ; Linacer and later writers, *potentialis**.

promissivus, et hortativus, item precativus, et forte potentialis, ac permissivus, sive concessivus modus, reliquis communi sententia receptis, fuerint addendi. Præterea, si particulæ *utinam*, *o*, *si* verbo præfixæ, modum ejus mutant, ergo et *cum* et *quomvis* et *ut* aliaque eidem additæ diversos efficient modos. Id quod ἄπορον. Omnino igitur ad diversum constituendum modum diversitas terminationis, sive diversa inflectendi ratio, præter diversam animi explicandi rationem requiritur.”

* The infinitive is no mood, for indeed it is not a verb. It is properly, as Priscian informs us it was anciently called, *nomen verbi*. It is devoid of that necessary and essential part of a verb, the copula. Hence it is, that the infinitive, when joined to a subject, cannot express a judgment; *te legere* is not a proposition, but a complex noun, equivalent to *tua lectio*. It certainly signifies an action, but it neither affirms nor denies it of the subject in relation to which it is spoken. It may also signify an action, progressive or perfect, and in relation to the different divisions of time; but this

As an authority for this division of moods, I shall adduce Varro. I do this the more readily, because his authority is entitled to great weight, and I have not discovered any writer who has quoted him in favour of the point. He says of verbs, that there are six "*species declinatum*;" in other words, six forms of inflexion. The first, that which arises from time, called *temporalis*, as *legebam*, *lego*. The second, that arising from persons, *personalis*, as *sero*, *seris*. The third, that which is used in interrogations, *rogandi*, as *scribone*. The fourth, of answering, *respondendi*, as *tingo*. The fifth, of wishing, *optandi*, as *dicerem*. The sixth, of commanding,

does not constitute it a verb; otherwise a participle would possess an equal claim to the appellation of verb. A participle is with great propriety called "part of a verb," and the infinitive should be designated by the same name. "If the expression with an attribute be sufficient to make a verb, the participle must be a verb too, because it signifies time also. But the essence of a verb consisting in predication, which is peculiar to it, and incommunicable to all other parts of speech, and these infinitives never predicating, they cannot be verbs. Again, the essence of a noun consisting in its so subsisting in the understanding as that it may be the subject of predication, and these infinitives being all capable of so subsisting, they must of necessity be nouns."—*R. Johnson's Gram. Commentaries*. The difference between infinitives and participles is analogous to that which subsists between nouns substantive and adjective. The infinitive may of itself be the subject of a proposition; the participle is a syncategorematic, requiring the addition of a noun in relation to which it is spoken, and without which it cannot be used as a *term*.

imperandi, as *cape*. After a few lines in regard to impersonal verbs, he adds, "Accedunt ad has species a copulis divisionum quadrinis ; ab infecti, et perfecti, ut *emo*, *edo* ; *emi*, *edi* : a semel et sæpius, ut *lego*, *scribo* ; *lectitavi*, *scriptitavi* ; faciendi et patiendi, ut *uro*, *ungo* ; *uror*, *ungor* : a singulari et multitudinis, ut *laudo*, *culpo* ; *laudamus*, *culpamus*." Now to compare this division of verbs given by Varro with that usually adopted in grammars ;—the first of Varro, combined* with the division into *infectum* and *perfectum*, constitutes the *tenses* of grammars ; the second, the *persons*. In the three last heads of the fourfold division we have, *numbers* of verbs, *voices*, and *frequentative* verbs. There remain, therefore, *the third*, *the fourth*, *the fifth*, and *the sixth species*. The third he calls *rogandi*, which is formed by adding *ne* to the verb. But as an interrogation was frequently made without the particle *ne*, and frequently the particle was separated from the verb, we are fully justified in including this form of inflexion under the fourth. In the preceding page he had called this species *fatendi*, the same word which Quintilian uses to designate one of the

* It seems to me desirable, that this combination should not take place, but that "tenses" should be spoken of as being three, and that a division of perfect and imperfect action should be mentioned separately.

moods,—*modus fatendus*. The species which remain, namely the fourth, fifth, and sixth, are those which are called, in modern grammars, *moods*.

From this review of Varro's opinion, I draw the following conclusions : 1st, That Varro speaks of all the inflexions of verbs which grammarians designate by the terms, *voice*, *number*, *person*, *tense*, *mood*.

2nd, That under this last head he speaks of only three, the *modus fatendus*, called by grammarians *indicativus* ; the *modus imperativus*, and the *modus optativus**, otherwise called *subjunctivus* or *potentialis*.

It is evident that Varro did not contemplate any difference such as later grammarians have devised, — a subjunctive mood differing from a potential ; for, in such case, he would have mentioned it and distinguished them, as grammarians do, the one by *utinam*, the other by *cum*. He did this in the case of the *species rogandi*, as *scribone*. The real number of moods, therefore, according to Varro, is three.

It matters little by what names they are designated. By the first mood, *indicativus*, is to

* This review of Varro confirms a former note, that the infinitive is not a verb, and therefore it is wrong to speak of an infinitive mood.

be understood that form of inflexion which is used in affirming, *fatendus*;—not, however, that the use of this mood is confined to what in strictness may be understood by the Latin word “fateor:” the second is *imperativus*, or the form commonly used in commanding, though the same may be employed in supplications: the third, *subjunctivus*, the reason for which appellation will be considered hereafter. By this latter is to be understood that form which is commonly used in expressing a wish.

Such is the evidence of Varro* respecting the nature and number of moods. Yet, notwithstanding this, it has always been a disputed point among grammarians, whether the potential and subjunctive moods are different or the same. The difficulty of deciding this question has arisen from the confessed ignorance of the principle which regulates the use of the subjunctive. If any fixed and determinate law had been known, it would have furnished an in-

* The view which I take of Varro's meaning renders it doubly to be lamented that we are unable to find in his work any information respecting the use of the “*species optandi* ;” for I entertain little doubt, that he would have explained its origin and principle. In the ninth book *De Ling. Lat.* he promised to treat fully of verbs in succeeding books, which, however, have been lost in the wreck of time. “*Hujus generis verborum, cujus species exposui, quam late quidque pateat, et cujusmodi efficiat figuras, in libris qui de formulis verborum erunt, diligentias expeditur.*”

fallible criterion for determining the character of the potential mood. If upon the application of this test the potential had been found to possess the same essential properties, the same discriminative characteristics, the identity would have been undisputed. This test, I trust, I shall be able to apply; and the result will prove that the potential and subjunctive moods are identical,—reducible to the same principle,—and answering the same end. In every case in which the *form* appears, it will be shown that the usage of the language, dictated by perspicuity, required that form and admitted of no other. It will still further be made evident, that the form, of itself, never conveys an idea of potentiality or contingency, but that it depends for these ideas upon an ellipsis. The law of perspicuity which regulated this ellipsis will be explained.

Objections, I am aware, have been raised against the supposition of an ellipsis in all cases where the subjunctive form is used, without any visible subjunction. But no single argument, as it appears to me, can be brought against the position, which will not bear with equal force against the elliptical use of the infinitive. In the majority of these latter cases the supply of the verb, which is omitted, is easily discover-

able : but in some instances it is not apparent ; the context affords the only clue to it. But any difficulty which may exist in discovering the verb, upon which the infinitive depends for its regimen, has never been held as an argument against the existence of an ellipsis. The use and construction of the infinitive are not involved in any obscurity. It possesses no property or power of predication, and therefore if it exist in a sentence without a verb, one must of necessity be supplied ; and in such case the context alone must dictate the supply.

Upon this principle I maintain that no argument against the elliptical use of the subjunctive form of a verb in a sentence, where potentiality or contingency is said to exist, can be raised upon the difficulty of supplying the ellipsis. The harshness, which appears when the ellipsis is supplied, arises principally from two causes. 1st, Our own language admitting, in such cases, the ellipsis of no other verb than one expressive of wish, and even then the conjunction being required to mark the ellipsis, we have no similar usage of our own to familiarize us to the Latin idiom, or to guide us in supplying the part which is omitted. 2ndly, If we express the sentence fully, we naturally alter the bearing of the whole, appending a weight and force to a

part which the author, in the construction of his sentence, never intended it to receive*. An ellipsis in the case of the potential mood may

* Ursinus argues against the supposition of an ellipsis existing in *all* cases where the potential mood is used, and no verb has been previously expressed upon which the potential clause is dependant. "Accedit singula ejusmodi supplendi difficultas. Unde fit, ut non ingrata solum auribus et molesta, languida et supina evadat oratio, quod quidem non adeo urgemus; utrumque enim a genuinis etiam supplementis contingere solet; sed distorta, etiam informis, superflua, imo absona quoque et a recta sententia devia. Quis porro tam incertam sæpe, et vagam, qualis Scioppii et erroribus adeo obnoxiam qualis utraque et hujus et Cl. Perizonii, supplendi rationem suspectam non habeat?"—*Ursin.* sect.v. cap.7. p.565. This extract contains the substance of his reasons for rejecting an ellipsis, as necessary in every case, where the potential mood is used without a dependance on some verb previously expressed. It must be remarked that Ursinus, notwithstanding these observations, does not object to an ellipsis existing in numerous instances. So far, indeed, is he from denying the doctrine altogether, that he gives a list of six classes of cases in which he admits an ellipsis. He appears to me to mistake the question. Our business is to inquire, not whether the sentence would be more or less elegant with the ellipsis supplied, but what is the proper construction of the parts of which it is composed. In many cases the supply would give it all the deformities which so much offended Ursinus' taste. Grant that it would be "monstrum, horrendum, informe, ingens," still the usage and construction of the language might require some clause, to which the potential mood was to be subjoined. Perhaps the very hideousness which shocked Ursinus might have suggested the ellipsis. An unwieldy body is not generally the strongest. A similar ellipsis exists in other languages where strength and energy are required. If we were to supply the ellipsis which often takes place in our own, we should frequently destroy the whole sense, or at least weaken the force materially. "O, that men would therefore praise the Lord for his goodness, and declare the wonders that he doeth for the children of men," would lose all its fire and spirit by a

therefore, I maintain, be inferred from a similar usage in regard to the infinitive.

The many cases in which the full construction is given, lead to the same conclusion. This,

commixture with some chilling clause, "How much it is to be wished." "O, how much it is to be wished, that men" &c. is frigid and nerveless. It frequently happens, that a sentence is indebted for its terseness and strength as much to an ellipsis as to the collocation of its words. Thus, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians" would be, perhaps, as much injured by the supply of "the Goddess," as by the transposition of its terms. There appears to me to have been manifestly a rule in Latin to determine whether an ellipsis should be used in the case of the potential mood or not. If the dependant clause in which the potential was employed contained the principal idea which the writer or speaker meant to express,—to which, therefore, his own attention was necessarily directed,—he introduced that idea to the reader or hearer, without distracting his attention by the circumlocution which the legitimate construction of the sentence required. The introduction of the real subject with the verb in the indicative would claim for itself a degree of importance to which the writer's aim did not entitle it, and therefore it was omitted. Perspicuity may be said to have dictated the omission: the insertion would have rendered the sentence according to Ursinus' description, "*distortam, etiam infor-mem, superfluum, imo absonam quoque et a recta sententia deviam.*" In no instance, I am inclined to think, was that, which I shall call the governing clause, in cases of *will, power, duty* and the like, inserted, unless it was the writer's principal object to predicate such circumstance of his subject. In reference to an observation of Scioppius, who remarks upon two examples, that "*dixerim*" is used for "*dicam*," Ursinus says with great justness, that it is one thing for a person to affirm definitely that he will say, which is the sense of the future indicative; and another to speak indefinitely, or with doubt, or upon some condition. He is, however, not willing to admit that this arises from an ellipsis, but is rather disposed to consider that the meaning is conveyed by the modal character of the verb.

E

again, is strengthened, by instances of the conjunction being used before the potential, evidently implying an ellipsis.

But the argument which, I think, carries with it more weight than all the rest, is this: If a verb in the indicative, or a clause containing the copula, is considered to be understood, where the potential mood is used; it will be found, that *all verbs having the same modal variation are under the same law,—one general principle regulating their use.* Thus, a perfect correspondence and harmony exists in the Latin verb; and that complete analogy, for which Varro and all sound grammarians contend, is shown to extend to the Latin mood no less than to the tenses, persons, and other properties of verbs.

The arguments which Dr. Crombie has brought forward upon this point are so well selected and so forcibly expressed, that I cannot forbear to give their substance in his own words.

“After having considered the subject with the greatest attention, it appears to me that the mood (potential) is strictly subjunctive, and that in all those cases where its signification is potential, it is by ellipsis, and not by its own proper power of expression. Of the two hypotheses, this, though not entirely free from objections, seems to me far the more probable, for the following reasons:—

“ 1st. Though it be perfectly conceivable, that the Latins might have framed a mood to express potentiality, it is not natural to suppose that they would have framed a mood which should perform the quadruple office of *power*, *liberty*, *will*, *duty*; nay, likewise, *entreaty*, *admonition*, and *command*,—thus creating a form of expression which they could not fail to perceive must be extremely vague and doubtful in its import. It is more natural to believe, that the variety of signification arises from variety of ellipsis, and not from the original intention, or the construction of the word. If this presumption be correct, the mood is strictly subjunctive.

“ 2ndly. We find the present tense of this mood used imperatively, precatively, and hortatively, and this usage is undeniably elliptical. And as the present tense has one and the same character with the preterite tenses of the same mood, the inference may be warrantably extended to them also.

“ 3rdly. As far as we are capable of investigating the structure of inflected nouns and verbs, we have reason to believe, that while the primary idea or chief attribute is expressed by the noun or verb, the accessory circumstances, though now incorporated with the principal term, were originally denoted by separate words, and

that these by a process simple and natural gradually coalesced with the primary term. Yet we find the same termination express the four distinct ideas of *will*, *power*, *liberty*, and *duty*. It seems, then, a fair conclusion, that this form of the verb, having only one termination to express three distinct ideas, does not denote them by its own power, a power which would be manifested by a variety of suffix, but expresses these various modifications by ellipsis. If this argument have any weight, it indicates the subjunctive character of this mood.

“ 4thly. It appears an argument in favour of this opinion, that the elliptical expression, or what is called the potential mood, is not used where emphasis is intended, or the meaning absolute, but in such clauses only as are dependant, and where the ellipsis is manifested by the meaning of the correlative clause either expressed or manifestly implied.

“ 5thly. This opinion seems to be confirmed by those passages in which the idea is either fully expressed, or with an ellipsis of the conjunction only.

“ 6thly. We know that this form of the verb is frequently employed to denote a prayer, a desire, or a wish. And if this mood be used optatively, and if the expression of the desire or wish

be evidently elliptical, it forms a strong presumption, unless we reject all analogy, that when it is used potentially, it expresses *ability, will, duty, liberty*, not by its own proper power, but by ellipsis."

The evidence which these arguments offer in favour of the potential and subjunctive moods being one and the same is so strong and conclusive, that without further observation I shall consider them as such ; and any remark which I may make, or any principle which I may lay down in reference to the one, is to be considered equally applicable to both, though in accommodation to the phraseology which has obtained, I may occasionally speak of potential or subjunctive mood.

CHAPTER III.

FUTURE PERFECT TENSE.

BEFORE we can obtain a correct view of the subjunctive mood, and reduce its use to a general principle, it will be necessary to ascertain the character of the tense commonly called future subjunctive, and to determine to what mood it properly belongs.

This is in itself a fit subject of inquiry, since Romans themselves made the character of this tense a point of discussion. The father of Q. Scævola Brutus, Manilius, Agellius, and Nigidius Figulus, whom Vossius calls “*Romanorum post Varronem doctissimus*,” could not agree whether “*surreptum erit*” referred to past or to future time. The occasion of this controversy was the interpretation of a part of the Atinian law, in which was the following sentence: “*Quod surreptum erit, ejus rei æterna auctoritas erit.*” The opinion of Vossius upon the point is, that the tense belongs both to the indicative and subjunctive moods. The following is the substance of his observations.

Time is considered by grammarians to be subject to a threefold division: *present*, (designated by Charisius, Diomedes and others, “*instans*,”) *past* and *future*. This triple division the Ægyp-

tians marked by a three-headed animal*. These three times may be spoken of in reference to an event progressive or perfect, "infectum vel perfectum." So that the "res infecta" is three-fold: *præsens*, as *facio*; *præteritum imperfectum*, as *faciebam*; *futurum simplex*, as *faciam*, or according to the old form, as Quintilian says, *faciem*. The "res perfecta" is likewise three-fold: *perfectum simplex*, as *feci*; *plusquam-perfectum*, as *feceram*; *futurum exactum*, as *fecero*. In this tense, Vossius observes, there is united the idea of past and future; for *fecero*, *docuero*, *amavero*, signify something which has not taken place, but which is considered as if it had. They, therefore, who make no distinction between this tense and the simple future, have not considered, that it is one thing to say *cum cœnabo*, and another to say *cum cœnauero*; the former referring to a time marked by "inter cœnandum," the latter to that designated by "cœna peracta."†

* "Apud eos, uti auctor est Macrobius primo Saturnalium libro, cap. 20. leonis capite monstrabatur præsens tempus, quia conditio ejus inter præteritum futurumque valida fervensque est. Præteritum tempus lupi capite signabatur, quoniam memoria rerum transactarum rapitur et aufertur. Canis blandientis effigies futuri temporis designabat eventum de quo nobis spes, licet incerta, blanditur."—*Vossii Aristarch.* lib. iii. cap. 3.

† This difference between the *times* and the *states* of an action is marked in Greek by a difference of tense: the following expressions being widely different: *περὶ δεδιπνησέναι*,—*περὶ δεσπνήσας*,—*περὶ δεσπνῶν*. See *Elmsley ad Med.* 78; and *Hermann. Annot.*

He then refers to the authority of Varro, to show that the tense is to be ranked in the indicative mood; and argues that the formation should be deemed sufficient evidence of the fact: *pungam* being formed from *pungo*; *punxero* being formed from *punxi*, not less than *punxeram* is. Vossius seems to incline to the opinion, that the tense belongs to the indicative only, though he does not positively exclude it from the subjunctive. But this is confounding the language, and destroying that distinctive character which marks all the other tenses.

It is not assuming too much to say, that it must belong either to the indicative or to the subjunctive, and that it cannot belong to both;—to which, however, has long been a question among grammarians. Among those who consider the tense to be of the subjunctive mood are Diomedes, Charisius, Priscian, Perizonius, and Linacer. On the side of the indicative are Varro, Grocinius, Ursinus, Scheller, Zumpt, and Crombie. The latter has thus stated the question as contested by Perizonius and Ursinus. “Ursinus infers that Varro regarded all these tenses (*discebam*, *disco*, *discam*, and *didiceram*, *didici*, *didicero*), as belonging to one and the same mood; and pleads, therefore, the authority of Varro in support of his rejection of this tense from the subjunctive mood. Perizonius remonstrates against

the truth of this inference, contending, that Varro was distinguishing tenses, and not moods ; and that not finding a future perfect in the indicative, he went in quest of it to the subjunctive mood." Upon this question Dr. Crombie remarks : " But it is sufficiently clear from Varro's enumeration, that he considered *didicero* to be of the same modal character as the other tenses, bearing the same relation to *discam*, as *didici* to *disco*, and *didisceram* to *discebam*. Unless, therefore, we are gratuitously to impute inconsistency to Varro, we must conclude, that he referred them all to one mood. But in questions like this, where abundant evidence is accessible, authority on either side should have little weight. Can those, who refer this tense to the subjunctive or potential mood, produce a single example of its being used potentially ? It has not been attempted. Can they show us one example of its being used subjunctively ? This *has been* attempted : but we believe we may affirm, that not one example has ever been or can be produced, in which this tense has been employed, because subjoined to a conjunction ; not one example in which the tense would not have been used, if the conjunction had been absent. In what sense, then, can it be called either potential or subjunctive, unless we are, in contradic-

tion to the clearest evidence, to retain inapplicable names and erroneous classifications, merely because they are sanctioned by some learned authorities? However, if the name should be retained, the reader should understand that the meaning of the tense is purely indicative."

The inference which the learned critic would draw from his observations is just, and decisive of the question. But the authority of Varro upon a point of this nature is surely entitled to the highest consideration. He was a Roman, and acknowledged to be more deeply read, and more accurately versed in every question of the Latin language than any of his countrymen. His opinion, therefore, should possess no inconsiderable weight in deciding the matter. The evidence, too, which he offers is more direct and conclusive than has been commonly considered. According to Perizonius, Varro does not say that *didicero* is of the same mood as *didiceram* and *didici*. "Voluit Varro tantum de temporibus agere, et ostendere tria esse in infecto et tria in perfecto. Sumpsit autem exempla ex primo potissimum modo, verum quum ille non haberet, nisi quinque tempora, seu non haberet futurum perfecti, arripuit illud ex secundo seu subjunctivo modo."

Perizonius has not stated the question fairly, as it concerns Varro; for though, in the part re-

ferred to, he is treating of tenses, his observations are not confined to them. He is arguing that a complete analogy runs through the Latin language, and he adduces the perfect and imperfect tenses as an instance. But he had observed, "Quod ad verborum rationem attinet, cum partes sint quatuor, temporum, personarum generum, divisionum, ex omni parte quoniam reprehendunt; ad singula respondebo." The first objection he answers in these words: "Nam ex eodem genere et divisione idem verbum quod sumptum est, per tempora traduci potest: ut *discebam*, *disco*, *disceam* et eadem perfecti sic *didiceram*, *didici*, *didicero*." These verbs, therefore, which vary in tense, are "ex eodem genere et divisione." What he means by these words may be collected from other observations, in the same chapter: "Etiam hoc reprehendunt, quod quædam verba neque personas habent ternas neque tempora ternæ. Id imperite reprehendunt, ut si quis reprehendat naturam quod non uniusmodi finxerit animales omnes. Si enim natura non omnes formæ verborum ternæ habeant tempora, ternas personas, non habent totidem verborum divisiones." He then proceeds to give examples, and shows that certain moods (*divisiones*) do not admit of certain tenses; as for instance, the imperative, which does not admit perfect tenses. But the mood

“fatendi,” i. e. the indicative, which he elsewhere calls “species rogandi respondendive,” admits both “infectum et perfectum.” “Quare cum imperamus, natura quod infecta solum habet : cum et præsentī et absenti imperamus, fiunt terna *lege*, *legito*, *legat*, perfectum enim imperat nemo. Contra quæ sunt fatendi, ut *lego*, *legis*, *legit*, novena fiunt verba infecti, novena perfecti.” He here speaks of one mood only, that which we call indicative ; he designates it as consisting of “verba fatendi ;” and that no mistake might arise, he gives an example, “*lego*, *legis*, *legit*.” In this *same* mood, by the combination of time and person, he counts nine forms “infecti,” and nine “perfecti.” Those, therefore, who object to the authority of Varro may justly be called upon to state what the nine forms of the “verbum perfecti” are, unless *didiceram*, *didiceras*, *didicerat*, *didici*, *didicisti*, *didicisti*, and *didicero*, *didiceris*, *didicerit*. It appears to me next to an impossibility for him to have asserted in more decisive terms that the future perfect is of the indicative mood. It is thus shown by analogy, and the authority of Varro.

The nature of a verb leads to the same conclusion ; for an action may be predicated as progressive or as perfect, *building*, *built* ; and these two states may be predicated of past, present, and future time respectively. Every language

which has made sufficient advancement to exhibit in distinctive dress the common occurrences of life, and the ordinary thoughts of the mind, will necessarily have some method of expressing these different modifications of an action. A simple sentence may be formed, in which each of these different modifications may be predicated. In Greek, the idea of an action perfect at some future time would be conveyed by the perfect participle active, and the future of the auxiliary verb *ἔσονται*. In Latin I know of no form of words by which the same modification of an action can be expressed, unless it is by the future perfect: “I shall have built,” “*ædificavero*.”

Upon such authority, and upon such evidence, direct and collateral, I conclude that the future perfect is a tense of the indicative mood. The conclusion to which I have thus come, will be confirmed by the law upon which the Latins used their moods; for no example of the use of this tense can be adduced from any writer, in which the principles of the language require the subjunctive form of the verb: on the contrary, wherever we meet with it, usage requires the indicative, and admits no other mood.

CHAPTER IV.

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

My observations in the preceding chapters have been directed to three points.

1st, An examination of the opinions which the principal grammarians have held respecting the use of the subjunctive mood.

2ndly, The identity of the potential and subjunctive moods, which are commonly considered to be different.

3rdly, The true modal character of the tense improperly called future subjunctive.

It was necessary that the ground should be thus cleared before I attempted to explain the principle which appears to have regulated the use of the subjunctive form of verb.

It has always appeared to me inconceivable, that while the other variations of the Latin verb exercise distinct and definite powers, the subjunctive form alone should be destitute of *its proper and peculiar force*: that, while the varieties of person, number, time, &c., are marked by a difference of termination, the form which we designate subjunctive, should be inactive, and unim-

portant in denoting some modification of the verb.

It may be objected to this, that grammarians do not consider it to be inactive, but to convey the idea of potentiality or futurity. And, indeed, if we listen to grammarians, the Latin subjunctive mood performs manifold parts. Its uses are as numerous and various as the forms of Proteus. At one time it implies a wish ; at another it conveys the idea of ability ; in other instances it denotes duty, contingency, or doubt ; it marks the meaning of a connecting particle, whether relative or conjunction, though it is admitted that on many occasions the same conjunction or the relative bears precisely the same meaning, when it is followed by an indicative mood : and frequently, we are told, it is a matter of indifference whether the indicative or subjunctive mood be used, the purest Roman writers being cited in support of the opinion.

To such doctrines I feel it impossible to subscribe : on the contrary, I am convinced that, as perspicuity dictated all the other forms which the Latin verb assumes ; so in like manner, whenever the *subjunctive form* was used, it was invariably intended to mark the character which the verb in such particular instance had to support. Entertaining this view, I am persuaded

that we must look for some plain, universal, consistent power, which it may exercise in the attainment of perspicuity. The end of all language is to enable us to communicate our thoughts to one another ; to deck out in distinctive dress, and display in discriminative colours, the ideas which occur to our minds. If this be the case, perspicuity dictated to the Romans the subjunctive form of verb ; and we may be assured that it was invariably used by them according to some fixed and general principle.

It is no argument against this supposition, that the majority of writers in every language compose without a continual recurrence to the principles upon which their language is founded*. Men acquire habits of writing and speaking in accordance with the rules of grammar, in the same manner as, in many arts, men who are unacquainted with scientific principles, nevertheless carry these principles into practice in their ordinary occupations. What account would the mechanic give of the principle of gravity, though, in the application of his *plumb-line*, he will not offend against the laws of gravitation?

Besides, let it be granted that a Roman

* The fact, that no direct allusion to the principle of the subjunctive mood is made by any Roman writer, may probably be accounted for from the little attention which was paid to the study of logic.

scarcely ever recurred systematically to the principle of the subjunctive mood ; the admission will furnish no argument against a plain principle having given rise to, and afterwards directed the use of the form, which will not weigh equally against the existence of consistent principles in the case of the Latin tenses, persons, &c. Nay, we have seen that Romans themselves, even persons of high literary credit, disputed respecting the character of a particular tense. Yet it is not to be supposed, that they would have misapplied it, either in their own writings or in speaking. Men write and speak, without thinking, and frequently without having the time to think, of the technical laws of diction. The Archbishop of Dublin has aptly expressed himself to the same effect in regard to logic. "The truth is, in this, as in many other things, there are processes going on in the mind (when we are practising anything quite familiar to us,) with such rapidity as to leave no trace in the memory ; and we often apply principles which did not, as far as we are conscious, even occur to us at the time."—*Elements of Logic*, chap. 3. p. 136.

Varro, in his treatise *De Lingua Latina*, gives us sufficient testimony that many of his countrymen, and even literary characters, were ignorant

of various principles of their language. But my business is, not to inquire whether the Latins in general were acquainted with any principle according to which they used the subjunctive mood; but to ascertain whether any such principle exists. This point can be ascertained solely by a process of *generalization**. All the properties, which are not common to *every* variety of sentence in which the subjunctive form of verb occurs, must be *abstracted*; and the attention must be fixed upon those points in which they all agree, and which are peculiar to them. It is by this process alone that we can hope to succeed in discovering the *characteristic* of the subjunctive mood. And in order to obtain a clear and distinct perception of its necessary and accidental properties, we must lay open the various folds of dress by which the real figure is concealed,—we

• “The notions expressed by common terms we are enabled (as has been remarked in the analytical outline,) to form by the faculty of abstraction: for by it, in contemplating any object (or objects), we can attend exclusively to some particular circumstances belonging to it, (some certain parts of its nature, as it were,) and quite withhold our attention from the rest. When, therefore, we are thus contemplating several individuals which *resemble* each other in *some* part of their nature, we can (by attending to *that part alone*, and not to those points in which they differ,) assign them *one common name*, which will express or stand for them merely as far as they all *agree*; and which, of course, will be applicable to all or any of them;—which process is called *generalization*.”—*Whately's Logic, Compendium*, chap. 2. *Synthet. App.* 2.

must unravel, adjust, and arrange the different threads, by the nice intertexture of which the beauty of Latin sentences is so elegantly set forth and displayed.

This process of generalization must take place in every instance: and, consequently, the knife must be used systematically, and every sentence be dissected into its true logical parts. Between logic and grammar there exists an inseparable connexion. Logic is the art of reasoning, and necessarily enters into all the communication which men hold with one another. Grammar compiles rules for a proper delineation of the thoughts according to the usage of a language. Hence grammar is particular, and logic universal. Logic is necessarily interwoven with the fundamental parts of every particular grammar, and must treat of language, inasmuch as it is by language that the operations of the mind are expressed.

It will be necessary for me, therefore, to draw so much upon logic, as may be sufficient to explain to general readers, and particularly to those whose attention has not been directed to this useful branch of education, the principle upon which the Latins used the subjunctive form of verb.

Every grammatical sentence, however varied in form, is resolvable into three, and only three

parts,* the subject, the predicate, and the copula. The first of these being that of which anything is affirmed or denied, must express either a person or a thing. The predicate is that part of a sentence which expresses what is affirmed or denied of its subject. The affirmation or negation is made by the copula or the substantive verb in the present tense, *is* or *is not*. The copula has no relation to time; its sole office is to express an act of judgment, to affirm or deny the predicate of the subject.

These three parts do not always show themselves in a grammatical sentence; and, indeed, most commonly the copula is blended with the predicate: but these constituent parts of every sentence,—namely, subject, predicate, and copula,—should always be distinctly seen. The importance of this cannot be too strongly impressed; for, if I mistake not, I shall be able to show, that the whole principle of the Latin subjunctive mood turns upon the distinction which naturally exists between them. Before we proceed

* The operations of the mind in regard to reasoning are three :—The first, called simple apprehension, is the conception of any object or objects in the mind, whether in relation to one another or not; as “table,” “pens,” “side of a ship.” The second is called judgment, because the mind by the act of judgment sets two objects before it, compares them, and pronounces whether they agree or disagree. The third operation of the mind is called reasoning, or a proceeding from one judgment to another founded upon it.

to analyse some sentences, let me observe, that the subject and predicate are called the *terms* of a proposition, because they stand as extremes, between which is placed the copula.

With one of these, namely, the predicate, the copula, as I have observed, is frequently blended, as, "John walks." In this and all similar examples, the grammatical verb contains within it the predicate and the copula, and is resolvable into these two parts: thus, *John—is—walking*. In each of these examples the act of walking is predicated affirmatively of John, or,—as it would be logically expressed,—the agreement between the terms "John" and "walking" is expressed by the copula "is." Again: "This cloth is not black:" in this negative proposition, the quality of blackness is denied of "this cloth," and the negation is expressed by the negative copula, "is not." In other words, the mind placing before itself the two notions of "this cloth" and "blackness," and finding that the latter does not agree to the former, pronounces accordingly, by placing between them the negative copula, "is not,"—*This cloth—is not—black*.

It frequently happens that sentences are composed of several clauses, which either express some quality of the subject or predicate, or account for some action or quality being predicated of the

subject. But they may be reduced to the form which I have mentioned: and it is material to observe, that all the clauses of a sentence may be attached either to the subject or the predicate.

The following are examples of different propositions, each being logically resolved.

“A wise son maketh a glad father.” or,

Subj.	Cop.	Pred.
<i>A wise son</i>	<i>—is—</i>	<i>a person who maketh a glad father.</i>

“Hannibal the Carthaginian general defeated the Romans in several engagements.”

Subj.	Cop.
<i>Hannibal the Carthaginian general</i>	<i>—is—</i>
<i>a person who defeated the Romans in several engagements.</i>	

“It is the height of folly, to suppose that the world could have existed from chance.”

Subj.	Pred.
<i>To suppose that the world could have existed from chance</i>	<i>—is—</i>
<i>the height of folly.</i>	

“All men must give an account of their own works, whether they be good or bad.”

Subj.	Cop.	Pred.
<i>All men</i>	<i>—are—</i>	<i>beings who must give, &c.</i>

“There are found men who will disgrace themselves with the most flagitious crimes.”

Subj.	Cop.	Pred.
<i>Some men</i>	<i>—are—</i>	<i>men who will disgrace, &c.</i>

In this manner all sentences containing propositions may be resolved. Questions are not (*logically*) propositions; but, for the purposes of grammatical construction, they may be treated as the answers, which would be given to the questions;—thus: “Are not your parents worthy of your highest love?”—*My parents are worthy of my highest love.*

“Is this man, whom I see, your friend?”—*This man, whom you see, is my friend.*

It next deserves to be noticed, that propositions are divided, according to their *quantity*, into universal, and particular. Universal propositions are those in which the predicate is said of the whole of the subject, that is, of all the individuals included under the common noun of the subject. Particular propositions are those in which the predication is made of some only*.

Singular propositions are such as have for their subjects a proper name, or a common

* Universal propositions have generally some universal sign prefixed, as “all,” “every,” “no:” particular propositions have generally some particular sign, as “some,” “many,” “few;” and they are frequently expressed by a circumlocution, as “There are—who;” and in Latin, “Sunt qui,” “Inventi sunt homines qui,” “Multi sunt qui”. When no sign is expressed, and the subject is a common noun, the quantity must be determined by the matter; that is to say, common sense must decide whether the predicate *must* apply to all the individuals of the subject, or is applicable to some only; and consequently, whether the proposition is universal or particular.

noun limited to some individual by a singular sign, as *Cato*,—*this pen*. But singular propositions may be classed under universals or particulars. All propositions in which the predication is made of a singular subject without any restriction or qualification, must be considered as universals; as, *George the Third was born in England*,—*This hat is black*,—*Cicero was a great orator*. But, if singular propositions have their subjects limited by some word or clause, in such a manner that the predication can be made only of such qualified singular subject, then they are to be classed among particular propositions. The subjects in such instances are not distributed, that is, are not taken in their fullest and most comprehensive sense*.

Propositions are either categorical or hypothetical: categorical are those in which the assertion is made absolutely;—hypothetical propositions are those to which a condition is an-

* "As for singular propositions, (viz. those whose subject is either a *proper name*, or a common term with a *singular sign*.) they are reckoned as universals, because in them we speak of the *whole* of the subject; e. g. when we say, "*Brutus was a Roman*," we mean the *whole* of Brutus: this is the general rule; but some singular propositions may fairly be reckoned *particular*; i. e. when some qualifying word is inserted, which indicates that you are not speaking of the *whole* of the subject; e. g. "*Cæsar was not wholly a tyrant*;" "*This man is occasionally intemperate*;" "*Non omnis moriar*."—*Whately's Elements of Logic*, chap. 2. part 2. sect. 2.

nexed; and the meaning is, that the assertion of the proposition is made solely upon an implied admission of the condition. There are other divisions of propositions; as, for instance, categorical propositions are subdivided into pure and modal.

But, perhaps, it is needless to enter more closely into the subject. One observation will be sufficient for our purpose. All propositions may have their terms so qualified by clauses, that, in one case, the predication can be made only of such *qualified* subject, and, in another, it is only such *qualified* predicate that can be said of its subject*.—If the mode or the condition be attached to the wrong term, a meaning will be

* “A modal proposition may be stated as a pure one by attaching the mode to one of the terms:—e. g. “John killed Thomas *wilfully and maliciously* ;” here the mode is to be regarded as part of the predicate. “It is *probable* that all knowledge is useful ;” “*probably useful*” is here the predicate. But when the mode is only used to express the necessary, contingent, or impossible connexion of the terms, it may as well be attached to the *subject* : e. g. “Man is *necessarily* mortal” is the same as “*All* men are mortal,” &c.—*Whately's Elements of Logic, Syn. Compendium*, chap. 2. Suppl. to part 3. sect. 1.—Also when a hypothetical conclusion is inferred from a hypothetical premiss, so that the force of the reasoning does not turn on the hypothesis, then the hypothesis (as in modals,) must be considered as *part of one of the terms* ; so that the reasoning will be, in effect, categorical : e. g. “Whatever comes from God is

Subject

entitled to reverence.” “If the Scriptures are not wholly false, they must come from God.” “If they are not wholly false, they are entitled to reverence.”—*Whately's Elements of Logic, Syn. Compendium*, chap. 2. Supp. to part 3. sect. 2.

conveyed very different from that which the author intended. In our own language we have no certain guide to direct us,—nothing in the words themselves by which we can at once determine whether a clause is to be attached to the subject, or to the predicate. The collocation of the words offers some help, especially as the usage of our language does not admit of great variety in the position of words. In the Latin, however, there is a much wider range: a large field is opened for an intermixture of clauses, by the facility which the variety of terminations in case, &c. offers for marking the proper dependence of the different parts of a sentence. The superiority of the Latin language in regard to its pronouns, also, gives it an advantage over our own, and a latitude in the arrangement of words and clauses, by which the hearer's or reader's attention is readily suspended till the whole sentence is concluded.

The consequence of this, however, is, that the clauses which qualify the terms of a sentence become so intermixed with each other, that perspicuity requires some characteristic mark, by which the component parts of the subject and predicate may be determined. Some clue is even needed to enable the reader to decide upon the proper subject of the sentence; elegance of style

is predicated is not complete, until the common noun "*anni*" is restricted by the clause, "*cum ille in ære meo est.*"

In a similar manner, the predicate may be qualified, and it is only in such qualified sense that it can be affirmed or denied of its subject.

"My own feelings are an evidence to me of the great estimation in which I hold you, and have always held you, and likewise of the estimation in which I have learned that I am held by you." Now, without separating the three propositions which this sentence con-

Subj.

tains, we may divide it thus : "My own feelings

Cop.

Pred.

—are—an evidence to me, &c." The predicate is not complete without the relative clauses. The sentence is a very meagre translation of a very elegant passage in Cicero's Epistles. "*Ego quanti te faciam, semperque fecerim, quanti me a te fieri intellexerim, sum mihi ipse testis.*"—*Cic. Fam. Ep. lib. 6. ep. 10.* In this sentence, "*ego ipse*" is the subject ; "*testis*" is the predicate, qualified, however, by the clauses "*quanti te faciam, &c.*" In like manner, in the following sentences, "Happy is the sailor who has safely gained the land," "You are worthy of our love," the subjects are, respectively, "*a sailor,*" and "*you ;*" and of these, *happiness* and

worthiness are predicated. But these qualities are not predicated in their fullest sense,—they are restricted by the clauses to a particular part of the *whole*, which is included under the general terms, “*happy*,” “*worthy* ;”—*happy in having safely gained the land*,—*worthy that you should receive our love*. These sentences expressed in Latin, and logically divided, would stand thus :

Subj.	Cop.	Pred.
<i>Nauta</i>	<i>est</i>	<i>felix qui in littus se receperit.</i>

Subj.	Cop.	Pred.
<i>Vos</i>	<i>estis</i>	<i>digni quos amemus.</i>

In a narrative, or a continuous discourse, we meet with numerous examples of this character.

In hypothetical propositions, the condition frequently attaches itself to the subject, and as frequently to the predicate. In many instances, we find the same person made the subject of two propositions, but a condition is annexed to qualify the singular noun, before the second predication can be made of it. The concluding sentence of Cicero’s treatise *De Officiis* offers a clear and striking example. “*Vale, igitur, mi Cicero, tibi que persuade esse te quidem mihi carissimum; sed multo fore cariorem, si talibus monumentis præceptisque lætabere.*” In this example, *Tu, mi Cicero*, is the person of whom the writer predicates two things; but the predication is not made, in each case, of the same person, *without*

qualification. In the latter proposition*, the condition should properly be attached to the subject. Thus, both the singular propositions might be considered categorical, but they would differ in quantity ; the former being universal, the lat-

ter particular. Subj. Cop. and
Tu, mi Cicero,—tibi persuade
Pred.

esse te quidem mihi carissimum. In this case the subject is distributed, being limited by no qualification. Cicero's son (*wholly*) was to assure himself of his father's ardent affection. Not so, however, in the latter proposition. The predicate of this (with the copula) is "*tibi persuade multo te fore cariorem ;*" but the subject is different. The same *person* is spoken of, namely, Cicero's son, but not *wholly*. The quantity is not the same as in the former instance, the subject not being distributed, but limited by the qualifying clause "*si talibus monumentis præceptisque lætabere.*" The terms of the latter proposition would be thus distinguished:

Subj.
Tu, mi Cicero, si talibus monumentis præceptisque
Pred. with Cop.
lætabere—tibi persuade multo fore cariorem.

* Strictly speaking, these examples are not *logical* propositions ; but all cases, in which an imperative mood presents itself, will be found to be under the same laws as though the indicative had been used. In the present instance, the same idea might be expressed by "You are a person who may, &c."

Again, we meet with cases, in which two propositions have the same person for the subject ; but the predicates are different ; and the singular noun, which is the subject of each, is differently qualified before the different predications can be made of it: as, “*Si illum relinquo, ejus vitæ timeo: sin opitulator, hujus minas.*”—*Ter. And.* 1. 3. 5. “*Ego*” is the singular noun of each subject, but it is qualified by the two opposite conditions, “*si illum relinquo,*” and “*si opitulator,*” before the two predicates “*ejus vitæ timeo,*” and “*hujus minas timeo,*” i. e. “*mihi ipsi timeo*” can be said of it. “*Ego,*”

Subj. of 1st prop.

(qualified by the condition) “*si illum relinquo*”

Pred. of 1st prop:

“*ejus vitæ timeo.*” “*Ego,*” (qualified by the

Subj. of 2nd prop. Pred. of 2nd prop.

condition) “*sin opitulator*” “*hujus minas timeo.*”

The subject of the proposition is not always the nominative case to the verb.* Elegance of style may require a different construction, as in

* This is sometimes the case in English, but more frequently in Latin; and it is especially the case in poetry. This will account for the *seeming* incongruity which exists between poets and prose writers, in the use of moods. Commentators being ignorant of the principle which guided the Latins in the use of the subjunctive mood, have ascribed this *apparent* deviation from correct Latin to poetic license (*metri causâ*); whereas, in fact, in all such cases, the poet will really be found to have adopted an elegant poetic style, *without at all sacrificing his pure Latinity*. The true subject must be discovered by considering the writer's principal view and aim. Instances will present themselves in the sequel.

the following example : “ Neque solum vivi (*illi quorum studia vitæque omnis in rerum cognitione versata est,*) atque præsentēs studiosos discendi erudiunt atque docent, sed hoc idem etiam post mortem monumentis litterarum assequuntur : nec enim ullus locus prætermisus est ab iis qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad disciplinam reipublicæ pertineret ; ut otium suum ad nostrum negotium contulisse videantur.”—*Cic. de Off.* 1. 44. The sentence contains three propositions, and the persons, of whom the respective predicates are made, are the same in each ; but they are *differently qualified*, so that the *subjects* of the three may fairly be reckoned different. The terms may be thus distinguished. “ *Illi quorum studia vitæque omnis in rerum cognitione versata est,*” (qualified by the adjuncts,) “ *vivi atque præsentēs,*” the subject of the *first* proposition ; “ *studiosos discendi erudiunt atque docent,*” affirmative copula and predicate. The *same persons*, qualified by the adjunct “ *post mortem,*” the subject of the *second* proposition ; “ *hoc idem monumentis litterarum assequuntur,*” affirmative copula, and predicate of the second proposition. The *same persons (wholly)*, *i. e.* not qualified by any restriction, expressed in the third sentence by *iis*, the subject of the third proposition ; “ . . . *nec ullus locus prætermisus est, qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad disciplinam rei-*

publicæ pertineret ; ut otium suum ad nostrum negotium contulisse videantur," affirmative copula and predicate of *third* proposition. Cicero chose to vary the style and change the grammatical subject in the latter part of the sentence.

The true subject of a proposition is also frequently hid by a circumlocution. This often takes place when a negation is implied under a question : as, for instance,—“ *Quis est qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam, nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis, atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere?*” The meaning of Cicero is, “ *Nemo est qui velit,*” &c. ; or “ *Nemo vult,*” &c. In this example the expression is so turned, that the relative clause forms the predicate of the proposition ; though it is important to be observed, that the Latin idiom expresses THE PREDICATE WITHOUT THE COPULA. If the same sentiment be expressed in a direct form, so that the copula becomes blended with the verb,—the verb is necessarily put in the indicative mood.

The following passage from Horace offers an instance of a proposition being implied in an exclamation :—

“ *Ut melius, quicquid erit, pati
Seu plures hyemes, seu tribuit Juppiter ultimam,
Quæ nunc oppositis debilitat pumicibus mare
Tyrrenum.*”

The subject of this sentence is "*pati**, " together with the explanatory clauses "*quicquid erit*," &c. ; and it is predicated of it that it is "*much preferable*."

Frequently, again, we find the logical subject continued the same, though the grammatical subject is changed. "Summa quidem auctoritate philosophi, severe sane atque honeste, hæc tria genera confusa, cogitatione distinguunt: quidquid enim justum sit, id etiam utile esse censent: itemque quod honestum idem justum: ex quo efficitur, ut quidquid honestum sit, idem sit utile." *Cic. de Off.* lib. 2. cap. 3. The subject of which the different predications are made, is "*philosophi summa auctoritate*." Cicero shows how they distinguish in imagination three things which in nature are blended together. He says, that they consider "*quicquid justum sit idem esse utile*;" also "*quod honestum idem justum*:" and thence they draw the conclusion, "*ut quidquid*

* Vossius mistakes the construction of this passage. He says, "Quemadmodum apud Græcos ὥστε infinitivum exigit: ita ut quoque interdum infinitivum apud Latinos adsciscit pro subjunctivo. *Horatius*, lib. i. Od. 11:—*Neu Babylonios Tentâris numeros, ut melius, quicquid erit, pati. ὥστε φέειν, ut melius patiaris, quicquid erit.* Hæc interpretatio placet, præ illa Mureti, quam apud Lambinum videre potes. *Aristarchus de Constructione*, cap. 62." Had he been aware of the principle of the Latin subjunctive mood, he would have seen enough in "*quicquid erit*" to have shown him the incorrectness of his own interpretation of the passage.

honestum sit, idem sit utile.” To each of these predicates there is the same subject, though the grammatical construction of the last sentence is varied.

The context alone will frequently determine the true subject. “*Usque ad aquas Sinuessanas populatio ea pervenit. Ingentem cladem, fugam tamen terroremque latius, Numidæ fecerunt. Nec tamen is terror, quum omnia bello flagrant, fide socios dimovit: videlicet quia justo et moderato regebantur imperio.*”—*Liv.* 22. 13. “*Is terror*” is the grammatical subject of one of these sentences; but the context shows that “*socios*” is the true subject. Hannibal having been, through the mistake of a guide, conducted to Casilinum instead of Casinum, determines to take advantage of the mistake, and endeavours, by the terror of devastation, to shake the fidelity of the Roman allies. But in this, Livy says, he failed; for they were not shaken from their fidelity to the Romans through that terror. The proper connexion of a clause may frequently be discovered from its more immediate reference to some particular word; as, “*Vadum fluminis tentare parant, si transire possent.*” *Cæs. B. C.* 1. 83. The clause cannot possibly be taken in connexion with the subject, as though the predication was made of the parties under the quali-

fication. The *preparation* is unconditionally asserted of them. The condition more immediately relates to “*tentare vadum fluminis*,” and determines that it is to be attached to the predicate.

Now, in reviewing the examples which I have adduced, it will be seen that the qualifying clauses, which they contain, have respectively verbs of the indicative and subjunctive moods. But they carry this remarkably distinctive feature about them;—that whenever the clauses attach themselves to the *true* subject of the sentence, the verbs of those clauses are in the indicative mood; but whenever the clauses attach themselves to the predicates of the propositions, the verbs of those clauses, *without exception*, assume the subjunctive form. Even when the clause formed the very predicate itself, but DID NOT CONTAIN THE COPULA, the subjunctive form was used. If the style of expression was altered, so that the copula became blended with the verb, the form of the verb became changed from the subjunctive to the indicative.

When the clause attached itself to the subject, we had, “*anni, cum ille in ære meo est*”—“*tu, mi Cicero, si talibus monumentis præceptisque lætabere*”—“*Ego si illum relinquo*”—“*Ego si optulor*”—“*Illi quorum studia vitæque omnis in*

rerum cognitione versata est"—“pati, quicquid erit—”

When the clause was attached to the predicate, we had, “*quanti te faciam semperque fecerim, &c.*”—“*felix qui in littus se receperit*”—“*digni quos amemus*”—“*ullus locus qui pertineret ut videantur*”—“*qui velit ut diligat, ut diligatur*”—“*quidquid enim justum sit quidquid honestum sit, idem sit utile*”—“*quum omnia bello flagrarent,*” “*si transire possent.*”

This remarkable coincidence cannot, surely, have arisen from accident. The passages are taken from various authors; and it is not to be supposed that they would all have so uniformly and consistently employed the different moods, unless they were guided by some general principle. The examples differ in *other* respects; but agree in *this*, that, *whenever a verb is in the true predicate of a sentence, or in a clause which is properly attached to the predicate, the subjunctive form is used.*

If we conceive, therefore, that the Latins framed a modal termination, which should enable them to mark the connexion which exists between the different clauses of a sentence, the principle is plain and reasonable. Their language admitted of an intermixture of the parts which composed

the subject and the predicate, and offered great facility for expressing the subject of the sentence in an oblique case. But this might give rise to obscurity; to obviate which, the variation of modal termination offered a ready means. This invention allowed numerous ellipses, which gave surprising terseness to expressions. Writers, and speakers especially, were enabled to give the proper force to *each* word that they used, omitting such as were of no importance, (the ellipsis being marked by the modal termination,) and the context readily suggesting to a Latin the word or words to be supplied.

As when Simo's whole mind and thoughts were engaged about his son, and he details to his servant his son's conduct, which had given him so much uneasiness, it would have ill accorded with the excitement under which he was labouring, to have expressed all the words which the strictness of grammatical construction required,—“*res ita fuit ut diceret, quid feci?*” but he would at once explain the excuse which his son might have made,—“*diceret quid feci?*” *Ter. And. l. 1. 111*. So, in like manner, Pamphilus, when angry with himself for following the advice of his servant Davus, answers his servant's appeal by breaking at once upon what is uppermost in his own thoughts, and omits the governing clause, “*Tibi*

ego ut credam, furcifer?" *Ter. And.* The energy of this would be wholly destroyed by the supply of "*orasne?*" In fact, the bearing of the whole would be altered, and an importance assigned to a part to which it was not entitled.

Virgil also makes Sinon conclude his artful harangue with this brief but forcible remark,—"*Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ,*" *Virg. Æn.* 2. 104. The beauty of the deceitful remark would be destroyed by the supply of the ellipsis, perhaps, "*hoc est quod.*" Catiline, in like manner, increases the energy of his introductory address to the assembled conspirators by an ellipsis of the governing clause, "*Ni virtus fidesque vestra spectata mihi forent, nequidquam opportuna cecidisset.*" *Sall. B. C.* cap. 20. In this, as in many similar cases, it is difficult to supply the ellipsis; though probably Catiline understood "*verisimile est,*" or some such expression.

Upon the whole, it appears to me impossible to account for the very marked agreement which exists between all the examples that I have adduced, upon any other supposition than that which I have made. It will never, surely, be contended, that the employment of the subjunctive form depends upon a different cause in each different case:—that, first, it depends upon

“*quanti* ;” next, upon a meaning of “*qui* ;” again upon a second meaning, after that upon a third, of the same word ; that, here, it is used because it follows an indefinite word ; and so on, that the modal termination in every successive example depends upon a different cause. Why should we go about to create difficulty and confusion where everything is clear and regular? We have seen that all the examples possess in common a distinctive mark,—one which appears to be peculiar to them. Let this, then, be assumed to be the principle of the subjunctive mood ;—and let other examples be submitted to the same test. If, upon its application, the subjunctive mood shall show itself in every case to be possessed of the same properties, I shall be justified in propounding a simple doctrine, which will satisfactorily reconcile all the seeming incongruities in regard to this hitherto abstruse point of grammar.

In a vast number of examples to which I have applied it, I find no real exception ; for the cases in which we meet with the subjunctive mood in the *subject*, and the indicative in the predicate, so far from being exceptions, greatly confirm the view which I have taken of the matter.

The subject of a sentence may be composed of two or more clauses, so dependant upon one

another, that the whole might form a complex sentence of itself. If, in such sentence taken independently, a clause should be attached to the predicate, and the verb be consequently in the subjunctive mood, the same mood is preserved; where a whole complex sentence is taken to form the subject of another. Thus, I may say, "*Is moderatione quietus animo, est, sibi: ipse placatus, ut nec tabescat molestiis, nec frangatur timore, nec sitienter quid expetens ardeat desiderio, nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat.*" The clauses are attached to the predicate, and the verbs are in the subjunctive mood. Now I may take this sentence as the description of a person of whom I may wish to predicate something, so that it shall form the subject of another proposition: the mood of "*tabescat,*" &c. will not be altered. Cicero predicates "wisdom" of such a man; "*Ergo is, quisquis est, qui moderatione et constantia quietus animo est, sibi: ipse placatus, ut nec tabescat molestiis, nec frangatur timore, nec sitienter quid expetens ardeat desiderio, nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat, is est sapiens.*" *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 4. cap. 17.* Such a case as this does not invalidate the doctrine, but, on the contrary, tends much to confirm it. In fact, the subjunctive form of verb here depends

upon the same principle as before, though it stand in the subject of the sentence.

Again, a relative clause is frequently introduced into a sentence solely to explain what particular person or thing is meant by the antecedent. In such cases there exists no sort of connexion between the *clause* and the *predication*; it is so perfectly independent, that it may fairly be assumed to be parenthetical, and therefore the verb is necessarily in the indicative mood, whether the antecedent of the relative belong to the subject or to the predicate*. “Flumen Axonam, quod est in extremis Remorum finibus, exercitum transducere maturavit.” *Cæs. B. G. 2. 5.* The clause “*quod est in extremis Remorum finibus*” is really parenthetical, and forms an independant proposition: the verb therefore, as containing the copula, must be in the indicative mood; though the clause grammatically is part of the predicate in Cæsar.—“Bellum, quod est in Syria, Syriamque provinciam tibi tributam esse a Cæsare, ex tuis litteris cognovi.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. 12. 19.* The clause “*quod est in Syria*” stands

* Should the *whole sentence*, and consequently the relative clause as *part of it*, be predicated as the words spoken by any person, or as the command, direction, decree, &c. of any subject, then of course the verb of the relative clause will be in the subjunctive mood.—See this explained more fully in the following chapter.

apparently in the predicate ; but its sole force is to explain what particular “war” is spoken of ; it is consequently independant of the predication, and requires the indicative mood. The same idea might have been expressed by “*bellum Syriacum.*”

The cases which I have mentioned form no exception to the principle of the DOCTRINE which, I maintain, regulates the use of the subjunctive mood : I shall lay down the following rule as the result of our inquiries.

If a clause be the TRUE subject of a proposition, or be properly attached to the TRUE subject, the verb of such clause is in the indicative mood ; but if a clause be the TRUE predicate of a sentence (provided it does not contain the copula blended with the verb), or if it be properly attached to the TRUE predicate, the verb of such clause is invariably found in the subjunctive mood.

To this rule the following observations must be added : 1st, If a relative clause be employed solely to define or explain more clearly an antecedent, and consequently has no connexion with the predication, the verb of such clause is in the indicative mood ; the clause being really parenthetical, and forming an independant sentence : 2ndly, If the subject of a sentence be composed of two or more clauses, so dependant upon one another, that together they form a perfect sen-

tence, then, if any verb is required to be in the subjunctive mood, as being attached to the predicate of the sentence taken independantly, the same mood is used when the sentence forms the subject of another.

Such appears to be the use of the Latin subjunctive mood. The form was dictated by perspicuity, and its object appears to be, to distinguish the true predicate of a sentence, and to remove all doubt respecting the particular *term* which a clause is intended to qualify.—The subject has hitherto been involved in great obscurity, and the proper use of this mood has justly been considered one of the most difficult points in the Latin language; but I trust that I have reduced the cases in which the subjunctive form appears, to one general principle: and, if I am not deceived, the rule which is founded upon it is easy of application.

The doctrine being thus propounded and explained, it remains for me to prove its truth by applying it to a variety of cases, which have not hitherto been considered as capable of being included under any single rule. This test is, perhaps, the most satisfactory to which it can be submitted.

CHAPTER V.

THE TRUE DOCTRINE PROVED.

HAVING propounded a principle for the use of the subjunctive mood, it remains, that I endeavour to establish it upon the authority of the purest Latin Classics.

The test which I mean to apply is one that appears to me to be best adapted to my purpose. Different writers upon the subject have proposed different systems, and have selected examples in support of the various rules which they propose. An analysis of these examples will best determine whether the clauses in which the subjunctive mood appears, are not without exception to be attached to the predicates of their respective proposition.

In an anonymous publication entitled, *A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford*, we find the following theory proposed by its acute and learned author*. “The use of the subjunctive mood may be referred to *three general heads* :—

“1st, *When the SUBJECT of the sentence is uncertain, vague, or indefinite.*

* Page 49, note.

“2ndly, *When the PREDICATE is of that kind.*

“3rdly, *When the PREDICATION or sentence itself is not direct, but dependant upon something else.*”

The following examples are adduced in support of the first head :—

“Quæ de me populi sit opinio, nescio.”—*Cic. Clar. Orat. cap. 51.* The subject of the sentence is manifestly *ego*, and the relative clause forms part of the predicate. “Neque is sum qui disputem.”

Subj.	Cop.	Pred.
Ego	—neque sum—	is qui disputem.

“Qui ita dicat, ut a multis probetur.”—*Clar. Orat. cap. 49.* The sentence is not complete, and even in the original the real subject does not clearly appear, unless from a review of the context. Cicero says, “Plane,” (*Res ita se habet ut,*) “inquam, Attice, disputationem hanc de oratore probando aut improbando multo malim tibi et Bruto placere: eloquentiam autem meam populo probari velim. Etenim necesse est, qui ita dicat, ut a multitudine probetur eundem a doctis probari.” At first view, it might appear that the antecedent to *qui* is the subject, but the argument shows that the true subject is *doctis* with its substantive understood. “For learned men must approve the eloquence of one whose eloquence is approved by the multitude.” The relative clause forms part of the predicate. “Ego præclare intelligo,

me in eorum commemoratione versari, qui nec habiti sint oratores, neque fuerint.”—*Ib.* 49. *Ego* is the subject, and the rest of the sentence is the predicate with the copula.

The next example is introduced with the following remark: “When the writer speaks of definite persons, he uses the indicative mood.” To this remark, I fully assent, though I should prefer the distinction more clearly marked. The indicative mood is used, when the relative clause is employed solely to define more clearly the parties of whom the predication is made, and when, therefore, it has no sort of connexion with the predication itself.

“De iis autem, quos ipsi vidimus neminem fere prætermittimus eorum, quos aliquando dicentes vidimus.”—*Clar. Orat. cap. 49.* The relative clauses may almost be considered parenthetical, being used solely to define the antecedents of the relatives.

We now come to those examples which are adduced in support of the second head.

“Omnium quos quidem ego audiverim.”—*Clar. Orat. cap. 55.*

The sentence runs thus: “Fuit enim Sulpicius vel maxime omnium, quos quidem ego audiverim, grandis, et, ut ita dicam, tragicus orator.” The subject being Sulpicius, the relation

which the clause bears to the predicate is evident. “*Epistolæ . . . tum videlicet datæ, cum ego me non belle haberem.*”—*Cic. Att. cap. 5. 11.* The clause is manifestly in connexion with the predicate,—the subject being *epistolæ*.

“*In Cumano cum essem, venit ad me, quod mihi pergratum fuit, Hortensius.*”—*Cic. Att. cap. 5. 2.*

Hortensius, the subject—*venit ad me cum in Cumano essem*, the predicate; *quod pergratum fuit*, is an independent sentence, and inserted parenthetically.

“*Nos Tarenti quos cum Pompeio dialogos de Republica habuerimus ad te perscribemus.*”—*Cic. Att. cap. 5. 5.* The learned author of the “Reply” appears to me to have mistaken the mood of the verb *habuerimus*. Cicero, at the time of writing his letter, had not had these discussions with Pompey. He says, “*Eas (tuas litteras) accipiemus Brundusii. Ibi enim Pomtinum ad eam diem, quam tu scripsisti expectare consilium est.*” In the following letter he speaks of his arrival at Tarentum, and alludes to the intention he had expressed of waiting the arrival of Pomtinus. That intervening time, he says, he considers it will be most convenient to spend in the society of Pompey. And, doubtless, he mentions this to account for his not having

remained at Brundisium. “Tarentum veni a. d. xv. Kalend. Jun. Quod Pomtinum statueram expectare, commodissimum duxi, dies eos, quoad ille veniret, cum Pompeio consumere : eoque magis, quod ei gratum esse videbam ; qui etiam a me petierit, ut secum et apud se essem quotidie : quod concessi libenter. Multos enim ejus præclaros de republica sermones accipiam.” From this it is clear, that *habuerimus* in the passage quoted is not in the subjunctive mood, but is the future perfect indicative. This mood was required by the usage of the language, for the relative clause has no connexion with the predication made by *perscribemus*, being used solely to define the antecedent.

A list of examples is then given, where it is said that something more distinct is intended by the predicate, and the indicative mood is used.—But I think that we shall be able to account for the mood upon the same principle as in other cases.

“Ex quo veni ad ea, quæ fueramus ego et tu inter nos de sorore in Tusculano locuti.”—*Cic. Att. 5. 1.* In which case it is evident, that the clause is used to define more clearly the antecedent of the relative *quæ*.

The same observation applies to the next case, though the whole sentence deserves to be intro-

duced, that we may observe whether *viderem** does not attach itself to the predicate. The clause *quod te spero approbaturum*, is independant and purely parenthetical, similarly to *quod mihi pergratum fuit* in a former example. "Tantum dicam; quod te spero approbaturum, me posteaquam illi arti, cui studueram, nihil esse locis neque in curia, neque in foro, viderim, omnem meam curam atque operam ad philosophiam contulisse." —*Cic. Fam.* lib. iv. Ep. 3.

"Quatenus de religione dicebat, cuique rei jam obsisti non poterat, Bibulo assensum est." —*Cic. Fam.* lib. i. Ep. 2. The quotation does not permit us to discover the real subject. The previous sentence, however, shows what was the leading idea in Cicero's mind, and consequently the true subject. "Itaque cum sententia prima Bibuli pronunciata esset, ut tres legati regem reducerent; secunda Hortensii, ut tu sine exercitu reduceres, tertia Volcatii, ut Pompeius reduceret: postulatum est ut Bibuli sententia divideretur. Quatenus de religione dicebat," &c. From this it is evident that *sententia Bibuli* is the subject, not *wholly*, but qualified and restricted by the clause, *quatenus de re-*

* Ernesti, whose edition I have consulted, and from which I have extracted my quotations, reads *viderim*, which certainly the construction requires, though he admits that it is "contra libros omnes."

ligione dicebat. Cuique rei jam obsisti non poterat is parenthetical. “*Illud, quod est, quaecunque est, probat.*”—*Clar. Orat. 52.* *Vulgus* is the grammatical subject; but, if I rightly interpret the writer’s argument, the true subject is *orator mediocris*, understood in the expression *illud, quod est, quaecunque est*; and if so, the indicative mood is used to mark it. The chapter begins thus, “*Hoc tamen interest, quod vulgus interdum non probandum oratorem probat; sed probat sine comparatione: cum a mediocri, etiam a malo delectatur, esse melius non sentit: illud, quod est, quaecunque est, probat. tenet enim aures vel mediocris orator, sit modo aliquid in eo: nec res ulla plus apud animos hominum, quam ordo et ornatus orationis valet.*” In the next example the clause is manifestly to be attached to the subject, as will be seen from the sentence given at length—“*Itaque post tribunatum primo multæ ad eum causæ, deinde omnes, maximæ quæcunque erant, deferebantur.*”—*Clar. Orat. 63.* The next example is introduced with the following observation: “A remarkable instance of this distinction of moods, founded in the nature of the predicate, occurs in the same passage of Livy.” “*Senatorum omnium, quique magistratus Capuæ, Atellæ, Calatiæ gessissent, bona venire Capuæ jusserunt: libera corpora quæ venundari placu-*

erat, Romam mitti et Romæ venire.”—*Liv.* 26. 34. The former relative clause is manifestly part of the predicate, the subject being *senatus*. The clause *quæ venundari placuerat* is commonly printed in Italics, as though it formed part of the decree; but I am persuaded that the clause is parenthetical, and forms an independent sentence introduced as an observation of Livy himself to mark that the *corpora* referred to were the same that had been mentioned before. He had said, “Campanis in familias singulas decreta facta, quæ non operæ pretium est omnia enumerare. Aliorum bona publicanda : ipsos liberosque eorum et conjuges vendendas, extra filias, quæ enup-sissent prius, quam in populi Romani potestatem venirent. Alios in vincula condendos, ac de his posterius consulendum.” When a reference is made to these in a succeeding part, the author marks it by the relative clause, *quæ venundari placuerat*; the object of which, therefore, is to define an antecedent, and is wholly unconnected with the predicate. A passage is then referred to in Cicero’s Epistles. “Hic quæ agantur, quæque acta sint, ea te et litteris multorum et nuntiis cognoscere arbitror : quæ autem posita sunt in conjectura, quæque mihi videntur fore, ea puto tibi a me scribi oportere.”—*Fam. Ep.* 1. 5. This passage certainly affords a remarkable in-

stance of the distinction between the moods; but it appears to me to be very confirmatory of the view which I take of the matter. The grammatical subject of each of these sentences is the same, namely *ego*; but I question much, whether it forms the *real* subject of either. The subjects are different in each sentence. In the former, Cicero seems to treat of *you* as though he had said, "You, as I imagine, are acquainted with, &c." and therefore the relative clause being part of the predicate has the subjunctive mood. But in the latter part there is a change of subjects, which is marked by the indicative mood. *The things* which Cicero thinks are proper to be communicated, are made *the subject*, and it is predicated of them that they *ought to be detailed in his letter*. He proceeds therefore at once to detail these circumstances. The principal parts of the predicates are really *cognoscere* in the former sentence, and *scribi oportere* in the latter. But as the two sentiments are expressed by a circumlocution, in which verbs of the indicative mood are introduced, the pure predicate is expressed by infinitives. Let any one take the predicates, *cognoscere*, and *scribi oportere*, as they stand in Cicero, and he will at once attach to them the proper subjects, *te*, and *ea quæ posita sunt*, &c.

We come now to the third head, which em-

braces all cases "where the whole sentence is dependant upon some word or sentence going before, to which, therefore, it is said to be subjoined." "Cui quidem ego, me cum rogaret, ut adessem in senatu, eadem omnia ostendi me esse dicturum.—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 4. 1. The clause is properly attached to the predicate ; for, as the anonymous critic observes, "*cum* means *upon* his asking me," and the clause qualifies the thing which Cicero asserts of himself. The critic remarks, "If the point of time merely is to be noted, the indicative will serve ;" but to this I will add, that in modal propositions, if the mode be significant of time only, the word or clause which expresses the mode is to be attached to the subject, as in the following example : and here the mode causes the proposition, which would otherwise be a *universal*, (as it has a singular noun for its subject,) to become a *particular*. "Cum de tuis rebus gestis agebatur, inserviebam honori tuo."—*Ep. Fam.* 3. 13. The predication is made of Cicero under the limitation of a particular time, as is manifest from the whole sentence. "Quasi divinarem, tali in officio fore mihi aliquando expetendum studium tuum, sic, cum de tuis rebus gestis agebatur, inserviebam honori tuo." *Quasi divinarem*, &c. qualifies *inserviebam*, the thing predicated.

We are next told, that “if the preceding clause be in the potential mood, all the subordinate clauses, *although merely descriptive*, (unless intended to introduce some independent fact,) must be in the subjunctive: and this is what is commonly meant by consecutive moods.” The reason of this is manifest from the doctrine which I lay down; for if the preceding clause, from its logical position, requires its verb to be in the subjunctive mood, the clauses which are subordinate, having necessarily the same logical position, will also have their verbs in the same mood. The example given is, “Jusserunt, ita ut nemo eorum civis Romanus, aut Latini nominis esset: neve quis eorum, qui Capuæ fuissent, dum portæ clausæ essent, in urbe agrove Campano intra certam diem maneret*.”—*Liv.* 26. 34. It is remarked, that “*ne*, which governs the principal clause, extends its power to all the subordinate ones.” It has however, I trust, been shown, that neither *ne* nor any other particle governs a mood. The verbs assume the subjunctive form from their connexion with *jusserunt*; and without the addition of the clauses, the predicate would be incomplete.

The next example is from Cicero; and I give

* Examples of this character will be treated of under the first rule given by Dr. Crombie for the subjunctive following *qui*.

the whole sentence, in order that the connexion of the clauses may be seen. “Quos Sex. Titius consecutus, homo loquax sane, et satis acutus, sed tam solutus, et mollis in gestu, ut saltatio quædam nasceretur, cui saltationi Titius nomen esset.”—*Clar. Orat.* 62. The adjectives in this sentence are the real predicates; as, in fact, Cicero wished to describe the oratorical character of Titius. The meaning of the author would be best conveyed in our language by “Sex. Titius succeeded these, and was, &c.” The next example is given to show, that “if the preceding clause be in the indicative, the subordinate descriptive clause is also indicative,” “M. Atilius Regulus, cujus, ex iis qui ad Capuam fuerant maxima auctoritas erat in consilio, inquit, &c.”—*Liv.* 26. 33. The clauses are attached to the subject; and besides, the relative clause *qui ad Capuam fuerant* is only explanatory of an antecedent. Had the other clause been attached to the predicate, we should have found *esset* and not *erat*.

The critic next observes, “In the speeches of Livy indeed, or of any Latin historian, may be seen a very striking illustration of the nature of this mood. When the speeches are given in the third person, every sentence proceeds in the subjunctive mood; because the

tenses depend on *dixit*, or some such word preceding. Let any one turn a speech of this kind into the first person, and he will change all the subjunctive tenses into indicatives ; with the exception of those which, according to the first and second principle, would still be subjunctive. The same holds of messages, instructions, decrees, &c." This rule is more fully set forth by Dr. Crombie in the *Gymnasium*, and we shall shortly have to allude to it.

The fact is true, but it has not, as I am aware, been accounted for upon any satisfactory principle. The doctrine which I have propounded explains the reason ; for in all cases of the kind, the speeches or decrees, or whatever else they be, are necessarily parts of the *predicate*, which is introduced by *dixit* or some such word. The example which is adduced appears to me to be not happily chosen ; for though the learned critic states, that if Livy had been simply relating a *fact*, he would have used the indicative mood, I am much disposed to question the correctness of the remark. The example is, " *Supplicatio omnibus deis, quorum pulvinaria Romæ essent, indicta est.*"—*Liv.* 24. 10. It appears that the relative clause exercises a power beyond that of defining an antecedent, and has a sort of connexion with *omnibus* ; and I must confess, that if

the following sentiment were turned into Latin, I should expect to find the subjunctive mood. "The Romans were celebrating a thanksgiving to all the gods who had shrines in Rome,"—"Supplicationem omnibus deis, quorum pulvinaria Romæ essent, Romani habebant." The words which Livy uses were probably the same as those of the decree, but he does not wish to mark that they are the precise words. He uses the same words, I may say, accidentally. The meaning of Livy would, perhaps, be best conveyed by the expression "as many as," or "such as," for *omnibus quorum*.

The next example is manifestly in support of the doctrine: "Nuntium misit, qui diceret*." The two remaining examples are to the same effect. I shall give the former of the two sentences complete, as it furnishes other examples in support of the doctrine I propose. "Itaque virum fortem, mihique imprimis probatum, Antonium, præfectum evocatorum, misi ad te, cui, si tibi videretur,

* It is foreign to my purpose to enter upon the question, whether the tenses of the subjunctive mood imply futurity. In the anonymous *Reply* it is said, that the example, "*nuntium misit, qui diceret*," "brings us very near to that character of the subjunctive, in which it is said to resemble the future tense,"—p. 52, *note*. I am inclined to think that the same law holds for the same tenses, whether of the indicative or the subjunctive mood; and that the seeming futurity of the latter mood arises from its being necessarily combined with other words which convey the idea of futurity.

cohortes traderes : ut dum tempus anni esset idoneum aliquid negotii gerere possem.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 3. 6. *Ego* is the subject ; and the clauses in which we find the subjunctive, express the object or purpose for which Antonius was sent, and are consequently attached to the predicate. In the last of the examples which are adduced, the clause expresses in like manner the purpose : “ In Siciliam duo Prætores profecti : P. Cornelius ad exercitum ; Otacilius, qui maritimæ oræ præesset.”—*Liv.* 24. 12.

I have thus examined the different examples adduced by a most able critic in support of a theory, which he proposed as likely to simplify the use of the subjunctive mood. Though they are brought forward under three different heads, they are, without exception, found to possess the same distinctive character with the examples which I selected in the last chapter ; namely, *that the clause, in which the subjunctive form of verb appears, is attached to the predicate ; and the clause in which the indicative mood is, belongs to the subject.* Of course, it will be understood, that I always except the cases in which the clause is used solely to define an antecedent more clearly ;—such cases being more properly parenthetical. The number and the variety of the cases

examined will go far to establish the doctrine. But let me proceed to examine the examples in Dr. Crombie's *Gymnasium*; the number of which is considerably greater, and they are classed under a much greater variety of heads.

CHAPTER VI.

THE TRUE DOCTRINE PROVED.

No grammarian has compiled clearer or more definite rules for the use of the subjunctive than those which are to be found in Dr. Crombie's *Gymnasium*. The directions which are given for the use of the mood with *conjunctions* are dispersed among the general observations. But at the commencement of the second volume we find a digested body of laws for the subjunctive, following the relative *qui*. The various cases, in which the subjunctive is thus found, are classed under eight heads; and examples are adduced from the purest Latin authors in confirmation of the view which the learned critic takes.

Before I proceed to examine the cases of the subjunctive following conjunctions, I shall consider the rules which are given for determining when this mood is to follow the relative. The wording of several of the rules is such, as necessarily to limit them to examples in which the relative clause is attached to the predicate of the sentence. It will not be necessary to examine many examples under these heads; but it is worthy of particular remark, that the critic ob-

serves in regard to them, that the pronoun *qui* is *uniformly* joined to the subjunctive mood. In other cases, where no such limitation as I have mentioned, exists, it is *not* asserted that the subjunctive mood *uniformly* follows *qui*.—But to proceed to the rules.

The first is given in these words: “The pronoun *qui* is uniformly joined to the subjunctive mood, when the relative clause does not express any sentiment of the author’s, but refers it to the person or persons of whom he speaks.” This same rule had been expressed by Gesner in various parts of his invaluable Lexicon.

Now assuming the doctrine, which I have propounded, to be true, it satisfactorily accounts for the fact. It is impossible for the relative clause, under the circumstances, to be otherwise than attached to the predicate. The rule extends itself beyond *relative* clauses, comprising all, howsoever connected with the principal verb. It matters not whether the verb be *dico*, *censeo*, *statuo*, or any other of the kind. These verbs are of incomplete meaning, and require clauses to express what is *said*, *thought*, or *determined*, and the verbs of such clauses will *never* be found in the indicative mood*.

* The anonymous author of a *Reply*, whose theory I have examined, states most justly that “the same holds of messages, instructions, decrees, &c.”—p. 52, note.

I will now proceed to examine the examples ; but I shall make more copious extracts than are given by Dr. Crombie, to show that the rule extends to every clause whether connected by the relative or a conjunction. “Non se existimare Romanos sine ope Deorum bellum gerere, qui tantæ altitudinis machinationes tanta celeritate promovere, et ex propinquitate pugnare *possent* : se suaque omnia eorum potestati permittere dixerunt : unum petere ac deprecari, si forte pro sua clementia ac mansuetudine, quam ipsi ab aliis *audirent*, *statuisset*, Adriaticos esse conservandos, ne se armis *despoliaret* : sibi omnes fere finitimos esse inimicos, ac suæ virtuti invidere, a quibus se defendere, traditis armis non *possent* ; sibi præstare, si in eum casum *deducerentur*, quamvis fortunam a populo Romano pati, quam ab his per cruciatum interfici, inter quos dominari *consueissent*.”—*Cæs. B. G.* 2. 31. The same remark applies to all the clauses of this passage. They are attached to the predicate, and the verbs are found to be one and all in the subjunctive mood. *Audiebant*,—*consueverant* would, as Dr. Crombie observes, imply observations of Cæsar, and not of the speakers. To this I would add, *audiebant* would predicate the hearing of its subject, namely the speakers : *audirent* would show that the *actual hearing* was not the thing predicated, but the

saying that they had heard. Cæsar's reply is the next example, in which we have four verbs in the subjunctive mood under the same circumstances as before. "Ad hæc Cæsar respondit : Se magis consuetudine sua quam merito eorum, civitatem conservaturum, si prius quam aries murum attigisset, se *dedidissent* : sed deditiois nullam esse conditionem, nisi armis traditis : se id quod in Nervios *fecisset*, facturum ; finitimisque imperaturum, ne quam dedititiis populi Romani injuriam *inferrent*."—*Cæs. B. G.* 2. 32. The subject of this passage is Cæsar, of whom it is predicated that he replied, "that he, &c." Every clause of this reply forms part of the predicate, and its verbs are found to be in the subjunctive mood.

"Itaque Cicerone consulente, frequens senatus decernit, Tarquinii indicium falsum videri, eumque in vinculis retinendum ; neque amplius potestatem faciundam, nisi de eo *indicaret*, cujus consilio tantam rem *esset mentitus*." *Sall. B. C.* cap. 49. *Senatus* is the subject, of which the decreeing certain things is predicated ; and *nisi de eo indicaret, cujus consilio tantam rem esset mentitus*, forms part of the decree, and therefore is attached to the predicate.

We are next referred to another example from Cæsar ; but I shall extract the whole speech of

Divitiacus. “Pro his Divitiacus facit verba : Bellovacos omni tempore in fide, atque amicitia civitatis Æduæ fuisse : impulsos a suis principibus, qui *dicerent*, Æduos, a Cæsare in servitum redactos, omnes indignitates, contumeliasque perferre, et ab Æduis defecisse, et populo Romano bellum intulisse. Qui hujus consilii principes *fuissent*, quod *intelligerent*, quantam calamitatem civitati *intulissent*, in Britanniam profugisse. Petere non solum Bellovacos, sed etiam pro his Æduos, ut sua clementia ac mansuetudine in eos *utatur*: quod si *fecerit*, Æduorum auctoritatem apud omnes Belgas amplificaturum, quorum auxiliis atque opibus, si qua bella inciderint, sustentare *consuerint*.”—*Cæs. B. G.* 2. 14. In this single quotation we meet with no fewer than the following examples of the subjunctive being used in clauses which form part of the predicate, “*dicerent*,” “*fuissent*,” “*intelligerent*,” “*intulissent*,” “*utatur*,” “*fecerit*,” “*inciderint*,” “*consuerint*.”

It is needless to pursue the inquiry further with the cases of this rule. It is observed by Dr. Crombie with truth, that “it may be delivered as a rule, admitting no exception, that when the relative clause expresses no sentiment of the writer’s, but refers the sentiment, directly or indirectly, to the persons of whom he is

speaking, the relative must be joined with the subjunctive mood."

It sometimes happens that the author, in detailing the sentiments of a person, will introduce an observation of his own, and of course, in such cases, the indicative mood is used. This may sometimes arise from inadvertency, but frequently the suddenness of the turn gives a vivacity to the narrative. We met with one instance of this from Livy, quoted in the anonymous *Reply*, and Dr. Crombie has given several others. To these we may add,—*Liv.* 24. 19. "dum Casilinum oppugnatur."—*Ib.* 23. 33. "vergunt."—*Ib.* 3. 2. "antea dederat."—*Ib.* 37. 52. "Taurum montem est."—*Tacit. Annal.* 11. 14. "præpollebant,—acceperant." Perhaps some of these may be interpolations or errors of transcribers, as *Cæs. B. G.* 1. 31. "quod Helvetii fecerunt," though other manuscripts have the better reading, "fecerint."

Let me now proceed to the second rule:

"The relative pronoun is joined to the subjunctive mood, when the relative clause expresses the motive, reason, or cause of the action or event, or explains some circumstance in the character of the agent, which accounts for its production."

Now, I apprehend, that all the relative clauses

which can properly be classed under this rule, are necessarily attached to the predicate, and that they can never be joined to the subject. But it may be advisable to examine a few of the examples, especially as it may be necessary to ascertain whether, in certain cases which are brought forward in the observations upon this rule, the clauses are not properly attached to the subject, and the indicative mood is used.

The first example given is, "*Male fecit Hannibal, qui Capuæ hiemarit**." The relative clause in this sentence is manifestly to be attached to the predicate. The subject is *Hannibal*; and *male fecit*, which is the predicate, is qualified by the clause *qui Capuæ hiemarit*. *Male fecit* is not predicated of Hannibal indefinitely, but in a sense limited to the fact of his wintering at Capua. If the indicative should be used, the clause would be unconnected with the predicate, and

* The author of the *Gymnasium* says: "*Hannibal did wrong in wintering at Capua, that is, because he wintered,—Male fecit Hannibal, qui Capuæ hiemarit, or quod Capuæ hiemavit.*" By this it is implied, that the two expressions, *qui hiemarit* and *quod hiemavit* are synonymous. This I cannot admit; but, as it involves the nature and construction of *quod*, I shall reserve the consideration, till we come to consider Conjunctions. The nature and use of *quod* deserves a separate examination. But thus much I may say, if *qui hiemarit* and *quod hiemavit* are synonymous, *qui haberem* and *quod habebam* are equally so; but I much question whether Terence would have said, "*Omnes laudare fortunas meas, quod gnatum habebam, tali ingenio præditum.*"

would only define the antecedent *Hannibal*; as though the writer did not consider *Hannibal* sufficiently descriptive of the person meant, and therefore added the clause, “*qui Capuæ hiemavit.*” The indicative connects the clause with the subject; the subjunctive attaches it to the predicate. The same is expressed in the *Gymnasium*: “If we say, *Male fecit, qui hiemavit*, we impute error to the person who wintered, but do not express the error as consisting in wintering. When we say, *Male fecit, qui hiemarit*, we signify that he erred *because he wintered, or in wintering.*”

The next example is of a similar character: “*Omnes—laudare fortunas meas, qui gnatum haberem, tali ingenio præditum.*”—*Ter. And. 1. 1. 70.* In this instance the connexion is manifest. “*O fortunatum Eunuchum, qui quidem in hanc detur donum.*”—*Ter. Eun. 2. 3. 73.* This is an exclamation, but it is under the same government as a proposition. In fact, exclamations are real sentences, though parts of them are omitted. Interjections have no government. The nouns which are joined to them depend for their case on the parts which are omitted. This is evident, as well from those sentences in which interjections are used without any ellipsis, as also from the fact, that interjections which are said to betoken certain emotions of

the mind, are joined to nouns in those cases which verbs, or other words expressing the same emotions, govern. In the example before us, Chærea predicates of himself an opinion which he entertains, namely, “that the Eunuch was happy in being made a present into that house.” The relative clause, therefore, is attached to the predicate. In like manner is it connected in the following example; though, to speak correctly, the clause is in this instance part of the predicate, as being part of what it is affirmed that the subject said. “Non se existimare, Romanos sine ope divina bellum gerere, qui tantæ altitudinis machinationes tanta celeritate promovere possent,—dixerunt.”—*Cæs. B. G. 2. 31.* Had Cæsar given this speech in the first person, *existimamus*, the subjunctive mood (*possint*) would have been required; but, in the form in which it appears, the example would have been better classed under the first rule.

The next example is an exclamation: “O fortunate adolescens, qui tuæ virtutis Homerum præconem inveneris.”—*Cic. Orat. post Redit.* The clause of this, as before, is attached to the predicate, whether *ego* or *tu* be considered as the subject.

Quo redibo ore ad eam, quam contempserim.

Ter. Phorm. 5. 7. 24.

The clause is not used in this instance to define

more clearly the antecedent of the relative, but it expresses the cause why Phormio is disinclined to return.

“Cum esset, ut dicere institueram, constituta auctio Romæ, suadebant amici cognatique Cæsennia, id quod ipsi quoque mulieri in mentem veniebat; quoniam potestas esset emendi fundum illum Fulcinianum, qui fundo ejus antiquo continens esset nullam esse rationem, amittere ejusmodi occasionem.”—*Cic. pro Cæcin. cap. 5.*

In this sentence the subject is *amici cognatique Cæsennia*, and the whole of the rest forms the predicate; the two clauses, *ut dicere institueram*, and *id quod ipsi quoque mulieri in mentem veniebat*, are parenthetical.

“Illi autem, qui omnia de republica præclara, atque egregia sentirent, sine recusatione, sine ulla mora negotium susceperunt.”—*Cic. in Cat. 3. 2.* It might appear, at first view, that the relative clause is connected with the subject: but Cicero does not confine his predication to the *fact*, that they “*undertook the business.*” He rather means to assert, that they *made no hesitation or delay in undertaking the business*; and he further pays them the compliment of predicating the reason of their readiness, which he does by means of the clause, *qui omnia de republica præclara atque egregia sentirent.*—“Religione tactus

hospes, qui omnia, ut prodigio responderet eventus, cuperet rite facta, ex templo descendit.”—*Liv.* 1. 45. The translation given in the *Gymnasium* for the clause is, “The stranger, being a person who was desirous,” or “because he desired,” &c. The latter is in my opinion correct; but the former does not convey the precise meaning of Livy. The writer does not intend simply to express the character of the stranger, but introduced the clause as *the reason why ex templo descendit*. “Cum ille promississet, tum Pythius, qui esset, ut argentarius, apud omnes ordines gratus, piscatores ad se convocavit et ab his petivit, ut ante suos hortulos postridie piscarentur.”—*Cic. de Off.* 3. 14. The clause, I maintain, is in this example also to be attached to the predicate; for, by means of it, Cicero explains the ground of Pythius’ confidence, that the fishermen would attend to his summons and accede to his request.

The next example is not given correctly from Cæsar: “Prima luce ex castris proficiscuntur, ut quibus esset persuasum.”—*Cæs. B. G.* 5. 31. Some very important words are omitted, which mark the proper connexion of the clause. Prima luce *sic* ex castris proficiscuntur, ut, quibus esset persuasum, *non ab hoste, sed ab homine amicissimo Ambiorige consilium datum, longissimo agmine,*

maximisque impedimentis. It was not so much Cæsar's intention to predicate the fact of marching out, as the manner in which the march was performed. This is shown by *sic*, which exerts great force here ; and the clause is necessary to complete the sense, in other words, the full predicate.

In the next example the terms of the sentence cannot be seen from the quotation. "Egressi Trojani ut quibus nihil superesset."—*Liv.* 1. 1. The whole sentence must be given ; and once for all, I would observe, that the writer's full view and object should be seen before any opinion is hazarded respecting the real terms, and the proper connexion of the clauses. Livy says, "Ibi egressi Trojani, ut quibus ab immenso prope errore nihil, præter arma et naves, superesset, quum prædam ex agris agerent, Latinus rex Aboriginesque, qui tum ea tenebant loca, ad arcendam vim advenarum armati ex urbe atque agris concurrunt." The relative clause is not connected with "*egressi*," or, I may say, with "*Trojani*" simply, but with the clause *quum prædam ex agris agerent*. The subject of the sentence is *Rex, Aboriginesque, qui tum ea tenebant loca* ; and it is predicated of them, *armati ex urbe atque agris concurrunt* ; the object is mentioned, *ad arcendam vim advenarum*. The sentence also explains, who the

strange comers were, and the nature of the *vis* committed, *Trojani, quum prædam ex agris agerent*. It further informs us of the reason which induced the Trojans upon landing to commit this violence: They did it in consequence of their being persons who after their long wanderings had nothing left, but their arms and their ships. The clause, therefore, like the other in which the subjunctive "*agerent*" is found, is properly attached to the predicate. The connexion of the clause in the next is manifest. "*Neque tamen Antonius longe aberat, utpote qui magno exercitu locis æquioribus expeditos in fugam sequeretur.*"—*Sall. B. C.* 59. The clause qualifies *longe*, at a great distance, for one who, &c.

I must again extract a full sentence, in order to show the proper connexion of the clause: *quippe qui videam* constitutes the whole of the quotation in the *Gymnasium*. "*Facturusne operæ pretium sim, si a primordio Urbis res populi Romani perscripserim, nec satis scio; nec, si sciam, dicere ausim: quippe qui, quum veterem, tum vulgatam esse rem, videam, dum novi semper scriptores, aut in rebus certius aliquid allaturos se, aut scribendi arte rudem vetustatem superaturos, credunt.*"—*Liv. Præf.* The passage quoted contains two sentences, of each of which *ego* is the subject; but in the latter, it is qualified by the

circumstance contained in the clause, *dum novi semper scriptores aut in rebus certius aliquid allaturos se, aut scribendi rudem vetustatem superaturos, credunt*. It is predicated of *ego* thus qualified, *nec, si sciam, dicere ausim*. The reason is subjoined, *quippe qui, quum veterem, tum vulgatam esse rem videam*. This, therefore, is manifestly attached to the predicate ; for, in fact, the verb which contains the copula is omitted, *ausim* being what is commonly called potential. Perhaps the ellipsis might be supplied by *res ita se habet ut*.

“Convivia cum patre non inibat ; quippe qui ne in oppidum quidem nisi perraro veniret.”—*Cic. pro Rosc. Amer.* 18. The relative clause expresses the cause of the predicate being denied of the subject, and is therefore, as any other under similar circumstances, connected with the predicate. “Frater ejus, utpote qui peregre depugnavit*, familiam ducit.”—*Cic. Phil.* 5. 11. The readings of manuscripts vary as to the mood, the majority having *depugnarit*, which, I am inclined to think, is the true reading. If the indicative mood is read, the clause simply mentions a circumstance which occurred in Lucius’ life, without connecting it with the fact expressed by the principal verb. This is an acknowledged

* Ernesti in a note says, “Conjeci esse debere *depugnavit*. Sic dein reperi in edd. pr. et notatum e MS. Huyd. unde restitui.”

law ; and therefore, in the case of the indicative mood, the clause is *not* connected with the predicate. But, if the subjunctive mood be the reading, it is equally an acknowledged maxim, that the clause accounts for the principal fact, and therefore is connected with the predicate. The words themselves imply a connexion between the clause and *familiam*.

“ Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera sint, quorum in altero venustas sit, in altero dignitas ; venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus ; dignitatem virilem.”—*Cic. de Off.* 1. 36. The subjects here are *dignitas* and *venustas*, and it is affirmed of them that they ought to be considered the one *virilis*, the other *muliebris* ; the reason for this division is given in the clauses, *Cum autem*, &c. “but since there are two,” i. e. “only two kinds of *pulchritudo*, and in one of these *venustas* consists, and in the other *dignitas*.” “ Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis quarum in altera sermo sit, in altera contentio : non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio orationis majorem vim habeat ad gloriam.”—*Cic. de Off.* 2. 14. The simple sentence is, *Contentio majorem sermone vim ad gloriam habet*. The subject is *contentio*, and Cicero is led to explain why he speaks of only these two *rationes orationis*, namely, that there are only two sorts, &c. “ Sed cum sint plura causarum genera, quæ

eloquentiam desiderant, multique in nostra republica adolescentes et apud iudices et apud senatum dicendo laudem assecuti sint; maxima admiratio est in judiciis.”—*Cic. de Off.* 2. 14. In this example the relative clause is in no wise connected with the predication, but is introduced to define more clearly the antecedent. The particular “*causæ*” of which Cicero wished to speak were not sufficiently defined without the addition of the clause, and the indicative* mood is required. The subject of the sentence is *judicia*, of which it is affirmed that they are most worthy of admiration of *all* the kinds of public speaking, since there are many kinds, and young men have acquired praise for their eloquence in judicial proceedings and in the senate†. “*Inde puerum liberum loco coeptum haberi, erudique artibus, quibus ingenia ad magnæ fortunæ cultum excitantur. Evenit facile, quod Diis cordi esset. Juvenis evasit vere indolis regię.*”—

* Ernesti says, in a note upon the passage, “*legendum est desiderant;*” but this would alter, or rather destroy the sense of the whole.

† The proper connexion of *cum sint plura causarum genera* in this example, and *cum duplex ratio sit orationis* in the preceding sentence, will be apparent, from considering in what term the word is, with which the clauses are more immediately connected, namely, *maxime*, in the superlative degree, where the comparison is made between several things,—*majorem*, in the comparative, where the comparison is made between two only.

Liv. 1. 39. The subject of the sentence, *Evenit facile, quod Diis cordi esset*, is the fact which is mentioned in the following line; and it is mentioned that it happened easily, as being a thing which was agreeable to the Gods.

The third rule comprises those cases in which “*qui* is equivalent to *quanquam*, or *etsi is, si modo, dummodo is*, when the subjunctive mood is required.”

The first example under this head is clearly in favour of the doctrine I have laid down. “*Id factum graviter tulit Induciomarus, suam gratiam inter suos minui: et qui jam ante inimico in nos animo fuisset, multo gravius hoc dolore exarsit.*” —*Cæs. B. G. 5. 4.* The clause explains the reason why Induciomarus “*multo gravius hoc dolore exarsit.*” The connexion in the next example will be seen more clearly from the context, and the quotation will show that all the verbs in the clauses attached to the predicate are in the subjunctive mood. “*Omnes denique hoc in hac causa intelligent, hoc animo esse Siculos, ut si in istum animadversum non sit, sibi relinquendas domos ac sedes suas, et ex Sicilia decedendum atque adeo fugiendum esse arbitrentur. Hos homines tu persuadebis ad honores atque amplitudinem tuam pecunias maximas voluntate sua contulisse? credo, qui te in tua civitate incolu-*

mem esse nollent, hi monumenta tuæ formæ ac nominis in suis civitatibus esse cupiebant.”—*Cic. in Verr. act. 2. lib. 2. cap. 65.* In this sentence, *credo* is used parenthetically, and the whole of the last sentence is spoken ironically. Cicero says, that the Sicilians did, indeed, desire to have *monumenta formæ* of a man, since they were unwilling that he should be in security in his own state. By this, he implies that they did not desire it.

After the following example from Tacitus, I shall proceed to the next rule. “*Memoriæ proditur, Tiberium, quotiens curia egrederetur, Græcis verbis in hunc modum eloqui solitum, O homines ad servitutem paratos ! scilicet, etiam illum, qui libertatem publicam nollent, tam projectæ servientium patientiæ tædebat.*”—*Tac. Annal. 3. 65.* The subject of this latter sentence is *tam projecta servientium patientia*; and it is affirmed of it that it excited disgust even in one, who had no desire for public liberty,—*qui libertatem publicam nollent.*

4th Rule. “When the relative pronoun follows an interrogative or a negative clause, the antecedent and relative clauses referring to the same subject, and logically expressing but one subject and one attribute, the relative is uniformly joined with the subjunctive mood.”

The wording of the rule necessarily limits it to those cases where the relative clause is so wholly unconnected with the subject, that, in reality, it is itself the true predicate ; but it does not contain the copula. “ *Quis est enim, cui non perspicua sint illa ?* ”—*Cic. de Off.* 2. 5. That is, in other words, *Omnes perspiciunt*. But Cicero expresses the sentiment in a more lively manner by a question and a circumlocution, in which *est* stands as the pure copula. The relative clause, which forms the predicate, has the verb in the subjunctive mood. “ *Quis est, qui utilia fugiat ?* ”—*Cic. de Off.* 3. 28. That is, *Nemo utilia fugit*. The same observation applies here, which was made in the preceding case.

An observation in the *Gymnasium* shows that the rule embraces only those cases, in which the relative clause forms the predicate. “ The reader, we presume, will observe that this rule is applicable to those cases only, which are indeed far the most numerous, in which the interrogation is equivalent to an affirmation or negation. When the sentence implies a question, put for the sake of information, the relative takes the indicative mood.” In fact, the relative clause in such cases is used to define the subject, as in the first example given in the *Gymnasium*. “ *Quis hic est, qui operto capite Æsculapium salutat ?* ”—*Plaut.*

Curc. 3. 19. The logical construction will be seen from the proper answer to the question, *Hic qui operto capite Æsculapium salutat, est quem quærebam.*

It is remarked under this rule, that, “in like manner, perspicuity requires, that after conditional or hypothetical clauses, the substantive verb not being the mere copula, and the two clauses being combinable into one, *qui* should be joined with the subjunctive mood.” A single example will be sufficient to show that the principle upon which we find the subjunctive mood in such cases is the same as that which regulates its use in all others. “*Si quis est, qui Catilinæ similes cum Catilina sentire non putet.*”—*Cic. Orat. in Cat.* 2. 4. This clause is attached to the subject of a sentence, but separately it forms a perfect sentence; and the relative clause is the predicate of that sentence, and the verb consequently is in the subjunctive mood.

Another observation is made in regard to the rule: “When the interrogative and relative, and also when the negative and relative clauses refer to different subjects or express different attributes, the rule does not hold.” The examples adduced are, first, “*Hoc nemini dubium est, qui reo custodiam, quæsitori gratulationem, indici præmium decrevit, quid de tota re et causa judi-*

carit.”—*Cic. in Cat.* 4. 5. The subject of this sentence is *nemo*, and the relative clause is certainly in the predicate ; but the indicative mood is used to mark, that it has really no proper connexion with the thing predicated, *dubitat*, but that it is used solely to define an antecedent. The sentence is spoken, not of an indefinite person marked by a certain character, but of a particular individual who had performed a certain action.

The second example is, “*Nihil sane id prosit Miloni, qui hoc fato natus est.*”—*Cic. pro Mil.* 11. The connexion of the clause cannot be seen without a fuller view of the writer’s argument. Cicero, after detailing the circumstances under which Clodius was killed, says, “*Nihil dico quid respublica consecuta sit : nihil quid vos : nihil quid omnes boni : nihil sane id prosit Miloni, qui hoc fato natus est, ut ne se quidem servare potuerit, quin una rempublicam vosque servaret.*” The true subject of the sentence therefore is “*Milo.*” For Cicero, wishing to represent the conduct of his client in a favourable point of view to his judges, hints at the advantages, which the state, the judges themselves, and all good men would receive from the death of Clodius. To prevent, however, any construction unfavourable to Milo being put upon his words, he strenuously asserts that Milo could not be profited by it. Upon the

mention of his client, Cicero attaches to him a circumstance which enables him to make the predication with the greater confidence. As though he had said, "Milo being born with this fate, &c., could not, indeed, receive any benefit to himself from the death of Clodius."

The doctrine which I have proposed is allowed by Dr. Crombie in regard to cases which can be classed under this fourth rule; for he observes, that "the rule appears to be dictated by a regard to perspicuity. For it is necessary to distinguish, whether the negative term with the substantive verb be the predicate, and the relative clause the subject; or whether the verb in the relative clause be the predicate, and the other terms the subject. If we say, *Nemo est, qui ita existimat*, it strictly means, 'He who thinks so, is nobody,' that is, 'a person of no consequence.' Here *nemo est* is the predicate; *qui ita existimat*, the subject. If we say, *Nemo est, qui ita existimet*, it means, 'There is no one who thinks so.' *Nemo* is the subject; and the other terms, logically comprehensible in the verb *existimat*, form the predicate,—thus, *Nemo existimat*." To these observations of Dr. Crombie, I need add nothing; for they contain the very principle, which, I maintain, regulates the use of the subjunctive in all cases.

“The fifth case, in which the relative is very generally, if not always, joined to the subjunctive mood, is when, in order to impart greater emphasis to the expression, a periphrasis with the verb *esse* is employed, instead of simply the nominative with the principal verb.” As, “Sunt quidicant.”—*Cic. in Cat.* 2. “Fuere ea tempestate, qui dicerent.”—*Sall. B. C.* 23. “Inventi autem multi sunt, qui vitam pro patria profundere parati essent.”—*Cic. de Off.* 1. “Plures inventi, qui propter ubertatem terræ in Crustumini nomina darent.”—*Liv.* 1. 11. In these and in all such-like examples, the relative clauses are the predicates. Were we in any case to change the mood into the indicative, the sense would become entirely altered, and the connexion of the clause would be manifest. This distinction is so well known, that I shall only quote the words of Dr. Crombie. “When Cicero says, ‘Erant in magna potentia qui consulebantur,’—*Cic. pro Muræ.*—he means, ‘Those who were consulted were in great power.’ Here the relative clause forms the subject, and the other the predicate. Had he said, ‘Erant in magna potentia, qui consulerentur,’ he would have expressed, ‘There were men in great power who were consulted.’ Here ‘men in great power’ is the subject, and ‘were consulted’ the predicate.” Thus another

class of cases is brought under the same principle as that to which we have reduced all the preceding examples.

But there is a remark made by Dr. Crombie, which I must not pass by. "Poets frequently, and prose writers sometimes, in cases where there is no risk of ambiguity, deviate from this rule." The examples, as far as regards prose writers, are not happily chosen; for the greater number of manuscripts and the better editions have the subjunctive mood; "Ut enim sunt qui urbanis rebus bellicas anteponunt," or, according to Ernesti, and the Oxford 4to edition of Cicero's Works, supported by manuscripts, "anteponant."—*Cic. de Off.* 1. 24. Indeed from any means which I have at hand, I cannot discover that any manuscript has the indicative mood. Besides, in the very same sentence we find another verb similarly circumstanced in the subjunctive mood: "Sic reperies multos quibus periculosa et callida consilia, quietis et cogitatis et splendidiora et majora videantur." Again, "Sunt, enim, qui discessum animi a corpore putant esse mortem."—*Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* 1. 9. Some manuscripts defend this reading; but, as before, the majority have the subjunctive mood, "putent." This, doubtless, is the correct reading, as may be shown from the context, the next sentence being, "Sunt

qui nullum censeant fieri discessum:” and here the readings of the manuscripts do not vary. Unless therefore we impute inconsistency to Cicero, we must conclude that he wrote “putent.”

It is next observed; “I believe it may be confidently affirmed, that not a single example can be found, in which *qui* is not thus joined to the subjunctive mood, if the substantive verb has its subject expressed. We cannot say *Est bonus, qui spernit*, to denote ‘There is a good man who despises;’ for this would mean, ‘He who despises is a good man.’” We meet with the following passage in Cicero: “Sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriæ, qui eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur: hique arbitrantur se beneficos in suos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quacumque ratione.—*De Off.* l. 14. This passage, at first sight, appears to contradict the assertion of the learned critic; but the relative clause forms the subject, and the true predicate is *multi et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriæ*. Cicero in the previous sentence had said, “those who injure some, that they may be liberal to others,” are guilty of the same injustice as though they should convert the property of another to their own use. And he proceeds now to say that such characters, described by the clause “*qui eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur*,

form a numerous class, and are, in fact, desirous of splendour and glory. This is further manifested by the introduction of *hi* in the following sentence, which would be unnecessary, if the relative clause were the predicate.

The observation in regard to poets has the appearance of being made with some degree of justness; as, certainly, from a few of the poets passages may be adduced, which are seemingly at variance with the rule. Dr. Parr has spoken of some of these in a letter upon the subjunctive mood, which he addressed to Professor Pillans of Edinburgh. It being my intention to examine the cases collected in this letter, it will be more convenient to consider Dr. Crombie's remark at the same time.

5th Rule. "When 'is qui,' 'ille qui,' 'hic qui' are used for 'such that;' in other words, when *qui* is used for *ut ego, ut tu, ut ille*,—it is joined with the subjunctive mood." The rule appears to embrace those cases only in which the relative clause is necessarily attached to the predicate. All other cases are excluded, and the reader's attention is particularly directed to the difference between the English expressions, "I am the man who commands you," and "I am the man who command you." In the former case, the relative clause forms part of the predicate of the propo-

sition; in the latter, it is part of the subject. In English, as in Latin, the relative agrees with the antecedent in gender, number, and person: and, as a general rule, it may be recommended, that the relative be placed as near as possible after the antecedent. Now in the example before us, "I am the man who command you," the person of the verb marks the antecedent with which the relative agrees, and the better order is, "I who command you am the man." "I who command you" is the subject; "the man" is the predicate. In the other example "I" is the subject, and "the man who commands you" is the predicate. This difference of meaning, which in English is marked by the different antecedents of the relative, and consequently by the different persons of the verb, is marked in Latin by the different moods in which the verb "command" is placed, the person of the verb remaining the same*. Thus "I am the man who commands you," would be expressed in Latin by "Ego is sum, qui tibi imperem." The proper Latin expression for the English sentence "I who command you am the man," is "Ego

* In English, if the subject be of the third person, the sentence will be ambiguous, unless the more grammatical order of words is preserved. "He is the man who commands you," which may mean either, "This man commands you," or "He who commands you is the man." In Latin there can be no ambiguity.

is sum, qui tibi impero.” The usage of the language appears to require this difference of moods.

But let me examine a few of the examples: “Atque illæ dissensiones erant hujusmodi, Quirites, quæ non ad delendam, sed ad commutandam rempublicam pertinerent.”—*Cic. in Cat.* 3. 10. The division of this sentence may be thus given; “*Illæ dissensiones*,” the subject,—of which it is predicated that they were “*hujusmodi quæ non ad delendam, sed ad commutandam rempublicam pertinerent*.”—“were dissensions of a particular character,”—“such as had a particular object in view.” The second example is similar, and is taken from the same chapter: “Atque illæ tamen omnes dissensiones, quarum nulla exitium reipublicæ quæsivit, ejusmodi fuerunt, ut non reconciliatione concordiæ, sed internecone dijudicatæ sint.”—*Id.* In this example the reader will observe, that the clause “*quarum nulla exitium reipublicæ quæsivit*” is parenthetical, and the verb is in the indicative mood.

“At ea fuit legatio Octavii, in qua periculi suspicio non subesset.”—*Cic. Orat. Philipp.* 9. 2. *Legatio Octavii*, the subject,—*ea, in qua periculi suspicio non subesset*, the predicate. “Nec tamen ego sum ille ferreus, qui fratris carissimi atque amantissimi præsentis mœrore non movear, ho-

rumque omnium lacrymis, a quibus me circum-
sessum videtis.”—*Cic. Orat. in Cat.* 4. 2. *Ego*
is the subject, and its predicate, “a man of such
an obdurate nature as not to be moved,” &c.
The clause “*a quibus me circumsessum videtis*,”
is used to define the antecedent, and therefore
the verb *videtis* is in the indicative mood.

The following example is also from Cicero :
“*Sed cum is sit, qui judicet.*” But the whole
sentence is worthy of being transcribed, as offer-
ing a clear illustration of the use of the moods.
“*Quod si is esset Panætius qui virtutem prop-
terea colendam diceret, quod ea efficiens utilita-
tis esset ; ut ii, qui res expetendas vel voluptate
vel indolentia metiuntur ; liceret ei dicere, utili-
tatem aliquando honestate pugnare : sed cum sit
is, qui id solum bonum judicet, quod honestum
sit ; quæ autem huic repugnent specie utilitatis,
eorum nempe accessione meliorem vitam fieri,
nec decessione pejorem : non videtur ejusmodi
debuisse deliberationem introducere, in qua quid
utile videretur, cum eo quod honestum esset
comparetur.*”—*Cic. de Off.* 3. 3. It will be ob-
served, that *ut ii, qui res expetendas vel voluptate,
vel indolentia metiuntur* is parenthetical, and its
relative clause, which has the verb in the indi-
cative mood, is the subject of the parenthetical
sentence, the predicate having been expressed in

the principal sentence. In the rest of the quotation, it will be perceived that the mood of every verb corresponds with the law that I am endeavouring to establish. The clauses are connected by various particles, as, *si*, *quod*, *cum*, and *qui*; but they are all connected with the predicates, and the verbs are in the subjunctive mood.

7th Rule: With regard to this rule nothing definite is laid down; and I hope to be excused for transcribing Dr. Crombie's observations. "The effect of the relative clause is sometimes explicative, and sometimes restrictive. If we say, 'Man that is born of a woman is of few days,' the relative clause is explanatory of the antecedent. It does not confine or limit the generic import of the antecedent, 'man,' but states a proposition applicable to the whole species, all men being born of woman. And, in such cases, the relative may be resolved into *et ille*, thus, 'Man is of few days, and he is born of woman.' But if we say, 'The man is wise who speaks little,' the relative clause limits the import of the antecedent, and confines it to that man who speaks little; '*Vir sapit, qui pauca loquitur*.' The *qui loquitur* is not explanatory of the term *vir*, or predicable of the whole species, but restricts and modifies its generic meaning. In English, the explicative and

the restrictive sense are generally distinguished by the omission or the insertion of the definite article. In Latin, the pronouns *Hic*, *Is*, *Ille*, are frequently employed to restrict the import of the antecedent. And where the pronoun is omitted, perspicuity would be consulted by joining the relative, when the clause is restrictive, to the subjunctive mood; and when it is explanatory, to the indicative mood. This distinction, however, is not frequently observed." The rule has no reference to the principle upon which, I maintain, the Latins used the subjunctive mood. If, therefore, I am right in the view which I take, it is not surprising, that the distinction mentioned by Dr. Crombie should "not be very frequently observed." It will, however, be better to examine the examples.

"Homo qui rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, principia et causas rerum videt, facile totius vitæ cursum videt."—*Cic. de Off.* 1. 4. In place of *qui* I prefer *quod*, which is the reading of most of the MSS. Under either circumstance the clause may be said to be explanatory, and certainly attached to the subject. Its verb is found in the indicative mood. "Quomodo, igitur, jucunda vita potest esse, a qua absit prudentia?"—*Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* 5. 35. In this passage, Dr. Crombie observes, the re-

lative clause is restrictive, and the verb is therefore in the subjunctive mood, though in the next sentence it is admitted, that there are numberless examples in which the relative clause limits the import of the antecedent, and yet the verb is in the indicative mood. The context appears to me to require a different translation from that which is given, "How can the (or that) life be agreeable, which is devoid of prudence?" By this translation, "agreeable" is made the predicate, and "life which is devoid of prudence" the subject. But the argument of Cicero will not admit this resolution of the sentence. I must confess, that I could not for a considerable time discover the true subject. And the difficulty appeared to me to arise from the nature of an universal negative proposition, which I considered this in reality to be. "No life that is devoid of prudence can be an agreeable life." For as both its terms would be distributed, the simple converse of it would be equally true. But the only conclusion which will suit Cicero's argument is an universal affirmative; and, moreover, "*jucunda vita*" *must be the subject*. In the twenty-ninth chapter he had drawn a conclusion from his previous reasoning, "*Necesse est semper beatum esse sapientem.*" He then proceeds to say, "*Sed quæramus unamquamque*

reliquorum sententiam, si fieri potest, ut hoc præclarum quasi decretum beatæ vitæ possit omnium sententiis et disciplinis convenire." He then enumerates four opinions, one of them being that of Epicurus,—“Nihil bonum, nisi voluptas.” To reconcile this with his own opinion is the aim of the thirty-third and two following chapters; and he draws the conclusion in these words: “Quomodo igitur jucunda vita potest esse, a qua absit prudentia?” A negative conclusion would prove nothing. The only one which would prove the point, that he desired to establish, was an affirmative proposition; and also, it could not be particular, for then neither term would be distributed. The two propositions which he wished to reconcile may be thus stated: “*Sapientia est felicitas*,” and “*Voluptas est felicitas*.” And the only method by which he could legitimately reconcile the *latter* with the *former*, was by showing that “*voluptas est sapientia*,” where “*voluptas*” must be distributed, and must therefore be the subject. Having proved this by induction, he draws the conclusion in these words: “Quomodo igitur jucunda vita potest esse a qua absit prudentia?” The meaning of which is, “How, therefore, can pleasure subsist in a life devoid of prudence?”—In other words, All (that can be properly included

under the term) pleasure is wisdom,—*voluptas est sapientia**.

In order to see the proper connexion of the relative clauses in the next example, it will be necessary to extract the entire sentence from Cicero: “Ita enim senectus honesta est, si se ipsa defendit, si jus suum retinet, si nemini emancipata est, si usque ad extremum spiritum dominatur in suos. Ut enim adolescentem, in quo senile aliquid; sic senem, in quo est adolescentis aliquid, probo: quod qui sequitur, corpore senex esse poterit, animo nunquam erit.”—*Cic. de Sen.* 11. Now if the sentence, which is quoted in the *Gymnasium*, be taken abstractedly, *ego* appears to be the subject; *ut enim adolescentem, in quo senile aliquid; sic senem in quo adolescentis aliquid, probo*. But Cicero had no wish to predicate any opinion of his own, as though he in particular approved of or admired any person. His true subjects are, *adolescens in quo est senile aliquid*; and *senex in quo est adolescentis aliquid*. Of each of these Cicero predicates *pro-*

* Cicero in reality says, that he will reconcile the opinion of Epicurus with his own; and he does it by a regular syllogism in *Barbara*, showing that the opinion of Epicurus is to be concluded legitimately from his own proposition. “Jucunda vita est sapiens vita (or sapientia,)” is the assumption or minor premiss:—

Sapientia est felicitas;

Voluptas est sapientia;

Ergo, Voluptas est felicitas.

bandus. The relative clauses, therefore, form parts of the subjects, and the verbs of the clauses are in the indicative mood.

“*Neque enim solum corporis, qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad naturam accommodati sunt.*” —*Cic. de Off.* 1. 28. The predicate “*probandi*” is not said of “*corporis motus*” or “*animi motus*” generally, but of them restricted by the clauses “*qui ad naturam apti sunt,*” and “*qui ad naturam accommodati sunt.*” The proper connexion is evident. “*Omnis homines, qui sese student præstare cæteris animalibus, summa ope niti decet.*”—*Sall. B. C.* 1. 1. The relative clause in this instance also forms part of the subject; *homines* being restricted by it.

There is no occasion to examine another class of cases mentioned under this rule, as, in fact, Dr. Crombie himself remarks, that “when the relative clause denotes the predicate, the relative is almost universally joined with the subjunctive mood.” No example is given of the verb being in the indicative, and I much question whether any can be adduced. Should there be any, and the readings be correct, I think it is not too much to assume, that they would be deviations from the common usage of the language.—The eighth rule informs us, that “*qui*, taken for *quis*,

is generally joined with the subjunctive mood." The few examples that are given confirm the view which I take. "Sentiet qui vir siem."—*Ter. Eun.* 1. 1. 21. "Ego illum nescio, qui fuerit."—*Ter. Eun.* 4. 3. 15. "Nescio, quibus artibus sit eruditus." In all these cases the relative clauses express the particular ignorance which is predicated of each subject: "Artes haud novi, quibus ille est eruditus," is an entirely different sentence from the preceding. In this latter case, ignorance of certain arts is predicated; and the particular arts which are meant are defined more clearly by the relative clause; and here, as in all such cases, the indicative mood is used. In the former sentence, ignorance of a fact is predicated, and the fact is expressed by the relative clause, which, therefore, limits the sense in which the ignorance is predicated.

Such are the comprehensive rules, laid down by the learned author of the *Gymnasium*, for the construction of *qui* with the subjunctive. I have endeavoured (and, I hope, successfully) to reduce to one simple and general principle all the examples which can be classed under them. And the reader will not fail to have observed, that whenever a rule was so expressed as to be capable of being reduced to that single one, which

I propose, it is particularly noticed in the *Gymnasium*, that the relative is *uniformly* joined with the subjunctive. In other cases it is admitted that the verb of the relative clause is found in both the indicative and subjunctive moods. Yet all the examples which are brought forward in proof of the assertion have, I trust, been shown to be under the same universal principle.

CHAPTER VII.

CONJUNCTIONS.

HAVING examined the rules which have been laid down for the construction of the relative with the subjunctive, I proceed to show, that the true doctrine of this mood is not confined to *relative* clauses, but extends itself to all, howsoever connected with the leading proposition.

I shall first examine the examples of the *Gymnasium*, in which *cum* is joined either with the indicative or with the subjunctive mood.

I must, however, premise two things. 1st, That I purposely omit to notice the distinction which is commonly made by grammarians between the *adverb* and the *conjunction* "*cum*." I shall take the word as employed to connect two clauses together, and examine under what circumstances it is found with the indicative, and under what with the subjunctive mood.

2ndly, That I am obliged to pass over many examples, from the want or inaccuracy of references; it being frequently impossible to discover the true subject of a sentence without an examination of the work whence the extract is made.

We are first told, that "*cum* taken for *quo*-

niam or *quandoquidem*, ‘since,’ is very generally joined to the subjunctive mood.”—“Cum amet aliam, non est utile hanc illi dari.”—*Ter. Adelph.* 3. 2. 43.

Hanc illi dari (subject),—*est* (copula),—*non utile*, (with the *reason* why so,) *cum amet aliam*, (predicate). The clause cannot be considered as in any-wise qualifying the sense in which *hanc dari* is to be taken: but it materially affects the predicate; for not only *uselessness*, but the *reason of it* also is predicated.

“Cum autem duobus modis, id est, aut vi, aut fraude fiat injuria: fraus quasi vulpeculæ, vis leonis videtur: utrumque homine alienissimum.”—*Cic. de Off.* 1. 13. The connexion of the clause will be apparent, if we consider the simple proposition expressed by this sentence, *Utrumque genus injuriarum* (or *omnis injuria*) *est homine alienissimum*. The reason is then assigned, why it is *homine alienissimum*; namely, because it necessarily takes place in one of two ways, *aut vi*, *aut fraude*. It is then parenthetically asserted, that *these* are qualities of beasts. *Fit* would convey an entirely different meaning. Cicero speaks of every kind of *injuria*, and consequently the proposition is universal. Had *fit* been used, the proposition would have been particular, and the meaning would have been, “In-

juria, when it takes place *aut vi*, *aut fraude*, *est homine alienissimum* ;”—in other words, “some injuries are” &c.

“*Quod cum ita sit*, putant quidam, hanc comparationem non recte introductam fu-isse.”—*Cic. de Off.* 3. 3. *Quidam* (subject),—*putant hanc comparationem non recte (quod cum ita sit) introductam fuisse* (predicate).

“*Per ecastor scitus puer natus est Pamphilo. Deos quæso, ut sit superstes, quandoquidem ipse est ingenio bono ; cumque huic veritus est optumæ adolescenti facere injuriam.*”—*Ter. And.* 3. 2. 7. In this case the indicative mood is used ; and we shall find that the clause is attached to the subject. *Cum* would here be said to be *causal* ; and it is worthy of remark, that when a clause expresses the cause of an action, it ought to be ascertained, whether it express the efficient or the final cause ; for it may be given as a general rule, that the efficient cause, since it expresses something *antecedent* to the action, is *generally* to be attached to the subject ; but that the final cause, which expresses something *subsequent* to the action, is *always* to be attached to the predicate*. It appears to be consistent with reason

* A clause expressing a final cause may be in the subject of a sentence ; but only when the subject forms a sentence of itself, and contains more than one clause : the final cause will then be attached to the predicate of the separate sentence.

to divide sentences in this manner ; and if I mistake not, it will be found, that the verb of the efficient cause is generally in the indicative mood, and the verb of the final cause always in the subjunctive mood. This connexion will explain why *ut**, signifying “in order that,” is always followed by the subjunctive mood, and *quod* more frequently joined with the indicative mood. Now, in regard to the example which led to these remarks, the clause expresses the efficient cause, and is properly attached to the subject, *ego*. Lesbia says, “I, induced by the character of Pamphilus, (expressed by *quandoquidem ipse est ingenio bono; cumque huic veritus est optumæ adolescenti facere injuriam,*) pray the Gods that his boy may live.”

“Ego redigam vos in gratiam ; hoc fretus, Chreme, cum e medio excessit, unde hæc suscepta est tibi.”—*Ter. Phor.* 5. 7. 73. The clause expresses something antecedent, which induced the hope in Demipho’s mind that he should succeed. The connexion with the subject is further

* “*Ut* is *causal*, but it denotes the *final cause*, or something which is to follow. *Quod*, *because*, denotes the *efficient cause*, or something which has gone before. This distinction is very necessary. It is the key to the right use of these particles in a thousand cases : and the neglect of it may account for many anomalies in the use of the English particles, which have much perplexed grammarians.”—*Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford*, p. 60, note.

manifested by the words, "hoc fretus." It almost amounts to this: "This circumstance will reconcile you." As in the preceding example, the sense may nearly be given in these words, "The noble disposition of Pamphilus merits that his boy should live." The next example requires that the whole sentence should be extracted. "De quo, etsi pro tua facilitate et humanitate purgatum se tibi scribit esse: tamen primum, ut debeo, tibi gratias ago, cum tantum litteræ potuerunt, ut his lectis, omnem offensionem suspicionis, quam habueras de Lysone, deponeres: deinde credas mihi affirmanti velim, me hoc non pro Lysone magis, quam pro omnibus scribere, hominem esse neminem, qui unquam mentionem tui sine tua summa laude fecerit."—*Cic. Fam. Ep. lib. 13. 24.* Cicero predicates two things of himself, and he mentions the antecedent circumstances under which he was induced to assert these things. The clauses which express these circumstances are; therefore, properly attached to the subject, and the verbs are in the indicative mood, "scribit," "potuerunt." The mood of "deponeres" arises from the verb being in the predicate of the complex clause: the clause "quam habueras de Lysone" is parenthetical, defining the antecedent *offensionem*.

Cum, taken for *etsi* "although," is said to be

uniformly joined with the subjunctive mood. I shall, therefore, satisfy myself with the first example. “Cui cum Cato et Caninius intercessissent tamen est prescripta.”—*Cic. Fam. Ep.* 1. 2. Cicero does not mean to assert simply “that the decree passed,” but “that it was carried *in defiance of the interdict* which the Tribunes interposed;” so that the clause which has its verb in the subjunctive mood is attached to the predicate.

Some directions are next given in the *Gymnasium* to determine when *cum* is to be joined with the indicative and when with the subjunctive mood. It is said, that “it is to be joined with the indicative when it signifies, 1st, ‘as often as,’ or ‘whenever;’ 2ndly, ‘at the time when,’ or ‘at which time;’ 3rdly, ‘the point of time at which an action or state commenced, conceived to be continued to the present period;’ 4thly, ‘as soon as,’ denoting an action or event in close succession to another.”

In all such cases, it is manifest that the clause having the particle *cum*, is used simply to denote *the time*, in respect of which some action or state is predicated of a subject. It therefore *limits* the subject as to *time*, it being only in regard to the time denoted by the clause, that the predication is made: and it is admitted that in all such cases

cum is joined with the indicative mood.—A single example of each rule will suffice.

“Cum prospero flatu ejus utimur, ad exitus pervehimur optatos; et cum reflavit, affligimur.”—*Cic. de Off.* 2. 6. *Nos* is the subject of the two sentences; but in the former it is qualified by the clause, *cum prospero ejus (fortunæ) flatu utimur*; in the latter sentence *nos* is in the same manner qualified by *cum reflavit*. In fact, Cicero means nothing more than to predicate *ad exitus pervehit optatos* and *affligit*, of two subjects, *fortuna prospera*, and *fortuna adversa*.

“At vocem citharædi non audiunt: ne stridorem quidem serræ tum, cum acuitur; aut grunnitum, cum jugulatur sus.”—*Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* 5. 40. The hearing of two different sounds is denied of *citharædi* at two different times, their attention being so wholly engrossed with their *music and their singing**. The proper connexion of the clauses is also rendered apparent by the sentence which follows the part quoted; *nec, cum quiescere volunt, fremitum murmurantis maris. Citharædi, cum serra acuitur* (subject),—*non audiunt stridorem* (predicate):—*citharædi, cum sus jugulatur* (subject),—*non audiunt grunnitum* (predicate). “Quia septem menses sunt, cum in

* The classical reader needs not to be reminded of the difference between *citharista* and *citharædus*.

hasce ædes pedem nemo intro tetulit.”—*Plaut. Most.* 2. 2. 39. *Menses* is the subject, but it is qualified by the clause *cum in hasce ædes pedem nemo intro tetulit*. The predicate is *septem*.

“Cum primum eam agere cœpi, pugilum gloria, funambuli eodem accessit exspectatio.”—*Ter. Hec. Prol.* 25. *Eodem accesserunt* is predicated of *pugiles* and *funambuli* limited to a time; which is marked by the clause *cum primum eam agere cœpi*.

The fifth and sixth directions inform us when *cum* is joined with the subjunctive mood: “when it signifies ‘after,’ denoting simply the posteriority of one event to another, but not implying close succession;” and again, “when it is joined to a secondary clause expressing a past action or event, as in progression, to which another action or event in the primary clause is expressed as contemporary.” The examples which are adduced in support of these two rules are of the same character. The clauses mark not simply the time, but the reason or occasion of the predicate, and consequently, they are properly attached to it. “Hæc cum animadvertisset, Cæsar convocato concilio, omniumque ordinum ad id concilium adhibitis centurionibus, vehementer eos incusavit.”—*Cæs. B. G.* 1. 40. “Cum finem oppugnandi nox fecisset, nuncios ad eum misit.”

—*Cæs. B. G.* 2. 6. “Quod cum Aristides audisset, in concionem venit.”—*Cic. de Off.* 3. 11.
 —“Cum civitas armis jus suum exequi conaretur, Orgetorix mortuus est.”—*Cæs. B. G.* 1. 4.
 The connexion between the clause and the death of Orgetorix does not appear at first sight. But it was Cæsar’s especial intention to mark that connexion, and he did it by using the subjunctive mood. The sense of the passage is,—that the death of Orgetorix was hastened by the circumstance mentioned in the clause. All doubt upon the point is, in my opinion, removed by the succeeding sentence: *Neque abest suspicio, ut Helvetii arbitrantur, quin ipse sibi mortem consciverit.* The connexion in the remaining examples is evident. “Cum hæc maxime agerent, trepidi nuncii ab Tusculo veniunt, Æquos in agro Tusculano esse.”—*Liv.* 3. 31. “Cum enim rex Pyrrhus, populo Romano ultro bellum intulisset, cumque de imperio certamen esset, perfuga ab eo venit.”—*Cic. de Off.* 3. 22. “Pridie Nonas Jun. cum essem Brundusii, litteras tuas accepi.” *Cic. Fam. Ep.* 3. 4.

It is no inconsiderable argument in favour of the doctrine which it is my object to establish, that it accounts for various circumstances which were known to exist in regard to the Latin mood; but which have never, as far as I am aware, been

satisfactorily explained. A very strong instance of this presents itself in the case of *cum*.

Dr. Crombie observes, that “it would seem that the rule by which the practice of classic writers was generally regulated, in regard to the adverb *cum*, was to join it to the indicative mood, when they intended emphatically to mark the time of one action, present, past, or future, as coincident with that of another action, or with any time specially, or generally. If no particular stress was laid on the times as coincident, and if the actions themselves, not their co-existence or their continuity, formed the primary consideration, *cum* was joined to the subjunctive mood.” In the former case, the clause being used merely to mark the time of another action, would necessarily be attached to the subject. It would imply, that the predication was made of the subject not *wholly*, but only in regard to the time of another action or event. This is marked by the indicative mood. In the latter case, when the subjunctive mood is used, it is admitted that the two actions, and not their co-existence, form the primary consideration. But in all such cases, the clause is connected with the leading action or event, and accounts for its happening, and therefore is attached to the predicate. *This distinction* is marked by the subjunctive mood.

The conjunction used is the same in each case, and the difference of meaning to be attached to the sentence does not arise from the conjunction *cum* (which, I am inclined to think, has always the same meaning, *concomitancy*), but from the difference of mood.

There is also another very useful rule, which is frequently given to learners to guide them in their choice of moods when *cum* is used, for which the doctrine accounts. If the verb following *cum* is to be put in the present or præterperfect tense, the indicative mood is to be used : but if the verb is to be put in the præterimperfect or præterpluperfect tense, the subjunctive mood is to be used. Now the present and præterperfect tenses have both of them a reference to present time, i. e. to a time *relatively* present ; the præterimperfect and præterpluperfect tenses refer to a time *relatively* past. The former, therefore, will be the tenses to be employed, if the clause is used to mark the time of another action or event ;—in other words, the clause in such cases is properly attached to the subject ; and the rule directs the indicative mood to be used. But if the clause be used to mark the cause or reason, as well as a connexion in regard to time, (since an event which causes another is necessarily antecedent to it,) a tense having reference to past time must be used, i. e.

the *præterimperfect* or *præterpluperfect*. The clause which expresses the cause of an action, (if the *action* naturally result from the circumstance mentioned in the clause,) is properly attached to the predicate ; and consequently, I say, the subjunctive mood is used.

There still remain two remarks in the *Gymnasium* upon the subject of *cum*, which deserve to be noticed. “The rules delivered for joining *cum* with the indicative mood, do not take place in the two following cases : 1st, If the clause be oblique,—We say, for example, ‘*Tempus fuit cum homines vagabantur.*’—*Cic.* ; but, ‘*Scio tempus fuisse cum homines vagarentur.*’—‘*Scis tempus fuisse,*’ says Cicero, ‘*cum homines existimarent.*’—*Ep. Fam.* 10. 3. 2ndly, When anything doubtful, contingent, or fortuitous is implied, the sense requires the potential mood.”

Why the indicative is not used in either of these cases is evident from the doctrine I have laid down. In such cases, as *tempus fuit cum homines vagabantur*, the subject is *tempus* qualified by the clause *cum homines vagabantur*,—the verb *fuit* is either the copula, or a verb of existence, accordingly as the sentence is complete or incomplete. But if the same sentiment be expressed obliquely, the *terms* of the sentence are different : a new subject is introduced, and the

former sentence is made part of a new predicate. The qualifying clause, which was before attached to the subject and had the indicative mood, has now become attached to the predicate, and consequently the subjunctive mood is required. *Scio tempus fuisse, cum homines vagarentur.*

In the case of doubt, contingency, &c. being implied, the subjunctive form is required, because the clause is attached to the predicate, namely the verb which expresses doubt or contingency, and which verb is omitted, because the sentiment expressed by the clause, and not the doubt or contingency, forms the primary consideration.

But an observation is made by Dr. Crombie, which is wholly inconsistent with what I consider to be the true principle of the subjunctive mood. He observes, that “though usage be very generally conformable to these rules, it is not universally so. Cicero says, ‘Tempus fuit, cum homines vagabantur.’ Varro, in a sentiment precisely similar, says, ‘Tempus fuit, cum homines rura colerent.’—*De Re Rust.* 3. 1. ‘Temporibus, cum homines vitam agerent.’—*Varro de Re Rust.* 1. 2.”

That the sentiments are *not precisely similar*, can, I think, be easily shown. There is exactly that difference which requires, in the one case the indicative, and in the other the subjunctive

mood. To make this appear, (and it is of material consequence that I should do it,) it will be necessary to extract from the authors the passages at length. Cicero, in his first book *De Inventione Rhetorica*, chapter 1st, says, “ Ac si volumus hujus rei, quæ vocatur eloquentia, sive studii, sive artis, sive exercitationis cujusdam, sive facultatis a natura profectæ considerare principium ; reperiemus id ex honestissimis causis natum, atque optimis rationibus profectum. Nam fuit quoddam tempus, cum in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur, et sibi victu ferino vitam propagabant ; nec ratione animi quidquam, sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant. Nondum divinæ religionis, non humani officii ratio colebatur ; nemo nuptias viderat legitimas : non certos quispiam adspexerat liberos : non, jus æquabile quid utilitatis haberet, acceperat. Quo tempore quidam, magnus videlicet vir et sapiens, cognovit, quæ materia esset, et quanta ad maximas res opportunitas in animis hominum, si quis eam posset elicere, et præcipiendo meliorem reddere : ”

Now from this it is manifest, that the real subject, of which Cicero wishes to predicate is *quoddam tempus* : the character of it is defined by the clauses, *cum in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur* &c. The sense of the author

would not be conveyed by the English expression, "for men in former times passed a wandering life like beasts." It is, in my opinion, inconsistent with Cicero's argument to make "men" the subject. This is shown by the insertion of the word "*quoddam*." It is further shown by the succeeding sentence beginning with *Nondum*. And after another sentence, a direct reference is made to the *particular time* of which past existence had been predicated "*Quo tempore*."

The case is very different in Varro. In the beginning of the third book *De Re Rustica*, he says, "Cum duæ vitæ traditæ sint hominum, rustica et urbana, Q. Pinni, dubium non est, quin hæ non solum locum discretæ sint, sed etiam tempore diversam originem habeant. Antiquior enim multo rustica: quod fuit tempus cum rura colerent homines, neque urbem haberent." In this case the true subject is *homines*, and the sentiment expressed is, that "men formerly inhabited country parts, and had no city." This is given in proof of *rustica vita* being of greater antiquity than *urbana vita*. As the sentence is expressed by a circumlocution, in which the copula is separated from the predicate, the verb of the predicate is put in the subjunctive mood. Without any detriment to the sense or the argument, Varro might have said, *quod olim*

rura colebant homines neque urbem habebant. But Cicero could not consistently have said, *Nam in agris olim homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur.* In such case, the sentence which follows *vagabantur* would have conveyed no meaning; for *Nondum* would have had no particular time to which it could refer. The same remark applies to another sentence, commencing with *Quo tempore.*

The arguments which the two writers use may be thus set forth; Cicero says, The origin of eloquence was most honourable and worthy. To prove this, he adds, For there was a time when men lived a life like beasts, and *at that time* some great and wise man induced them to live together in some fixed abode, and to adopt more civilized manners. To effect this, eloquence was necessary. The *time* is the primary consideration, as it marks the origin of eloquence. Varro observes, that a country life is of greater antiquity than a city life; and to prove this, he brings forward the proposition, that men once lived in the country and possessed no city. Here, the *fact* of men having originally possessed no city is the very argument by which he proves his question.—I am therefore justified in concluding, that the sentiments expressed by Cicero and by Varro are not precisely similar. The different

views which they had, required the use of different moods. The subjunctive mood was no less required for the sake of perspicuity in the sentiment expressed by Varro, than the indicative in that expressed by Cicero.

Now let us examine, whether the view which I have taken of the matter is not confirmed by other examples from the same writers. Cicero says, "*Sed incidunt sæpe tempora, cum ea quæ maxime videntur digna esse, justo homine, eoque quem virum bonum dicimus, commutantur fiuntque contraria.*"—*De Off.* 1. 10. In this sentence, *sæpe incidunt* is the predicate, and it is spoken of *tempora*, not indefinitely, but qualified and restricted by the clause, *cum ea, quæ commutantur, fiuntque contraria*. The construction and logical division of this sentence is precisely similar to that taken from the treatise *De Inventione Rhetorica*. Again, "*Scis profecto, (nihil enim te fugere potuit,) fuisse quoddam tempus, cum homines existimarent, te nimis servire temporibus.*"—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 10. 3. Now in what possible way can we satisfactorily account for the use of the subjunctive mood in this sentence, and the indicative mood in each of the two preceding, if we do not have recourse to a logical division of sentences? The clause in this latter sentence forms part of the predicate, and the usage of the lan-

guage required the subjunctive mood. For the same reason we find the subjunctive mood in the clauses of the following sentence from Varro. "Qui (Dicæarchus) Græciæ vita qualis fuerit ab initio, nobis ita ostendit, ut superioribus temporibus fuisse doceat, cum homines pastoritiam vitam agerent, neque scirent," &c.—*De Re Rust.* 1. 2. Again, "Atqui si tempus est ullum jure hominis necandi, quæ multa sunt, certe illud est non modo justum, verum etiam necessarium, cum vi vis illata defenditur."—*Cic. Orat. pro Mil.* 4. *Non modo justum, verum etiam necessarium*, is the predicate, which is affirmed of the rest, which forms the subject; and the verb of the subject's clause is in the indicative mood.

In the following sentence we might imagine from the commencement, that "quoddam tempus" is the subject. But the context requires that *tu* should be, and the insertion of the personal pronoun proves the same. The sentiment is expressed by a periphrasis, and as the copula is introduced, the verb of the pure predicate is in the subjunctive mood. "Erit, erit illud profecto tempus, et illucescet aliquando ille dies, cum, *tu* salutaribus, ut spero, rebus tuis, sed fortasse motu aliquo communium temporum immutatis, (qui quam crebro accidat, experti debemus scire,) et amicissimi benevolentiam, et gravissimi ho-

minis fidem et unius post homines natos fortissimi viri magnitudinem animi desideres.”—*Cic. Orat. pro Mil.* 26. In like manner, in the following sentence the true subject is not “tempus,” but “ego:” and the having held a certain opinion is affirmed of it. This opinion is restricted by a conditional clause. “Ac fuit tempus illud, cum mihi quoque initium requiescendi atque animum ad utriusque nostrum præclara studia referendi, fore justum et prope ab omnibus concessum arbitrarer, si infinitus forensium rerum labor, et ambitionis occupatio, decursu honorum, etiam ætatis fluxu, constitisset.”—*Cic. de Orat.* l. 1. The clauses connected by *cum* and *si* qualify and restrict the predicate, and hence the subjunctive mood is used.

Having thus applied the doctrine in such a multiplicity and variety of cases, I might fairly assume, that it is established upon a sufficiently broad and solid basis. It may, however, be satisfactory to apply it to cases of other conjunctions, and the result will, I trust, prove equally conclusive.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONJUNCTIONS.

I PROCEED now to apply the doctrine to some cases of clauses connected by other conjunctions. And first with regard to *si*; the use of which is so frequent, that it will be necessary to examine a greater number of examples, than in the case of other conjunctions.

“ Verum ubi molestum non erit, ubi tu voles, ubi tempus tibi erit, sat habet, si tum recipitur.” —*Ter. Eun.* 3. 2. 31. In this sentence, “ contentment ” is predicated of Phædria under the condition of being placed in a particular state of circumstances. *Is, si ubi molestum non erit, ubi tu voles, ubi tempus tibi erit, tum recipitur*, is the subject. *Sat habet* contains the copula and predicate.

Facciolati defines *si* to be *conjunctio conditionalis*, and observes, “ Regit tum indicativum, tum conjunctivum.” He introduces the Latin student into the labyrinth, but does not supply him with any silken thread. Numerous examples are brought forward of the use of this conjunction, which evince the deep and accurate research of the compiler. But, as if to bewilder the student,

under each head are brought forward examples of the use of this conjunction joined with the indicative and with the subjunctive moods. A double path is thus presented to his choice at every step, “*partes ubi se via findit in ambas;*” without, however, his possessing the advantage of the Sibyl at his side to inform him which leads “*Ditis magni sub moenia,*” and by which “*iter Elysium est.*”

Gesner remarks upon this same conjunction, “*Conjunctio conditionalis : sed late accepto vocabulo conditionis, ut omnia etiam causarum genera complectatur, tempus item, et omnem aliam circumstantiam, a qua eventus aliquis quocumque modo pendere intelligitur. Quod ad constructionem attinet, indicativus modus adhibetur in re certa et definita. Conjunctivus pendere conditionem, incertamque esse indicat.*” He then proceeds to adduce examples in confirmation of his rule. The examination of a few of these will be a fair criterion of the truth of the Doctrine.

“*Etenim quid est, Catilina, quod jam amplius exspectes, si neque nox tenebris obscurare coetus nefarios, nec privata domus parietibus continere vocem conjurationis tuæ potest? Si illustrantur, si erumpunt omnia?*”—*Cic. Orat. in Cat. 1. 3.* The sentence is a particular proposition, of which

Tu, Catilina, si neque nox potest, si illustrantur, si erumpunt omnia, is the subject.

“ Si potuit manes arcessere conjugis Orpheus,
Threïcia fretus cithara fidibusque canoris :
Si fratrem Pollux alterna morte redemit,
Itque reditque viam toties.”—*Virg. Æn.* 6. 119.

In this passage the predicate is understood, having been expressed in the former sentence, *miserere nostri*. *Tu*, with the words quoted, forms the subject. Again, “ Nunquam labere, si te audies.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 2. 7. “ Failing” is denied of a person not wholly, but under the condition or qualification *si te audies*. Of a similar character is the next example. “ Si me audies, vitabis inimicitias, et posteritatis otio consules.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 2. 18. Again, “ Tum ei quadraginta millia, si esset absolutus Oppianicus pollicetur.”—*Cic. Orat. pro Cluent.* 26. Upon this Gesner remarks, “ *Pendet conditio*, Tamen finitivis, τοῖς ὀριστικοῖς, id est, indicativis etiam jungitur, cum conditio, ita tamen, ut nexum conditionis cum consequente suo certum indicet.” For myself, I must confess that I cannot discover the difference which the learned Lexicographer would make, between the conditions in the several examples : but this, as well as others, may be classed more readily and more methodically under one of two heads ; that the condition

is to be attached, either to the subject, or to the predicate. Now the act of promising is said of a subject unlimited by any condition. "He," *absolutely* or *wholly*, the subject, "makes a certain promise, namely, of a *conditional* gift,—that he would give under the condition, *si esset absolutus*. 'Pamphile, si id facis, hodie me postremum vides.'"—*Ter. And.* 2. 1. 22.

Let us now examine some examples classed under other meanings given of *si*. In *concessionibus*; I pass over several examples which do not apply to our subject, and to some I cannot refer in consequence of errors in the figures of reference. A very satisfactory exemplification of the doctrine is, however, offered in the following: "Si adsunt amici, honestissimi sermones explicantur, si non, liber legitur."—*Plin. Ep.* 3. 1. The true subject is not discoverable from the quotation. It will be necessary to refer to the preceding sentences. We shall be repaid by an instance of *si* followed by a subjunctive mood, the clause being a qualification of the predicate of a sentence. "Hanc regulam Spurinna constantissime servat; quinetiam parva hæc, (parva si non quotidie fiant,) ordine quodam, et velut orbe circumagit. Mane lectulo continetur: hora secunda calceos poscit, ambulat millia passuum tria: nec minus animum quam corpus exercet.

Si adsunt amici, honestissimi sermones explicantur: si non, liber legitur: interdum etiam presentibus amicis, si tamen non gravantur." It is evident from this, that neither "*sermones*" is the subject of the first sentence, nor "*liber*" of either of the two last. There are three particular propositions, of each of which *Spurinna*, under separate conditional qualifications, is the subject. The first condition is, *si adsunt amici*. Of this subject it is predicated, *cum iis honestissimos sermones explicat*. The second conditional subject is, *Spurinna, si non adsunt amici*; and of this it is predicated, *librum legit*. In the third sentence there is the same predicate, the subject being *Spurinna interdum etiam presentibus amicis, si tamen illi non gravantur*.

"Quod si bruma nives Albanis illinet agris,
Ad mare descendet vates tuus, et sibi parcet,
Contractusque leget."—*Hor. Ep. 1. 7. 10.*

In this sentence, *vates tuus* qualified by the condition *si bruma nives Albanis illinet agris*, is the subject.

The next example is one, which I enter upon with the greatest diffidence, as I have to express an opinion in opposition to the highest authorities. "*Visam si domi est.*"—*Ter. Heaut. 1. 1. 118*: Facciolati adduces this, as an example of *si* expressing a doubt and being used for *an*,

“dubitandi, pro *an.*” Gesner says the same; and Dr. Parr adduces it as an example of *si* signifying *whether**. But, in my opinion, the context requires a different interpretation. Chremes had before said, “sed ut diei tempus est, Monere oportet me hunc vicinum Phanium Ad cœnam ut veniat.” Now it appears to suit the context better to translate the passage, “Ibo, visam, si domi est,” “I will go, and *if he is at home*, I will pay him a visit.” The object of the visit had been before expressed, *monere ad cœnam ut veniat*. Chremes does not wish to ascertain *whether* Phantias is at home or not; but he wishes, should he be at home, to pay him a visit, with the object of reminding him of his engagement. This view appears to be confirmed by the succeeding line; for Chremes having gone to the house, and having ascertained that Phantias was at his (Chremes’)

* “Now before I close, let me observe, that there is a great laxity among the poets in the use of *si* and *an.* We have in Horace, ‘Inspice si possum donata reponere:’ here I should be disposed to read *possim*, if I did not find in Tibullus,

‘Illa mihi referat, si nostri mutua cura est.’

And in Terence, ‘Visam si domi est;’ where *si* has the power of *whether*. Yet the more general, and the more proper, or at least the more *analogical use* is the subjunctive.”—*Parr’s Works, Correspondence*, vol. vii. p. 478. The examples from Horace and Tibullus will be examined in another part: but I think it can be shown, that there did not exist “great laxity” among the Latin poets. Among them, it happens more frequently that the *grammatical* is not the *true* subject.

house, he says, “*Nihil opus fuit monitore.*” “*Ibo*” and “*visam si domi est*” are two propositions. The subject of the first is “*ego*” *absolutely* or *wholly*. The subject of the second also is *ego*, but not wholly, being qualified by the clause *si domi est*: and it is only under such qualification that the predication is made of it.

“*Si sapis ; neque præterquam quas ipse amor molestias habet, addas.*”—*Ter. Eun.* 1. 1. 31. Upon this passage Donatus, and after him, Gesner, says, “*Si sapis*” is used for “*Si sapias.*” If I may again presume to differ from such high authorities, I would affirm, that “*Si sapis*” is right. The subject of the sentence is *tu*, qualified by the condition “*si sapis.*”

The following sentence will be found to be similarly constructed :

“*Præterea, si nona diem mortalibus almum
Aurora extulerit, radiisque retexerit orbem
Prima citæ Teucris ponam certamina classis.*”

Virg. Æn. 5. 64.

“*Si est, ut velit reducere uxorem licet.*”—*Ter. Hec.* 3. 5. 51. In this example the subject is “*ille.*” With this the clause is connected, and therefore the verb is in the indicative mood, “*est.*” The mood of *velit* is caused by its being in the pure predicate, the copula being introduced through the periphrasis “*est ut velit,*” for “*vult.*”

The last example of *si* which I shall examine is from Cæsar. “*Illi vadum fluminis tentare (parant), si transire possent.*”—*Cæs. B. C.* 1. 83. The conditional clause here cannot possibly be taken in connexion with the subject. The act of making preparations is predicated of the subject “they,” unlimited by any condition. The part of the predicate with which the condition is more immediately connected, is, “*vadum fluminis tentare.*” “They make preparations to attempt a *passage* of the river, should they be able to effect it.”

The reader, if he chooses, may refer to the following passages, in which *si* is joined with the indicative, and the clause will be found to be properly attached to the subject. “*Si tibi videtur,—a quo si erit a nobis rescriptum.*”—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 9. 6. “*Si quid pragmaticon habes.*”—*Id.* 14. 3. “*Si quid possumus.*”—*Cic. Orat. pro Mil.* 8. “*Si illum—sciebat.*”—*Id.* 19, which sentence also contains *cum* with the subjunctive mood. “*Si nescis.*”—*Virg. Ecgl.* 3. 23. “*Si nescis.*”—*Ov. Ep.* 17. 198. “*Tempora si fuerint nubila.*”—*Ov. Trist.* 1. 9. 6. Also, “*Nec admiror metuunt si fulmine,*”—*Id.* 21. Also, “*Cum quis in adversis, si quid amavit, amat.*”—*Id.* 26, where *cum* is joined with an indicative mood, though it does not signify “at the time when.”

“Si—dilexi—sive te hæc—fecit.”—*Ter. And.* 1. 5. 57. “Si bene quid de te merui.”—*Virg. Æn.* 4. 317. “Si futuri sunt.”—*Cic. de Off.* 1. 21. “Si putas,—si offenderit,—si amiseris.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 7. 17. “Si vales, bene est.”—*Id.* 14. 22. “Si est, ut—admiserit.”—*Ter. Phor.* 2. 1. 40. “Fortuna, si cui obstitit.”—*Senec. de Benef.* 1. 5. “Di tibi si—respectant, si—justitia est.”—*Virg. Æn.* 1. 603.

The following are examples of clauses attached to the predicates of sentences, in which *si* is joined with the subjunctive. “Si omnis—videatur.”—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 14. 17. “Si unus ille occidisset.”—*Cic. Orat. pro Mil.* 15. “Si putetis—si posset.”—*Id.* 29. “Si qui tum interemisset.”—*Id.* 15. “Si—dicant.”—*Cic. de Off.* 1. 21. “Si se consulem fecissent.”—*Cic. de Off.* 3. 20. “Si—possimus.”—*Id.* 3. 8. “Si posset.”—*Liv.* 31. 9. “Operam servus dat, si possiet.”—*Plaut. Cist.* 1. 3. 37. “Si—gereret.”—*Liv.* 7. 31.

I will now proceed to examine some cases of other conjunctions, and first of “*quamquam*.” Vossius says, that it is sometimes joined to a subjunctive mood, though generally to an indicative. Gesner says, there is nothing in “*quamquam*” to govern the subjunctive mood. “Perspiciebant (consules) enim, in Hortensii sententiam multis partibus plures ituros; quamquam aperte Vol-

catio assentirentur.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 1. 2. The MSS. do not differ in regard to the mood of *assentirentur*; and if they did, there can be no doubt that the subjunctive is right. The subject of the sentence is *consules*, and the word of the predicate with which the clause is more immediately connected, is *plures*, which it qualifies. “*Cædi vero discentes, quamquam et receptum sit, et Chrysippus non improbet, minime velim.*”—*Quinct. de Inst. Orat.* 1. 3, alii 4. The clause is clearly to be attached to the predicate, for even *velim* itself is in the pure predicate. The verb containing the copula is omitted, the principal idea to be conveyed being expressed by *velim*.

“*Nam vi quidem regere patriam, aut parentes, quamquam et possis, et delicta corrigas, tamen importunum est.*”—*Sall. B. J.* 3. In this sentence the subject is *vi regere patriam aut parentes*, of which Sallust wished to predicate, that it was in every way *importunum*. This he does by attaching the clause *quamquam et possis et delicta corrigas*, to *importunum*. As though he had said, that it is outrageous even in one *qui et possit, et delicta corrigat*. To mark this, I have no doubt, Sallust used the subjunctive mood. Another instance is found: “*Quamquam—judicentur.*”—*Cic. Tusc. Quest.* 5. 33.

The meaning of *quamquam* and other con-

cessive conjunctions is such, that the clauses in which they are found more naturally attach themselves to the subject ; for the predicate is asserted of it, even though it be qualified by the fact or circumstance mentioned in the concessive clause. Corresponding with this, these conjunctions are found more commonly joined with the indicative mood.

“ Quamquam aliud videtur oratio esse, aliud disputatio ; nec idem loqui esse, quod dicere : attamen utrum in disserendo est.”—*Cic. Orat.* 32. The predicate of the sentence, with the copula, is, *est in disserendo*. The subject is, *oratio et disputatio*, with the adjuncts.

In like manner, the clauses in the following examples are to be attached to the subjects of the sentences in which they are found. “ Quamquam — erepta est.”—*Sall. B. J.* 17. “ Quamquam — diversum est.”—*Sall. B. J.* 20. “ Quamquam cupio.”—*Ter. Eun.* 1. 2. 92. “ Quamquam notitia est.”—*Ter. Heaut.* 1. 1. 1. “ Quamquam est scelestus.”—*Ter. Adelph.* 2. 1. 5. “ Quamquam tenetur.”—*Virg. Æn.* 2. 533.

Etsi, in like manner, will be generally found constructed with the indicative mood, from its being usually attached to the subject. But there are cases in which the clause is properly connected with the predicate, and then the verb is

in the subjunctive mood ; as in the following instances : “ *Quin ita faciam, ut te cupias facere sumptum, etsi ego vetem.* ”—*Plaut. Capt.* 4. 2. 76. The subject of the sentence is *ego*, and the clause, *etsi ego vetem*, qualifies *tu*, which is part of the predicate. In the following sentence the clause is attached to the subject, but the mood depends upon a verb omitted, the meaning being contingent, and the verb, therefore, being in, what grammarians would call, the potential mood. “ *Nunc tantum videmur intelligere non diuturnum bellum ; etsi id ipsum nonnullis videatur secus.* ”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 6. 4. The same remark may be made respecting the following sentence. “ *Pol etsi taceas, palam id quidem est. Res ipsa testis est.* ”—*Plaut. Aulal.* 3. 2. 7. *Euclio* was *not silent* upon the point, as in fact, he had, in the preceding line, made the declaration referred to. *Homo nullus est te scelestior qui vivat hodie, Neque cui ego de industria amplius male plus lubens faxim.* The reply made to this is, “ The fact (even although the case were that you were silent upon the matter) is evident.”

In the following sentence, there is manifestly an ellipsis of “ I have arrived at that time of life, that.” I insert the passage because *etsi* is commonly written as one word, and it is quoted so by *Vossius* ; but a conjunction is required, and *etsi*

should properly be written as two words, *et si*.
 “*Et si illis plane orbatus essem ; magnum tamen
 afferret mihi ætas ipsa solatium.*”—*Cic. de Amicit.* 27. “*Ac primum illud, in quo te Dicæarcho
 assentiri negas, etsi cupidissime expetitur a me
 sit, et approbante te, ne diutius anno in provincia
 essem, tamen non est nostra contentione perfectum.*”—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 7. 3.

Quamvis is found with both moods, though much more frequently with the subjunctive. But Gesner very properly remarks upon this conjunction, that, “it does not itself govern a subjunctive mood, and that, when a subjunctive follows, it is required by the construction of the sentence.” It may be supposed, that I do not admit the reasons which he assigns for the mood*.

“*Quidque facis ? lacrimis opus est, non sanguine, dixit :*

Sæpe per has flecti principis ira solet.

Quamvis est igitur meritis indebita nostris,

Magna tamen spes est in bonitate Dei.”

Or. Ep. ex Pont. 1. 6. 43.

The logical division of this example will show the proper connexion of the concessive clause. *Spes*

Subject.

in bonitate Dei quamvis est indebita nostris meritis

Cop. Pred.

—*est*—*magna*. The subject of a sentence is

* “*Conjunctivum si quem adjunctum habet, is non ab ipso regitur, sed pendet a reliqua constructionis ratione, prout illa infinita, potentialis, aut similis est :—cum licet propter intellectam ut semper conjunctivum postulet.*”—*Gesner, See quamvis.*

frequently put in an oblique case: this particularly takes place, when a sentiment is to be expressed in an animated manner. The pathetic address made to Coriolanus by his mother contains an example: “Potuisti populari hanc terram quæ te genuit atque aluit? Non tibi, quamvis infesto animo et minaci perveneras, ingredienti fines ira cecidit?”—*Liv.* 2. 40.

Ovid will supply us with another example:

“Mænia conduntur: quæ, quamvis parva fuerunt,
Non tamen expedit transiluisse Remo.”

Ov. Fast. 3. 69.

The clause in this case is manifestly in connexion with the subject, *mænia*. Ovid does not wish to predicate anything of *Remus*, but takes advantage of a fabulous anecdote to express, that Rome, however small it was at first, was not to be despised.

In the following example, the clause will be found in the predicate, and Cicero uses the subjunctive mood. “Vides in hac tota disceptatione non illud dici. Quamvis hoc turpe sit, tamen, quoniam expedit, faciam.”—*Cic. de Off.* 3. 13. “I, influenced by the consideration of expediency, will do this, how base soever it is.”

Similar examples are to be met with in every author: the following may be referred to. “Quamvis sit datus.”—*Ov. Fast.* 6. 231. “Quamvis

prudens sis.”—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 12. 37. “Quamvis demersæ sint.”—*Cic. de Off.* 2. 7. “Quamvis non fueris.”—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 16. 7. “Quamvis sint fructuosæ.”—*Varro de Re Rust.* 1. 2.

It is admitted, I believe, by all grammarians, that *licet* is universally followed by the subjunctive mood; and indeed, it would surprise me, were it otherwise. *Licet* being really a verb itself in the indicative mood, if it be followed by another verb, (not the infinitive) that verb must be in a clause connected with *licet* by *ut*, expressed or understood; and, therefore, as the clause will necessarily be attached to the predicate, the verb must be in the subjunctive mood.

The following are examples of *ubi*. “Prope modum ubi loci fortunæ tuæ sint, facile intelligis.”—*Plaut. Capt.* 5. 2. 5. The subject being *tu*, there can be no question to which term the subjunctive clause is attached. “Ubi pro labore desidia, pro continentia libido invasere, fortuna simul cum moribus immutatur.”—*Sall. B. C.* 2. The predicate with copula is *immutatur*, which is said absolutely of the rest of the sentence, which forms the subject.

“Ubi sumus provecti in altum, id quod volunt,
Capiunt prædones navem illam ubi vectus fui.”

Plaut. Mil. 2. 1. 39.

Should *prædones* be considered the subject, the

first clause is to be attached to it, which is thus restricted to the time of another event. The second clause is wholly unconnected with the predication, and is used (parenthetically) to define the antecedent "*illam navem.*" But the context seems to require that *navi silla*, or rather *nos*, should be the subject : as, in fact, Palæstrio is giving an account of his own proceedings : and if the view I take be correct, *capiant prædones*, or *capti sunt prædonibus* is the predicate. The scene, from which the example is taken, may be recommended for perusal, as a test of the doctrine which I have laid down. Its applicability to the case of every verb which is found there, is remarkably apparent.

"Hujusmodi res semper comminiscere, ubi me excarnifices."—*Ter. Heaut.* 4. 6. 8. The subject is *tu* (wholly), and the clause which expresses the effect of the plans invented, is of course attached to the predicate.

The principle of the rule given in Zumpt's Latin Grammar for particles of time, will be evident from the light in which I trust I have been enabled to set the use of the Latin moods. "The particles of time, *dum*, *donec*, *quamdiu*, and *quoad*, have an indicative, when they signify *as long as*. In the sense of *until*, *dum*, *donec* and *quoad* may have either mood ; the indicative, if nothing more

is contemplated than the time of termination ; the subjunctive, if there is a reference to an object to be attained."

In the two former cases, the clauses naturally attach themselves to the subjects, restricting them as to time, in reference to which time alone the predication is made. In the last case, "the reference to an object to be attained," manifestly shows with which term the clause is to be connected.

The conclusion which we draw from this part of the subject is, that the sense in which the clause is to be taken, whether as denoting the time simply, or the object as well as the time, is shown by the *mood* and not by the *conjunction*.

Having now examined the cases of so many conjunctions, I think it needless to pursue further the inquiry into their use. I am, moreover, induced to take this course for two reasons : first, examples of other conjunctions have been incidentally examined in different parts of the work ; and secondly, I have been led into much greater length than I anticipated, while there remain matters, which I cannot omit.

CHAPTER IX.

QUOD.

THE use of *quod* being a much-disputed point among grammarians, I have reserved for a separate consideration the cases in which it appears. The difficulty which is commonly considered to exist in regard to this word seems to arise principally from its being frequently viewed as a conjunction, when it is really the pronoun relative. It does not, however, come within the scope of my purpose, to lay down any rules for its use. It will be sufficient for me to show, that the clauses in which it is found, present no exception to the principle, which, it is my endeavour to prove, universally regulated the use of the subjunctive mood.

The examination of a few cases in which it occurs will suffice to prove, that it does not *per se* exercise any influence over the mood of the verb. I am confirmed in this opinion by Gesner, who remarks upon the conjunction *quod*, “*Conjunctivum adsciscit non sua vi, sed pro ratione reliquæ orationis.*” The learned Lexicographer perceived, that, even according to the notion that conjunctions govern moods, there is nothing in

the nature of *quod* which could require it to be followed by the subjunctive.

There is also another observation made by the same writer, which deserves to be noticed : “ Nonnunquam vix dijudicare licet, utrum ad pronomen commodius, an ad conjunctiones referatur.” Of this difficulty he gives manifest proof, by adducing many passages under the conjunction *quod*, which should more properly have been classed under the relative. That the conjunction and the relative were originally one and the same cannot be doubted, though it may be difficult to discover the ellipsis in many of the cases, where it appears to be used as a conjunction. Frequently, however, the omitted part is apparent ; and its supply should be made, to show the real construction of the sentence. This will materially aid us in distinguishing between the relative and the conjunction.

Now, it appears to me, that we are not justified in considering *quod* to be a conjunction, whenever there is a direct reference to some fact or circumstance mentioned. The neuter gender of the relative in such case is required, upon the same principle which causes an adjective or participle to be put in the neuter gender, when the subjects to which they refer are infinitives, or whole propositions. As, “ Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.” “ Allato, Pœnos Iberum transisse.”

My meaning in regard to *quod* will be better explained by a few examples. “Reliquum erat certamen positum in virtute ; qua nostri milites facile superabant, atque eo magis quod in conspectu Cæsaris atque omnis exercitus res gerebatur ; ut nullum paullo fortius factum latere posset.”—*Cæs. B. G.* 3. 14. *Quod* in this passage is usually considered to be a conjunction ; but it is as purely a relative, as it is in any instance where its antecedent substantive is expressed. The *meaning* may be conveyed in English by translating *quod* “because ;” but it is the business of the grammarian, not to find idioms in his own language adapted to the expressions of another, but to explain the real *construction* of the language of which he treats. Now, in the example before us, *quod* refers to and agrees with the same noun as *eo*, and the construction will be seen, if we supply the verb *est*. “The remainder of the contest consisted in personal prowess, in which our soldiers were greatly superior, and the more so, from this circumstance (*eo*), *which is* (*quod est*), The affair,” &c.

By considering *quod* as a relative, (the only light in which I can be induced to view it,) the mood of the verb is easily accounted for. The cause is mentioned as an independent fact or assertion, and, consequently, the indicative mood

is required. If the subjunctive mood should follow *quod* in such cases, it will be found, that the whole sentence is part of the predicate, following some verb of affirmation, as *dico*, *scribo*, &c. Thus, “*Idem Divitiacus Æduus respondit ; Hoc esse miseriores, gravioresque fortunam Sequanorum, quam reliquorum ; quod soli ne in occulto quidem queri neque auxilium implorare auderent.*”—*Cæs. B. G.* 1. 32. *Quod* in this, as in the former case, is a relative, and *auderent* is in the subjunctive mood, because the whole sentence is predicated as being the reply of Divitiacus.

Under this head may be included all examples of *quod*, commonly considered a conjunction, when it has been preceded by *hoc*, *eo*, *propter id*, *propterea*, *ob hanc causam*, and the like. In all cases of this kind, *quod* may be rendered in English by “namely.”

The following are examples : “*Sed tamen hoc me ipse consolabar, quod non dubitabam, quin te ille aut Dyrrachii aut in istis locis uspiam visurus esset.*”—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 1. 17. “*Ego autem hoc miserior sum, quam tu, quæ es miserrima, quod ipsa calamitas communis est utriusque nostrum, sed culpa mea propria est.*”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 14. 3. “*Id hoc facilius eis persuasit, quod undique loci natura Helvetii continentur.*”—*Cæs. B. G.* 1. 2. “*Horum omnium fortissimi*

sunt Belgæ: propterea quod, a cultu atque humanitate provinciæ longissime absunt.”—*Cæs. B. G.* 1. 1. “Quod eo facilius nobis est, quod non est annus tibi destinatus, ut si ædilis fuisses, post biennium tuus annus esset.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 10. 25. “Sed brevior me duæ res faciunt: una, quod publicis litteris omnia sum persecutus: altera, quod M. Varisidium ipsum ad te transisse jussi, ex quo omnia cognoscere possis.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 10. 7. See also *Cic. de Off.* 2. 20. “Videndum est illud, quod &c.”—*Plaut. Merc.* 3. 4. 10. “Id, quod.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 8. 14. “Propositum hoc est . . . quod.”—*Cic. Orat. pro Rosc. Amer.* 1. “ita fit, ut adsint, quod.”

No exception is offered to the doctrine of the subjunctive mood by any of the examples which can be classed under this head. The clauses, in fact, are introduced as independent sentences, and the verbs are, consequently, in the indicative mood.

There is a second class of cases, nearly allied to the preceding, in which *quod* may, perhaps, be considered a conjunction, though I am disposed to look upon it as a relative, and capable of being explained as in the previous examples. But taking it, according to the common acceptation, as a conjunction, the clause is causal, and if it simply mention a fact or circumstance, which induces the

subject to perform another action, it is necessarily attached to the subject, and the verb in such case is uniformly in the indicative mood. “Ipse (Cæsar) omnes copias castris eduxit; equitatumque quod recenti prælio perterritum esse existimabat, agmen subsequi jussit.”—*Cæs. B. G.* 4. 13. This passage contains two sentences; of the former of which *Cæsar*, absolutely, is the subject: the predicate of this sentence is *copias omnes eduxit*. Of the latter, also, *Cæsar* is the subject, but not *absolutely*, the predication being made of him under the influence of the circumstance mentioned, *quod recenti prælio perterritum esse existimabat*. “Pugnatum est ab utrisque acriter. Nostri, tamen, quod neque ordines servare, neque firmiter insistere, neque signa subsequi poterant, atque alius alia ex navi quibuscunque signis occurrerat, se aggregabat, magno opere perturbantur.”—*Cæs. B. G.* 4. 26. “Omnes eodem animo Lampaceni, simul ut hoc audiverunt, quod eos tum Philodami dignitas, tum injuriæ magnitudo movebat, ad ædes noctu convenerunt.”—*Cic. in Verr.* 1. 26. “Ille, quod ejus avaritiam cives Romani ferre non potuerant, Uticæ domi suæ vivus exustus est.”—*Cic. in Verr.* 1. 27.

A third class of cases is one, in which *quod* is commonly considered a conjunction, and is explained by *Quod attinet ad id quod*. It is fre-

quently used in this sense in epistolary correspondence, and the clause is almost universally attached to the subject ; for the predicate is said of it, only in reference to the matter mentioned in the clause. “Quod scripsi ad te proximis litteris de nuntio remittendo : quæ sit istius vis hoc tempore, et quæ concitatio multitudinis, ignoro.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 14. 13. “Quare quod scribis, te confidere, auctoritate et eloquentia nostra aliquid profici posse ; nonnihil ut in tantis malis est profectum.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 12. 2. “Nam quod me tam sæpe et tam vehementer objurgas, et animo infirmo esse dicis : quæso, ecquod tantum malum est, quod in mea calamitate non sit.”—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 3. 10.

The relative *quod* is again mistaken for a conjunction, when it is used to connect a clause with the predicate, which it limits to a particular fact or circumstance mentioned in the clause. Thus, “Hic tu me accusas, quod me afflictem.”—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 3. 12. Gesner accounts for the mood in this example, by saying, that Cicero does not assert the thing himself, but expresses the sentiment of Atticus. The anonymous author of the “Reply to the Edinburgh Review,” says, that the subjunctive mood is used here, because “the assertion is not an acknowledged truth.” The mood, in my opinion, is more satisfactorily ac-

counted for upon the general principle of the language. The relative clause does not express the efficient cause, but qualifies and restricts to a particular circumstance the assertion of the principal verb. The proper English for the sentence is, "In this, you accuse me *of afflicting myself*." The following passages are parallel. "Neque mihi unquam veniet in mentem Crasso invidere, neque pœnitere, quod a me ipse non desciverim."—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 2. 4. The clause, in this case, expresses the sentiment of Cicero himself, and therefore destroys the theory of Gesner. It is also a truth acknowledged by Cicero, and therefore, according to the opinion of the anonymous Critic, we might expect to find the indicative mood. It may be objected, perhaps, that the clause in this last example follows an infinitive mood, by which the similarity to the preceding is destroyed. But the same mood would be used in the relative clause, if the infinitive were changed into an indicative.

In like manner the subjunctive mood is found after a participle, where, in consequence of a preceding verb, it is equivalent to a verb in the indicative mood with the conjunction *et*. "Bis ad te scripsi, me purgans diligenter, te leviter accusans in eo, quod de me cito credidisses."—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 3. 11. Again: "Qui

(Laco) glorianti cuidam mercatori quod multas naves in omnem oram maritimam dimisisset inquit.”—*Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* 5. 14. The following sentences are similarly constructed. “Ad me scripsit molesteque te ferre, quod me propter valetudinem tuam cum ad urbem accessissem, non vidisses.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 4. 1. “In viam quod te des hoc tempore, nihil est.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 14. 12. “De familia liberata nihil est, quod te moveat.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 14. 4. “Quod quispiam ignem quærat, extinguere volo: Ne causæ quid sit, quod te quispiam quæritet.”—*Plaut. Aulul.* 1. 2. 13. In these, and all similar cases, the clause is manifestly connected with the predicate, and the subjunctive mood is uniformly employed.

Under one or other of these heads, I am inclined to think, may be classed all cases* in which we meet with *quod* commonly considered a conjunction. They offer no exception to the doctrine developed in the foregoing pages. For wherever the clause is attached to the predicate, limiting the sense in which the principal verb is to be taken, or where it forms part of it, being the reported declaration of some person, the subjunctive mood is uniformly employed. But if the clause is really an independent sen-

* The idiomatic expression “adde quod” will be noticed in the following chapter.

tence, or is immediately attached to the subject, its verb is in the indicative mood.

Before I quit this part of our subject, it may be expedient to examine a few cases, which, at first sight, may seem to contradict the theory that I have laid down.

Cicero said, “Hic tu me accusas, quod me *afflictem*.”—*Att.* 3. 12; and in the 10th Epistle, “Hic utrum tandem sum accusandus, quod *doleo*; an quod *commisi*, ut hæc aut non retinerem, (quod facile fuisset, nisi intra parietes meas de mea pernicie consilia inirentur,) aut certe vivus nunc amitterem.—*Ep. ad Att.* 3. 10. The meaning of the clauses in these two sentences is different; and this difference, I maintain, is denoted by the moods. In the former instance, *quod afflictem* limits the verb *accusas*, and expresses the charge brought against Cicero. In the latter case, *quod doleo* does not in any degree limit or qualify *accusandus*. It expresses the efficient cause which moved the party to make a charge. The charge laid had been mentioned before, and if there had been any occasion for its being repeated, it would have been expressed in these words, *quod infirmo animo sim*. Cicero had said, “Nam quod me tam sæpe et tam vehementer objurgas, et *animo infirmo esse* dicis.”

“Molestissime autem fero; quod te ubi visu-

rus sim, nescio: eoque ad te tardius scripsi, quod quotidie te ipsum expectabam.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 3. 6. The clauses in this example express the efficient causes, and are, therefore, attached to the subject. They are expressed last, because the *causes* are the primary consideration. If the fact had been the principal thing to be noticed, the order would have been different. But the fact, and the object of *molestissime fero*, had been mentioned in the preceding sentence. “Il-lud (vere dicam) me movet, in tanta militum paucitate abesse tres cohortes, quæ sint plenissimæ: nec me scire ubi sint.”

Again, “Utinam illum diem videam, cum tibi agam gratias, quod me vivere coegisti! adhuc quidem valde me pœnitet.”—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 3. 3. I have preserved the note of admiration after *coegisti* as it stands in Ernesti’s edition; for the difficulty of reconciling this passage with the rules I have laid down arises solely from the improper punctuation. Had the clause been intended by Cicero to signify the object, for which he says that he wished he could express gratitude, he would doubtless have written *coegeris*. But the expression in that case would have lost much of its fire and vivacity, and the succeeding part would have dragged heavily after it. The note of admiration should be placed after *gratias*.

The clause, *quod me vivere coegisti* has no grammatical connexion with the part that precedes. It neither qualifies *agam gratias*, nor expresses the efficient cause. In either of these cases the subjunctive mood would have been used. If it qualified *agam gratias*, the sentence would have run thus, *Utinam illum diem videam, cum tibi agam gratias, quod me vivere coegeris*. In addition to such of the preceding examples as may be classed under the same head as this, all of which confirm my present assertion, the following are to the purpose. “L. Manlio A. F. cum dictator fuisset, M. Pomponius tribunus plebis, diem dixit, quod is paucos sibi dies ad dictaturam gerendam addidisset.”—*Cic. de Off.* 3. 31; and, again, “criminibatur etiam quod Titum filium qui postea Torquatus appellatus, ab hominibus relegasset, et ruri habitare jussisset.” The passages will show the proper mood and order, if the clause had been intended to signify the object of *agam gratias*. If the efficient cause had been expressed, the passage would have run, *Utinam illum diem videam cum tibi, quod me vivere coegeris, gratias agam*. The clause which expresses the efficient cause (unless such cause form the primary consideration,) is placed before the verb which expresses the effect. Thus, “Sed cave, si me amas, existimes, me, quod jocosius

scribam, abjecisse curam reipublicæ.”—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 9. 24. Also, “Cui (M. Pomponio) cum esset nunciatum; quod illum iratum allaturum ad se aliquid contra patrem arbitraretur, surrexit e lectulo, remotisque arbitris, ad se adolescentem jussit venire.”—*Cic. de Off.* 3. 31.

The general rule appears to be this: If the cause form the primary consideration, the clause which expresses it is placed last; but then, *eo*, *hoc propterea*, or some such word, precedes, and generally in the antecedent clause. But if the fact be the principal thing to be noticed, and the cause be mentioned incidentally, the causal clause precedes, or, rather, is inserted parenthetically, and the words which express the leading fact close the sentence. If the reader will turn to the examples adduced in this chapter, he will find abundant evidence to satisfy him upon the point. Thus, in one of the examples adduced, “*Molestissime fero; quod te ubi visurum sim nescio: eoque ad te tardius scripsi, quod quotidie te ipsum expectabam.*” The cause being the principal thing to be noticed, the causal clause is placed last in order. And the fact of Cicero being distressed at a particular circumstance having been mentioned in the previous sentence, the words *molestissime autem* naturally lead the reader to expect another clause. In the latter sentence, however,

as the fact (*ad te tardius scripsi*) had not been previously mentioned, it was necessary to suspend the hearer's attention, and to lead him to expect the mention of the cause; and this is done by the introduction of *eo*.

This order in the collocation of the words accords with the general rule of the language, to place the principal word in the last part of the sentence. But if the causal clause were placed last in order, when *eo* or a word of similar import has not preceded, the sentence would betray great *looseness* of style. And since the Latin language affords so many facilities for avoiding it*, Cicero would never have been guilty of so glaring an instance, as the sentence which led to these remarks would contain, if *quod me vivere coegisti* is to signify the cause of *agam gratias*. The introduction of *eo*, &c. prevents the sentence being

* "The objection, however, to loose sentences and consequent tendency towards the periodic structure, must have been greater among the ancients than the moderns; because the variety of arrangement which the ancient languages permitted, and in particular of reserving the *verb*, on which the whole sense depends, to the end, made that structure natural and easy, in many instances in which, in our language, it would appear forced, unnatural, and affected. But the agreeableness of a certain degree, at least, of periodic structure, in all languages, is apparent from this; that they all contain words, which may be said to have no other use or signification, but to *suspend the sense*, and lead the hearer of the first part of the sentence to expect the remainder."—*Whatly's Elements of Rhetoric*, p. 3. chap. ii. sect. 12.

loose, by announcing to the reader, that something besides the fact is to be mentioned. Various words perform this office, as in an example quoted, *molestissime autem*, and *utrum*, in another. “Hic *utrum*, tandem sum accusandus, quod doleo, an quod commisi, &c.”

For such reasons, and upon the authority of Cicero himself, I conclude that the clause, *quod me vivere coegisti*, has no grammatical connexion with the part that precedes it, but expresses the efficient cause of the regret mentioned after it, *adhuc quidem valde me pœnitet*. It is attached to the true subject of this sentence, and the verb therefore is rightly in the indicative mood*.

I have thus endeavoured to reduce the cases in which *quod* is found, to the true doctrine of the subjunctive mood, and, I trust, I have satisfactorily shown, that so far from offering any exception, they uniformly tend to establish its truth.

* I have endeavoured to establish, upon the authority of Cicero, the theory which I have propounded in this chapter in regard to *quod*; and if the view which I have taken is correct, I must express my doubts, whether an anonymous Critic, whose system I have examined, is right in saying that the following expressions are correct Latin: “Quod rex *irasceret*, metuebat, ne quid sibi mali eveniret.” “Quod lævum *intonuisset*, speravit, &c.” “Artes negliguntur, quod inutiles sint.”—See *Reply to Edinburgh Review*, pp. 61 and 64. The reasons may be easily gathered from the pages of this chapter.

CHAPTER X.

DR. PARR'S THEORY.

It is impossible that I can pass by without notice the opinion which was entertained upon this subject by that most accurate and profound scholar, Dr. Parr. His correspondence during the last fifteen years of his life affords abundant evidence of the great consideration which he thought the subject merited ; and his library, after his death, evinced (by his numerous notes and corrections of moods,) that he must have devoted to it no inconsiderable portion of time and thought.

The true principle, however, of the Latin subjunctive mood seems to have escaped his penetrating eye ; for the theory which he propounded takes no account of many cases in which the subjunctive is employed ; and, partial as it is, it is confessedly difficult in practice. This, I apprehend, is admitted by the learned critic himself, when he says, that " he hardly knew any teacher that understood it ; " and when he recommends to Professor Pillans " to make himself master of it by intense and incessant application." The theory which he propounded, namely, that an indicative mood never follows an indefinite word, had been maintained

by many grammarians. This is even asserted by himself at the commencement of a letter upon the use of the subjunctive mood, addressed to Professor Pillans of Edinburgh.

It is beside my purpose to inquire into the accuracy of the rule ; it is sufficient for me that it is not universal. It does not account for the subjunctive mood when it is found following *definite words*. And moreover, notwithstanding the light which Dr. Parr's observations have thrown upon the subject, it is still, in many cases, a matter of very nice discrimination, whether a word is used indefinitely or not.

In the absence of any simple and universal rule for the guide of the Latin student, the direction of Dr. Parr was most serviceable ; and especially so, with the explanation given by himself. This explanation excludes all sentences which consist of only one enunciation, and confines it to those in which "one part of the enunciation depends upon the other, and the subjunctive mood is used at the close." "The preceding word," he says, "may be a verb, as, *Scio, qualis fuerit Cicero* ; or it may be an adjective or participle ;" but in such case the sentence is imperfect, and requires a verb to complete it. The clause which contains the subjunctive mood is, in some degree, subjoined to this verb.

It will be seen from this, that Dr. Parr's rule is not only consistent with, but (as far as it goes,) in accordance with the principle of my own. I might, therefore, be excused for assuming it to be confirmatory of the doctrine, which I have endeavoured in the preceding pages to establish, were it not for a list of examples which the deep research of that profound scholar has compiled, and which he pronounces, in a letter addressed to Messrs. Pillans and Carson of Edinburgh,* to be "deviations from common usage." It will be necessary, in order to strengthen my induction, to examine this list, and to ascertain whether all or any of the examples may be explained upon the principle of what, I have endeavoured to show, is the true doctrine of the subjunctive mood.

The list of exceptions is preceded by a few quotations in exemplification of the theory, that a subjunctive mood follows an indefinite word. I shall commence with these, and proceed regularly according to the order in which they stand in the letter.

"Namque canebat, uti magnum per inane coacta
Semina, terrarumque, animæque, marisque fuissent
Et liquidi simul ignis : ut his exordia primis
Omnia, et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis."

Virg. Eclog. 6. 31.

* This letter is published in the last volume of Dr. Parr's works, page 533.

In this passage *Silenus* is the subject, and the lines quoted are part of what it is predicated he sang. The verbs are in the subjunctive mood.

The next example is of a similar character.

“ Hic juvenum chorus ; ille senum ; qui carmine laudes
Herculeas et facta ferunt ; ut prima novercæ
Monstra manu geminosque premens eliserit angues ;
Ut bello egregias idem disjecerit urbes.”—*Virg. Æn.* 8. 287.

The observation which follows this passage is very satisfactory. Some examples are put, first interrogatively, and afterwards in the form called indefinite. In the former, the indicative mood is used ; but in the latter, that which formed the whole enunciation of the former is only part of the predicate of a new sentence,—a new subject, and in fact a new predicate, being introduced. In the *indefinite* sentences, the copula is contained in the verb *potest*. “ Utrum hoc fecit Cicero, an Catilina ? Utrum hoc Cicero *fecerit*, an Catilina, nemini dubium esse potest*. Tune id fecisti, an alius ? Tune id feceris an alius, nemini dubium esse potest. Cicero hoc fecit, necne ? Cicero hoc *fecerit* necne nemini dubium esse potest.”

* In a little treatise by Mr. Carson on the Relative with the Subjunctive, to which I had occasion to allude in a former part of the work, I find the following in a note : “ Incertum est, quam longa nostrum cujusque vita futura sit.—*Cic. Verr.* act. 2. 1. 58. The words, *quam longa nostrum cujusque vita futura sit*, form the subject concerning which something is affirmed.” A reference to the context in Cicero will, however, show, that the words mentioned are not the *real subject*, but that *nos* (or *nobis* understood after *incertum*),

An example is then introduced for the purpose of showing that *utrum* is frequently understood.

“ Ne perconteris, fundus meus, optime Quincti,
Arvo pascat herum, an baccis opulentet olivæ.”

Hor. Ep. 1. 16.

The reader is left to account for the mood of *perconteris*. This, however, is a matter of no difficulty, if we supply *fac*, similarly to “*fac, cogites*,” —*Sall. B. C. 45*.

In the same manner, in the next example, we are told that “*cures* precedes several indefinite words, which are followed by a subjunctive mood.” But upon what does *cures* itself depend for its mood? As we are again left to ourselves, it will be necessary to quote the two previous lines in addition.

“ Miramur, si Democriti pecus edit agellos
Cultaque, dum peregre est animus sine corpore velox ;
Cum tu inter scabiem tantam et contagia lucri,
Nil parvum sapias, et adhuc sublimia cures :
Quæ mare compescant causæ ; quid temperet annum ;
Stellæ sponte sua, jussæne, vagentur et errent ;
Quid premat obscurum lunæ, quid proferat orbem ;
Quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors ;
Empedocles, an Stertinium deliret acumen.”

Hor. Ep. 1. 12. 13.

is. The whole passage quoted, contains only the predicate and copula. Cicero is reasoning, and he uses this argument: “*Habemus enim liberos parvos. Incertum est, quam longa nostrum cujusque vita futura sit. Consulere vivi ac prospicere debemus, ut illorum solitudo et pueritia quam firmissimo præsidio munita sit.*”

The two additional lines furnish us with *edit* and *est* in the indicative mood, and the clauses in which they are found are attached to the subject *nos* (or *ego*). The remaining seven lines are part of the predicate, being the object of the principal verb, *miramur*. The conditional clause in the first line, in which we find the indicative mood, appears to me to be parallel with the next example, in which Dr. Parr says we are to supply *sit*; but let him speak for himself.

“ Debes hoc etiam rescribere, si tibi curæ,
Quantæ conveniat, Munatius : an male sarta
Gratia necquicquam coit, et rescinditur.”

Hor. Ep. 1. 3. 30.

The verb which should follow *si* is omitted; that verb is *sit*. The construction is, *debes rescribere, si Munatius tibi curæ sit*; and *si* indefinite means “whether,” as thus:

“ Quæ si sit Danaïs reddenda, vel Hectora fratrem,
Vel cum Deiphobo Polydamanta roga.”—*Ov. Ep. 5. 93.*

Doering interprets the passage from Horace in the same manner as Dr. Parr. Bentley supplies *est* in the text*. In opposition to Dr. Parr and

* Bentley gives the following note upon the passage: “Videamus locum integrum.

*Debes hoc etiam rescribere, SIT tibi curæ
Quantæ conveniat Munatius, an male sarta
Gratia necquicquam coit et rescinditur.*

Dissent hic et libri et interpretes: alii *SI* *TIBI*, alii *SIT* *TIBI* exhibent; ab illa parte stant Leidensis noster et Grævianus, ab hac

Doering, I agree with Bentley so far, as that if any verb is to be supplied, it should be *est*, and not *sit*; but the passage is stronger and more poetic with the omission, and it is supported by the following authorities.

" Illi mea carmina curæ."—*Virg. Ecl.* 3. 61.

" Tua si tibi Mænala curæ."—*Ib. Georg.* 1. 17.

" Cui vincla jugalia curæ."—*Ib. Æn.* 4. 59.

The cases of *si* meaning the same as *an* are *very rare*, and the examples which are commonly given in dictionaries, may, almost without exception, be better translated by "if." One thing may be confidently affirmed,—that *si* never means the same as *an*, when it is followed by an indicative mood. This remark certainly applies to all the examples brought forward by Gesner and Faciolati. I have already shown that *si* does not

Reginensis cum Vossiano, ne de recentioribus memorem. Et utrumque quidem probe, si per se spectetur. *Sit tibi curæ*, ἡλειπ-
τιζῶς, hoc est plane. *An sit, si sit, sit ne tibi curæ*: nihil vulgatus, atque hanc scripturam Nic. Heinsius in libri sui margine amplectitur. Atque illud non animadvertit vir summus; posita hac lectione; tum sequentia fore vitiosa *coit et rescinditur*. Nam dicendum utique fuerit, *Sit tibi curæ Munatius, an nequicquam coeat et rescindatur gratia*. Retinemus, igitur, *Si tibi curæ* quod pro *AN* passim accipitur etiam sequente verbo modi indicativi; ut Noster *Ep.* 1. 7. 39.

Inspice si possum donata reponere lætus.—*Ter. Heaut.* 1. 1. 118. *Ibo, visam si domi est*. Nos, ut ambiguum evitetur, *est* addidimus: quod cum in scriptis vel simplici e vel notula plerumque scribatur et præterea ultra verum excurrat, facile a precedente litera in *CURÆ* absorberi potuit."

mean "whether" in the passage quoted from Terence; and in the case before us, *hoc* does not refer to what follows, but to what precedes. Horace seems to me to be inviting Florus to write an account of Nero's expedition. He had said,

"Quid studiosa cohors operum struit? hoc quoque curo;
Quis sibi res gestas Augusti scribere sumit?
Bella quis et paces longum diffundit in ævum?"

He then speaks of Titius, "Quid Titius, &c." and "Quid mihi Celsus agit;" and next says, in regard to Florus himself,

"Ipse quid audes?
Quæ circum volitas agilis thyma? non tibi parvum
Ingenium, non incultum est, nec turpiter hirtum.
Seu linguam causis acuis, seu civica jura
Respondere paras, seu conditis amabile carmen;
Prima feres hederæ victricis præmia: quodsi
Frigida curarum fomenta relinquere posses,
Quo te cœlestis sapientia duceret, ires.
Hoc opus, hoc studium parvi properemus et ampli
Si patriæ volumus, si nobis vivere cari."

The *hoc* in line 30, I maintain, refers to *hoc opus* which precedes it. A disagreement between Munatius and Florus had already commenced; and though an apparent reconciliation had been effected between them, it is evident, from the allusion made to the subject, that Horace had reason to suspect, that the breach was not permanently and effectually healed. He observes, therefore, to Florus, (having first appealed to him generally,) that, "if he entertains

that regard for Munatius which he ought," (*si tibi curæ, quantæ conveniat, Munatius*;) "it afforded an additional reason why he should answer Horace's epistle by writing the account which he recommended." The subject of the sentence, namely, Julius Florus, is qualified by the condition *si tibi*, &c. before the predicate, *debes hoc ETIAM rescribere*, can be said of it. After the mention of this, Horace breaks off into a question upon the subject, *An male sarta Gratia necquicquam coit et rescinditur?*

I have been anxious to show that *si* does not in this passage mean the same as *an*; and I have been obliged to state my reasons at length, because the contrary opinion is upheld by the authority of such high names.

Now, in regard to the passage quoted by Bentley, in which he says that *si* means the same as *an*:

"Inspice, si possum donata reponere lætus."—*Hor. Ep. 1. 7. 39.*

If *si* in this instance meant "whether," we should, doubtless, have found *possim*. But the meaning of Horace is, "Now, if I am able cheerfully to resign into your hands your gifts to me, consider the matter well," *i. e.* "consider the demand you make of me, to spend more of my time at Rome." In the passage, also, from Ovid, quoted by Dr. Parr, I think *si* may be otherwise explained; though the clause must,

under either circumstance, be connected with the predicate, and the subjunctive mood is used. If *si* be considered to mean "whether," in the quotation from Horace, the clause is manifestly connected with the predicate ; and in such case, Dr. Parr is right in supposing *sit* to be omitted.

We now come to the examples which Dr. Parr admits to be deviations from the general usage of the language. He first observes, however, "I pass an unequivocal and unqualified interdict in prose against the use of *est qui*, or *sunt qui*, with an indicative ; but I find that the poets are not quite uniform." Scheller is not so positive, but maintains, on the authority of various manuscripts, that Cicero used the form of construction which is so peremptorily interdicted by Dr. Parr, and observes, moreover, that the instances which are met with in poets are no evidence of negligence, or disregard of an elegant Latin style. "Sed perperam et contra elegantiam eos loqui quis a pœsi non plane alienus credat ? Poeta, si quis alius, elegantiae sermonis valde studere debet. Equidem arbitror, exempla poetarum in usu linguae valde observanda esse. Perperam sentiunt de poetis, qui eos accusant, vel licentiam effrenatam, quam vulgo poeticam appellant, iis tribuant, quasi poetæ omnia permiscere ac confundere possint. Quis tale quid credat de Vir-

gilio, Horatio, Ovidio, qui magnorum et venustorum usu fruebantur ?"—*Schell. Obs. in Prisc. Script. (Not. in Cic. Invent. 1. 40.)*

And, certainly, when I find *est qui* followed by an indicative in Horace, where the metre has secured it from the pen of audacious transcribers; and when I find that a similar form of expression is met with in manuscripts of poets, and even of Cicero, I cannot bring myself to believe that the expression is incorrect. Scheller in the same note has collected a number of examples in confirmation of his assertion. It is not my intention to examine all the passages in detail; but if we except the cases in which *sunt* appears to form a separate clause of itself,—in other words, where no noun (or I may say *categorematic*,) follows, it will be found that the relative clause, with the antecedent, in every instance forms the true subject of which Cicero means to predicate, and that the clauses themselves are descriptive of the subjects.

And with regard to those passages in which *sunt qui* (alone) is followed by an indicative mood, the number is so small, that they can never invalidate a doctrine which rests upon the authority of so many and such various passages, as those which have been advanced in the foregoing pages.

The following are the principal passages,

“Sunt*, qui unum officium consolantis putant, docere malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet. Sunt, qui non magnum malum ut Peripatetici. Sunt, qui abducunt a malis ad bona ut Epicurus. Sunt, qui satis putant ostendere, nihil inopinati accidisse, nihil novi. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando, detrahere illam opinionem mœrenti, si se officio fungi putet justo et debito. Sunt etiam qui hæc omnia genera consolandi colligunt.”—*Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* 3. 31.

“Sunt autem qui dicunt fœdus quoddam esse sapientium, ut ne minus quidem amicos quam se ipsos diligant.”—*Cic. de Fin.* 1. 20. “Sunt autem, quæ præterii: interregnumne esset ex-

* When I first examined the examples collected by Scheller, I intended to introduce them into the body of this work; but my attention was drawn to a second edition of a little treatise, of which I have had occasion to speak in terms of commendation in a former part of this work: *Rules for the Construction of the Relative with the Subjunctive Mood*, by A. R. Carson, A.M. &c. &c. An appendix is subjoined to this admirable little work, containing Scheller's note at length. All the examples, also, which had not been examined in the body of the treatise, are there explained. But I must beg to differ from the learned writer, so far as he thinks it necessary to say, that the indicative mood is proper in some cases, because Cicero “alludes to certain persons, to determinate and specific individuals.” If this be the case, the same rule, I think, must be applied to similar examples in poetry, and I cannot persuade myself, that we are to understand Horace as speaking of determinate and specific individuals, in *Sunt quos curriculo pulverem Olympicum Collegisse juvat. Est qui nec veteris pocula Massici, spernit. Sunt quibus unum opus est.*—These and such like examples must be otherwise accounted for.

pectaturus ; an, quomodo dixerit ille quidem, ad se deferri consulatum, sed se nolle in proximum annum, et alia sunt quæ exquiram.”—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 10. 4. “Sunt enim, qui quod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen invidiæ metu non audent dicere.”—*Cic. de Off.* 1. 24.

“Sunt quos curriculo pulverem Olympicum Collegisse juvat.”—*Hor. Od.* 1. 1. 4.

“Est qui nec veteris pocula Massici Spernit.”—*Hor. Od.* 1. 1. 19.

“Sunt quibus unum opus est intactæ Pallidis urbem Carmine perpetuo celebrare.”—*Hor. Od.* 1. 7. 5.

“Quod sunt, quos genus hoc minime juvat, utpote plures Culpari dignos.”—*Hor. Serm.* 1. 4. 24.

“Sunt quorum ingenium nova tantum crustula promit.”
Hor. Serm. 2. 4. 47.

Now, with one single exception, the subjunctive mood might be substituted, without any detriment to the verse, in the examples from Horace. But this would be cutting the knot,—a very unsatisfactory method of evading the difficulty. In comparing the passages with one another, it is to be observed, that the sentences begin with *sunt qui* ; and that in the examples from Horace, no word stands between *sunt* and the relative ; and that the same is the case in the quotations from Cicero, with this exception, that *autem* or some similar word is in some instances inserted. It may be further remarked, that in all the cases

quoted, the substantive verb and the relative appear to exercise the same force as would be conveyed by a single word, namely, "some," when used *emphatically*. I know of no Latin expression which precisely corresponds with the English "some," when used *emphatically*, except *sunt qui*. *Hi* and *illi* may be used, and particularly in poetry, but they are not equivalent to *sunt qui*.

For these reasons I am inclined to agree with Bentley, that *sunt-qui* was really a compound word, and that it should be written with a hyphen. The learned critic in a note upon the third line of the first ode of Horace, is arguing in favour of a uniformity of construction throughout the ode; and in the course of his remarks observes, "Hoc totius orationis filum, hæc carminis mens est; de Pindaro, ut videtur, adumbrata, cujus hæc exstant apud Sextum Empiricum Pyrrh. Hypot. p. 18.

Ἀελλοπόδων μὲν τινὰς εὐφραίνου-
 σιν ἵππων τιμαὶ καὶ στέφανοι·
 τοὺς δ' ἐν πολυχρύσοις θαλάμοις βιοτά.
 Τέρεπται δὲ καὶ τις ἐπ' οἴδμ' ἄλιον
 καὶ δοᾷ σῶς διαστείχων.

SUNT-QUOS *juvant velocium equorum honores et coronæ*: Hos *in auratis thalamis vita*: EST-QUI *etiam delectatur, in celeri nave salvus per mare currit*. Ubi τινὰς dedimus pro τιν', ob illud τοὺς

quod sequitur ; βιωτὰ autem pro βιωτὰ· σῶς δια-
στείχων pro σῶν διαστείβων. Jam autem ut verba
Flacci, cum de sententia satis constet, paulla-
tim explicemus ; illud primum observabis, τὸ
SUNT-QUOS junctim et ὅφ' ἐν accipiendum esse,
perindeque esse ac si *Quosdam, aliquos* dixisset :
Ita Græci Εἰσὶν οὐκ, εἰσὶν οἷς passim usurpant.
Noster *Serm.* I. 4. v. 24.

*Quod sunt-quos genus hoc minime juvat, utpote plures
Culpari dignos ;*

ubi nisi ὅφ' ἐν legeris, *digni* utique non *dignos*
dictum oportuit. *De Arte Poet.* 361 :

*Ut pictura poesis ; erit-quæ, si propius stes
Te capiet magis, et quædam si longius abstes.*

Et hic quoque, nisi ὅφ' ἐν adscissis *quæ* erat di-
cendum, non *quædam*. Finge itaque hic esse
QUOSDAM *curriculo pulverem Olympicum collegisse
juvat : HUNC, si mobilium, &c. ILLUM, si proprio,
&c. et familiarior ad aures tuas oratio acce-*
det," &c.

To this opinion of Bentley I incline the more
readily, as it makes the examples, in which *sunt-*
qui appears with an indicative following, har-
monize in construction with the rest of the lan-
guage. From the best consideration which I
can bring to the subject, and an examination of
cases in which the form appears, I am inclined

to think, that the Latins used it when they meant to express, that there existed a class or body of persons, either holding precisely the same opinion, or occupied in a precisely similar manner, their opinion or their occupation being of a distinctive character. If this be the case, the expression differs from *quidam*, *aliqui*, and any other that I know; and the relative clause will be found to be as much descriptive of this class, as predicative of them in their individual capacity, while the substantive verb exerts its full power as a verb of existence.

Upon a similar principle are *nescio-quis**, *scio-quis*, and perhaps *adde-quod*, when followed by an indicative to be reconciled. I have inserted *adde-quod* as a compound word, being of opinion that it was so used by the Latins; but the phrase, when followed by an indicative, is by no means opposed to the doctrine of the moods. It may always be translated "moreover," and the construction will be evident by supplying "hoc," i. e. "add this, which is," &c. The relative

* "*Nescio quis* is sometimes used as a compound pronoun, equivalent in sense to *aliquis*, but more indefinite; in which case it has no operation upon the verb following. '*Nescio quid majus nascitur Iliade.*' '*Quæ fortiter gesta sunt, ea nescio quomodo pleniore ore laudamus.*'—*Cic.* With a substantive *nescio quod* must be used. '*Quod si meus consulatus sustulerit, non breve nescio quod tempus, sed multa sæcula propagarit reipublicæ.*'—*Sall.*"—*Zumpt's Lat. Gram.*, sect. 76. 11.

clause, therefore, being descriptive, requires the indicative mood.

I am aware that *nescio quis* and *scio quis* may, in almost every instance, be considered parenthetical, and in such case they offer no difficulty in regard to the mood of the following verb. And I think it probable that such a use was the origin of the compound word ; for I am satisfied that in *sunt-qui*, *nescio-quis*, and *scio-quis*, the verbal power of *sunt*, *nescio*, and *scio* was lost. When "ignorance" or "knowledge" forms the primary consideration, the following verb is *uniformly* in the subjunctive mood.

But to return to Dr. Parr's letter :—He proceeds to establish by examples, "that the poets do not uniformly keep the rule." I might with perfect confidence leave the subject of the true doctrine, and account for the apparent deviations by considering them to have arisen from inadvertence on the part of poets. But I am not disposed to cast such an imputation upon them, and especially so, as I think that a number of the examples adduced in the letter to Professor Pillans as exceptions to the rule, may be satisfactorily accounted for upon the principle of the true doctrine of the mood.

"O Romule, Romule, dic, O,
Qualem te patriai custodem Di genuerunt."—*Ennii Aun.* 2.

In this passage, the last line should have a mark of interrogation after *genuerunt*. Dr. Parr objects, that such an interrogation would be abrupt and inelegant. But the abruptness is, I think, not ill-suited to the style of the author, or to the context ; and I cannot consider it more inelegant than

“ Quis te Palinure deorum
Arripuit nobis, medioque sub æquore mersit ?
Dic, age.”—*Virg. Æn.* 6. 341.

“ Bone vir, Dore, salve, dic mihi,
Aufugistine ?”—*Ter. Eun.* 5. 2. 11.

The next sentence may be similarly explained :

“ Misimus et Sparten, Sparte quoque nescia veri.
Quas habitas terras, aut ubi lentus abes ?”
Ov. Ep. Her. 1. 65.

A question in this case appears to me to be most appropriate ; for the former of the lines quoted thus answers exactly to what had preceded :

“ Nos Pylon, antiqui Neleïa Nestoris arva
Misimus, incerta est fama remissa Pylo.”

It moreover suits the distracted state of Penelope's mind to break off abruptly into a question.

Two passages are next adduced from Lucan, as “ indisputable exceptions to the rule ;” but, unless I am much deceived, the usage of the language requires the indicative, and of course, therefore, the subjunctive would be wrong. The first passage is,

“ Quis justius induit arma
Scire nefas.”—*Lucan.* 1. 126.

I subjoin to this page a long note by Burman upon the line*. My object is, as well to show the difficulty into which an ignorance of the true principle of the Latin moods leads critics, as,

* “Quum ex grammaticorum dictatis debuerit poeta dicere *induerit* vidi in codice Heinsii, ejus manu aliter hæc verba distingui, et in duo membra digeri, ut prius sit interrogatio, *Quis justius induit arma?* Cui respondet poeta sequentibus, *scire nefas*. In Langermanni uno etiam codice vidi librarium, forte ferulam metuentem, dedisse *induat*. Sed nunquam potui mihi persuadere, poetam ita servire ludimagistrorum canonibus, ut non sæpius hoc obsequium librariis, quam ipsis scriptoribus sit adtribuendum. Certe noster, lib. 8. 644, et in duobus codicibus deprehendi, et in uno nuperus editor et ut edidit Hortensius,

*Nescis, crudelis, ubi ipsa
Viscera sunt magni.*

ubi nunc *sint* legi solet. Cicero pro Muræna. 21. *Nescio quo pacto hoc fit.* Claudian. I. in Eutrop. 501.

*Nescis, quod turpior hostis
Lætitia majore cadit.*

Non formidavit etiam pædagogos Ovidius, qui lib. 10. *Metam.* 637. dixit, *quid facit, ignorans*, ut meliores, et numero plures codices exhibent, ubi nec opus *quod*, nec *quidque agat*, legere. Nolo ex corrupto apud eundem loco *Epist.* 10. 86,

Quis scit an hæc sævas tigridas insula habet.

argumentum capere, sed tamen temere nimis Heinsium pronuntiare, Latine non dici, *quis scit an habet*, sed dicendum, *an habeat*, arbitror. Nescivit ergo Latine Terentius, unicus elegantiae auctor, qui *Adelph.* act. 4. 5. *qui infelix haud scio an illam misere nunc amat.* et in eadem fabula simili constructione, Act. 2. 1. 41. *nunc, vide, utrum vis, argentum accipere, an (scilicet vis) causam meditari tuam.* In *Hecyr.* 2. 1. 20. *multo melius, hæc quæ fiunt, scio.* *Adelph.* 5. 9. 39. *plus scis, quid facto opus est.* Et *Eun.* 3. 3. 23. *dicat, quid*

also, to enable the reader to refer to the passages quoted by Burman, in all of which (with the exception of one which will be noticed,) the verb is in the proper mood.

Now in reference to the passage quoted from Lucan, the true subject of the sentence is, the

vult. ubi Donatus docet: dictum est pro, quid velit. Infr. 9. 563. quære, quid est virtus, ubi male et Heinsius. Cic. 2. de Nat. Deor. 6. animum illum spirabilem si quis quærat, unde habemus, ubi Davisius. Latinitatem flagitare habeamus, frustra contendit. Variant codices apud Maron. 3. 109. Cuncti quæ sunt (vel sint) ea mœnia quærunt. Sine diversitate Ovid. 9. Met. 79. Deinde ubi sunt digiti, dum pes ubi quærit. Vid. et 2. Fast. 57. Ita post verbum adde fere semper indicativum video sequi, secus atque nunc fieri solet. Sic apud nostrum lib. 5. 776.

Adde quod adulescis fatis.

ubi virum doctum *adulesci* notat Cortius, lib. 10. 223.

Adde quod omne caput fluvii &c. tumescit.

et ita centies Ovidius, ubi per libenarios licuit, ex quo unum et alterum locum in quibus corrupendis nullum jus datur, producam. lib. 13. Met. 117.

*Adde quod ille tuus tam raro prælia passus,
Integer est clypeus.*

lib. 4. ex Ponto, 10. 45.

Adde quod hic clauso miscentur flumina ponto.

Sic noster, lib. 3. 321.

Adde quod innumeræ concurrunt undique gentes,

ubi unus modo codex, *concurrant.* vid. et lib. 3. 50. sed exemplorum modus esto, quæ semel cumulare libuit, ut inde discant Critici, non temere semper præceptis grammaticorum esse obtemperandum, nec mutanda quæ illis adversari videntur. Hanc etiam in hac constructione corrigendi libidinem aliquot exemplis castigavit Wopkens Lect. Tull. 2. 5. ubi ex Severi *Ætna* 5. 274. adducitur

Scire quid occulto naturæ terra coerces.

fact expressed by *Quis justius induit arma*; and the poet says of it, that it cannot be ascertained ("scire nefas"*) . Had he intended to deny *knowledge* of any particular person as his subject, then, doubtless, we should have found *induerit*; but, as the case is, *induit* is right, and there is no occasion for any mark of interrogation. The context bears me out in my assertion, that the observation is made of no particular person, but is general;—in other words, that *quis justius induit arma* expresses a fact which is made the subject of a proposition.

"Nec quemquam ferre potest, Cæsare priorem,
Pompeiusve parem. Quis justius induit arma,
Scire nefas: magno se iudice quisque tuetur."

In regard to the passage quoted by Burman,

*Nescis, crudelis, ubi ipsa
Viscera sunt magni,*

Dr. Parr justly remarks, that *sint* is the true reading.

I must particularize another passage, as it is frequently appealed to by critics, and it has given rise to numerous observations of commentators.

Quis scit an hæc sævas tigridas insula habet.

Various alterations have been suggested to make it meet the rules of grammarians, but there is no occasion to disturb the reading. It appears to

* "Durum sed levius fit patientia
Quicquid corrigere est nefas."—*Hor. Od.* 1. 24. 19.

me, that *quis scit* should have a mark of interrogation ; and I am persuaded, that the question refers to the previous line. The question, in the line quoted, is put in a direct form, and begins with *an hæc*.

“ Jam jam venturos aut hac, aut suspicor illac,
Qui lanient avido viscera dente, lupos.
Forsitan et fulvos tellus alat ista leones,
Quis scit? an hæc sævas tigridas insula habet?”

The direct form of question is similar to an example from Horace already examined in this chapter, in which case Dr. Parr admits an interrogation ;

“ An male sarta
Gratia nequicquam coit et rescinditur?”

The next passage quoted in the letter is also from Lucan ;

“ Quære quid est virtus, et posce exemplar honesti.”
Lucan. 9. 563.

I see no objection to the indicative mood in this instance, and indeed the context seems to me to require it. Cato is certainly asked to make the inquiry ; but the context implies, that he was able to give the answer himself. And the inquiry being made *of him directly*, conveys a greater compliment. A mark of interrogation should also be placed after *perit*.

“ Inquire in fata nefandi
Cæsaris, et patriæ venturos excute mores.
Jure suo populis uti legumque licebit,

An bellum civile perit? Tua pectora sacra
Voce reple; duræ saltem virtutis amator
Quære; Quid est virtus? et posce exemplar honesti."

Should this explanation be objected to, still the subjunctive mood is inadmissible; for the real subject is *quid est virtus*, and the sentence expresses, that it is a fit subject of inquiry for one who is himself *duræ virtutis amator*.

Dr. Parr next notices some instances brought forward by Vossius, and he considers them to be "real exceptions." This surprises me much, as two of them contain *scio quid*, and the learned critic had in the same page explained the construction of *nescio quo* followed by an indicative. Upon the same principle, surely, may be explained the two instances of *scio quid* which follow; though, it will be remembered, that I consider *scio-quid* to be in reality a compound word.

"Scio quid ago. P. Et Pol! ego scio quid metuo."

Plaut. Bach. 1. 1. 45.

In the case of *scio quid* being taken as two words, the clause is parenthetical, the context evidently showing, that *ago* and *metuo* are the principal predicates. In either case, the meaning is the same, "I am doing—I know what." *Agam* and *metuam* would give a power and emphasis to *scio* which it was not intended to possess, and which would destroy the sense of the passage.

Again,

“ Verba ne facias, soror,
Scio quid dictura es, hanc esse pauperem.”

Plaut. Aulul. 2. 1. 45.

The context by no means requires that Megadorus should predicate of himself the *knowledge* of what his sister is about to say; but rather, that his sister should be made the subject, and *an intention of making a particular observation* be predicated of her. Megadorus parenthetically asserts (or by means of a common and familiar form expresses,) that he knows the observation. He then mentions it, namely, *hanc esse pauperem*. The succeeding line confirms my interpretation, for Megadorus reasons upon the observation, which he had said it was the sister's intention to make, *Hæc pauper placet*.

The next passage is,

“ Neu persentiscat, aurum ubi est absconditum.”

Plaut. Aulul. 1. 1. 24.

I must confess, that I cannot satisfactorily account for the indicative mood in this passage. I will not attempt to force the construction; and should any one have proceeded thus far with these pages, and still object to the doctrine, I will readily give him all the benefit which this passage can afford him, being fully satisfied with the position which I have been enabled to establish.

We now come to passages collected from Latin poets, in which the rule is said "to be entirely neglected." The first example is,

"Nec tibi quid liceat, sed quid fecisse licebit
Occurrat, mentemque domet respectus honesti."

Claud. de Quart. Cons. 267.

The mood of every verb in this passage is in accordance with the general principle of the language; though there may be some difficulty in supplying the ellipses, which shall explain the grammatical construction. I remember, too, the observation of Ursinus, that the supply would disfigure the sentence with various deformities. Claudian has given us a figure set forth in its just proportions, and in the formation of it he pared it of everything that was unnecessary, everything that interfered with a graceful display of its several members. If, therefore, I attempt to discover and replace these, I hope the reader will forgive me, my object being not to give additional grace to the whole, but to give some idea of its appearance before the artist adjusted the members in due proportion.

Now *liceat*, *occurrat*, and *domet*, are in the mood commonly called potential, that is, their potentiality of meaning (as I have endeavoured in a former part to show,) arises not from their subjunctive form, but from ellipses. Let me ob-

serve in the first place, in regard to *fecisse licebit*, that there could be no *contingency* here: an action perfected (the idea expressed by *fecisse*,) must be becoming or not. It was certain and positive, and therefore no ellipsis was necessary. The mood of the verb would be indicative or subjunctive, according to the *term* of the sentence in which the clause might be situated. The case, however, is different with *quid liceat*. Here, there is nothing determinate. The passage would not be properly rendered in English either by “what *is*” or by “what *shall be* in your power,” but by “what *may be* in your power.” In like manner, *occurrat* implies “*should* occur to your thoughts.” Now for these meanings of “may” and “should” in reference to some future time, we must look

Subject

to ellipses, and I will suggest, *Quid fors obtulerit*
Copula
Predicate
ut tibi liceat,—non est—decens quod occurrat.

Subject

Copula

Sed, *quid tibi fecisse decebit—est—decens quod occurrat.* I do not stop to inquire whether I have made the proper supply. Such, I maintain, is the proper construction of the sentence; and if so, the indicative mood is right in *decebit*, and the subjunctive, no less so, in *liceat*. I will only add, that the two sentences refer to two different states of an action, *imperfect*, and *perfect*; the

negative sentence refers to that state which is expressed by *facere*, the affirmative to that expressed by *fecisse*.

Let us proceed to the next passage :

“*Aspice quod donis Eriphyla invenit amaris,
Arserit et quantis nupta Creusa malis.*”

Propert. 2. 16. 29.

As I entertain great doubt of the correctness of the mood in this passage, I shall attempt no explanation, and therefore I am willing to count it a second example, which offers a mood not to be accounted for upon the principle of the true doctrine.

“*Non rursus licet Ætoli referas Acheloi,*

*Luærit
Fluxerit ut magno factus amore liquor
Atque etiam ut Phrygio fallax Mæandria campo
Errat et ipsa suas decipit unda vias.*

*Qualis et Adrasti fuerit vocalis Arion
Tristis ad Archemori funera victor equus.*”

Propert. El. 2. 34. 33.

Upon this passage I will borrow a remark made by Dr. Parr upon another occasion. “This would be an exception if the passage were genuine.” I will not so confidently affirm, “but, it is not.” It is, however, very suspicious. The two lines written in Italics, besides containing *errat* and *decipit*, contrary to every principle and usage of the language, bear about them other marks of being interpolated. In the first place, *Mæandria* being an adjective agrees with *unda*,

which should be in the first member of the sentence ; secondly, *Unda* is, I believe, never used to express a *river* itself, but in the passage before us *unda* is personified. Thirdly, *all* the other names mentioned are connected with some well-known love fable, which is not the case with the river Mæander. The two lines which follow those quoted are,

“ Amphiaraëæ nil prosunt fata quadrigæ,
Aut Capanei magno grata ruina Jovi.”

Lastly, I find no authority for the use of *atque* in this passage. Several independent circumstances are mentioned ; the second is connected with the first by *atque*, and *et* is used in the succeeding sentences. For such reasons I consider that the passage is not genuine.

“ Discite, O miseri, et causas cognoscite rerum :
Quid sumus ; et quidnam victuri gignimur : ordo
Quis datus : et metæ qua mollis flexus, et undæ.
Quis modus argento : quid fas optare : quid asper
Utile nummus habet : patriæ charisque propinquis,
Quantum elargiri deceat : quem te Deus esse
Jussit ; et humana qua parte locatus es in re.”

Persius, Sat. 3. 66.

The separate clauses in this quotation form the subjects of the sentences ; for it is of them, that the poet means to assert, that they are matters proper to be learnt. There are no particular persons of whom any predication is made, nor does the context at all require that “ all men ”

should be the subject. The opinion which I express, appears to me to receive confirmation from the circumstance, that both the singular and plural numbers are used. The line which follows the quotation begins with *disce*. The indicative mood is right, therefore, in the clauses in which it is found. *Deceat* also is rightly in the subjunctive mood ; for *quantum* is in the nominative case, and if the ellipsis be supplied, the sentence will perhaps assume the following form, *quantum est quod elargiri deceat*. The indicative would have been wrong for this reason, namely, the amount to be given is not fixed, but variable, depending upon contingent circumstances.

The next example is also from Persius :

“ His ego centenas ausim deprecere voces
Ut, quantum mihi te sinuoso in pectore fixi,
Voce traham pura.”—*Sat.* 5. 26.

The indicative may be defended in this passage, though I do not combat for the elegance of the expression. *Fixerim* (which, Dr. Parr says, we should find, if the rule were followed,) would convey a different meaning from that which Persius intended to express. The passage with *fixerim*, rendered into English, would be, “ That with a sincere tongue I may express as much as I have fixed you in the recesses of my heart.” Such is not the meaning of Persius : he says,

“ I should require a hundred voices to express sincerely this, namely, how deeply I have fixed you in the recesses of my heart.”

We are next reminded, “ that with *video* there is often a peculiarity of construction, but that the seeming impropriety of an indicative when we should expect a subjunctive, is removed by making the construction interrogative ;”

“ Nonne vides, croceos ut Tmolus odores,
India mittit ebur.”—*Virg. Georg.* 1. 56.

Dr. Parr observes, “ that *ut* here has the power of ‘ quomodo,’ and we put an interrogative at *vides*, and another at *odores*.” That is, “ Do you not see?” “ How does Tmolus transmit its saffron odours ? ” But let us hear what Virgil says :

“ At prius, ignotum ferro quam scindimus æquor,
Ventos et varium cœli prædiscere morem
Cura sit, ac patrios cultusque habitusque locorum;
Et quid quæque ferat regio, et quid quæque recuset.
Hic segetes, illic veniunt felicius uvæ;
Arborei fetus alibi, atque injussa virescunt
Gramina. Nonne vides, croceos ut Tmolus odores,
India mittit ebur, molles sua tura Sabæi;
At Chalybes nudi ferrum; virosaque Pontus
Castorea; Eliadum palmas Epiros equarum.”

Upon the passage in question, I find the following observation under the various readings, Heyne's edition. “ *Mittat* Medic. Scilicet, quod sæpissime in Marone notandum occurret: Est orationis pedestris exquisitior ratio in multis, ut

subjunctivus ponatur: ita h. l. *Nonne vides ut mittat*. At poeta hoc ipso a vulgari recedit, dum subjunctivum respuit. Critici fere in his ludunt, et alterum, quod scriptum reperiunt, mutant in alterum; nulla certa ratione; sed tantum ut ingenium ostentent." This is an easy method of escaping a difficulty, charging the author with deviations from the acknowledged principles of his language. The meaning of the passage and the intention of the form *nonne vides ut* are well set forth in the note. "*Nonne vides*, est inter formulas enumerationum: pro *præterea*, *porro*: et habet ἐνάρτυαν."

But to account for the *mittit*; which, in my opinion, is not a matter of difficulty. Virgil is addressing himself to no particular person as his subject, nor, indeed, is he speaking so much of *persons* as of *facts*. He says, that different regions and soils are suited to different crops, and he proves it by induction. His cases are those enumerated in the quotation. "The fact of Tmolus producing odoriferous dyes is well known." *Vides*, therefore, contains within it the essential part of the predicate, and the real subject is contained in the expression, *croceos ut Tmolus odores mittit*. According to some editions, the fifty-eighth line commences "UT *Chalybes ferrum*," which I think much preferable to *At*. Had *mittat* been the

reading, then the *seeing* the circumstances mentioned would have been predicated of some particular person addressed, *Tu*.

Virgil is charged with a second irregularity :

“Vidisti quo Turnus equo, quibus ibat in armis
Aureus.”—*Virg. Æn.* 9. 269.

One interpreter pleads in our poet's behalf, that the expression is a Græcism. Heyne says of *quibus ibat*, “Possunt hæc interrogando efferri.” This is Dr. Parr's opinion, who again stands up for the poet, armed right and left with interrogatives. “Here *ibat* should be in the subjunctive, after *quo* and *vidisti*. But we ought to have a double interrogative, and this well suits the spirit of the passage.”

But Virgil says :

“Bina dabo argento perfecta et aspera signis
Pocula, devicta genitor quæ cepit Arisba ;
Et tripodas geminos ; auri duo magna talenta ;
Cratera antiquum, quem dat Sidonia Dido.
Si vero capere Italiam, sceptrisque potiri
Contigerit victori, et prædæ ducere sortem :
Vidisti, quo Turnus equo, quibus ibat in armis
Aureus : ipsum illum, clypeum cristasque rubentes
Excipiam sorti, jam nunc tua præmia Nise.”

That is, “Restore my father to me, and I (absolutely) will give you two cups,” described as those “devicta genitor quæ cepit Arisba.” “I will give you an antique goblet,” described as that, “quem dat Sidonia Dido.” And again, “I

(not *absolutely*, but *conditionally*), if it shall ever be our happy fortune to conquer and to divide the spoil, will assign to you, subject to no lot, a horse and armour," (a particular horse and a particular set of armour,) described as "the horse which you have seen Turnus ride,—the splendid armour in which you have seen Turnus move." This is elegantly expressed by Virgil, *Vidisti quo Turnus equo, quibus ibat in armis Aureus*. The same principle which required *cepit* and *dat* to be in the indicative mood, caused *vidisti* and *ibat* to be in the same. The relative clauses in each case are used as descriptive of their antecedents, and in such cases the indicative mood is uniformly employed. Virgil introduces the last description in a very animated manner, in order that he might set forth the high value of the gift which he was about to mention. To have used *iret* would have altered the whole meaning. What Virgil did, was the judicious exercise of poetic licence ; to have used *iret*, would have been a degree of barbarous licentiousness which would have condemned him among his countrymen. This would have predicated the act of "*seeing* what sort of horse Turnus was in the habit of riding" as an independent and primary idea.

A charge similar to that which we have been considering, is brought against Calphurnius :

"Cernis ut ecce pater quas tradidit, Ornite, vaccæ
Molle sub hirsuta latus explicuere genista."—*Ecl.* 1. 4.

The poet goes on to say,

"Nos quoque vicinis cur non succedimus umbris?
Torrida cur solo defendimus ora galero?"

That is, "Why do not we, in like manner as the cows are to be seen, &c." Nothing more is required to show that the indicative mood is right.

"Viden' ut ægre patitur gnatum esse corruptum tuum,
Suum sodalem? ut ipsus se cruciat ægritudine."

Plaut. Bacch. 3. 3. 88.

Dr. Parr puts an interrogative after *sodalem*. But, if this solution had not been proposed by one whose opinion upon every matter of criticism is worthy of the highest respect, I should have been disposed to say, that such a punctuation was ill suited to the context. Lydus does not wish to inquire of Philoxenus "whether he sees *that* or *how* (*ut*) Mnesilochus is grieved at the corrupt morals of his friend." All that he desires to do is, to draw Philoxenus' attention to the fact, and this he does by the common and familiar form of calling another's attention, *Videne*; (after this word I would supply *illum*;) Lydus then introduces the fact in the form of an exclamation, meaning thereby to state, that Mnesilochus *evidently* takes it greatly to heart.

After this example, the following observation is made: "Be it observed, that the poets are not

uniform, but seem to put the indicative or subjunctive after *viden' ut* as it suits their metre. I will give examples of the subjunctive." If I assent to this observation, I must give up the point, which, I trust, I have now well nigh established, namely, the universality of the true doctrine of the subjunctive mood. Presumptuous, therefore, as it must appear in me, I am compelled to question the correctness of the remark; and doing this, I am bound to show, that the examples in which we find the subjunctive, are of a different character from those which we have been examining; in fact, that they require the very interpretation which I said would be necessary in those instances, if the subjunctive mood had been found.

"Viden' ut Latonia virgo

Accensas quatiat Phlegethontis gurgite tædas."

Sil. Italicus, Pun. 12. 713.

Jupiter seeing Hannibal advancing against the walls of Rome, calls upon Juno to withdraw the ambitious youth from his mad attempt. Juno, upon this, proceeds to the camp, and taking Hannibal by the hand addresses him in the following words :

"Quo ruis, O vecors? majoraque bella capessis,
Mortali quam ferre datum? Juno inquit, et atram
Dimovit nubem, veroque apparuit ore.
Non tibi cum Phrygio res Laurentive colono.
En age, (namque, oculis amota nube parumper,
Cernere cuncta dabo,) surgit qua celsus ad auras

Adspice, montis apex, vocitata palatia regi
Parrhasio plena tenet et resonante pharetra,
Intenditque arcus, et pugnas meditatur Apollo.
At qua vicinis tollit se collibus altæ
Molis Aventinus, viden' ut Latonia virgo
Accensas quatiat Phlegethontis gurgite tædas,
Exsertos avide pugnæ nudata lacertos.
Parte alia, cerne, ut sævis Gradivus in armis
Implerit dictum proprio de nomine campum."

Now, in the first place, we have an address to a particular person, from whose eyes Juno had removed the mist which impedes mortal vision. The object of this was, that he might be able to discern gods. He is then directed to turn his eyes to a particular part, which is described. Juno asserts that Apollo is engaged there; but the assertion is made absolutely and not connected with the fact of "seeing." In this sentence, in accordance with the usage of the language, the indicative mood is used, *tenet*, *intendit*, *meditatur*. The introduction of the last word, which does not relate to an object of actual vision, appears to be the reason why the circumstances are not expressed in connexion with *adspice*. All the other circumstances detailed in the remaining lines of the quotation were capable of being discerned by the eye, and Hannibal is called upon to observe them. The clauses, therefore, are attached to the predicates, being the objects of the principal verbs, *vide*, *cerne*, and in line 719,

adspice. In all these cases the verbs of the pendant clauses are in the subjunctive mood.

“ Viden’ arctoo de carcere quantæ
Tollat se nubes, atque æquore pendeat atro ?”

Valer. Flacc. Argon. 3. 499.

This passage is addressed to Minerva by Juno, and the lines which immediately follow it, show that *tu* is the subject, and explain the degree of stress which is to be laid on *vide*.

“ Viden’ arctoo de carcere quantæ
Tollat se nubes, atque æquore pendeat atro ?
Corripe prima vias : finem cum Phasidis alti
Transierit Perses, aciemque admoverit urbi,
Cœpta *refer*, paullumque nefas et fœdera *necte*
Consiliis atque arte tua : *sponde* affore reges
Dīs genitos quīs arma volens, quīs agmina jungat.”

We now come to the following remark, “ But Virgil says,

“ Viden’ ut geminæ stant vertice cristæ
Et pater ipse suo superum jam signat honore ?”

Virg. Æn. 6. 780.

It must, however, be acknowledged, that *stent* and *signet* are found in some of the manuscripts, and therefore no stress can be laid on these instances.” Heyne’s note upon the passage is, “ *Stent* multi codd. et edd. quod recte deseruit Pier. et mox *signet*. Scilicet ut consecutio temporum servetur.” As the readings differ, nothing can be proved ; but the evidence in favour of the indicative preponderates, the greater number of

manuscripts having *stant*: and Virgil had used the indicative at the commencement of Anchises' speech, where the metre leaves no room for the licentiousness of transcribers:

“ Ille, vides, pura juvenis qui nititur hasta
Proxima sorte tenet loca: ”

though it may be justly remarked upon this passage, that there is no word by which the other part of the sentence is attached to *vides*; but the same remark will not apply to line 771,

“ Qui juvenis quantas ostentant, aspice, vires: ”

here, however, there is room for alterations, and one or two manuscripts have *ostentent*.

Now considering the evidence to be in favour of *stant* and *signat*, I may observe, that the indicative accords with the doctrine, which, I trust, I may now assume to be established. *Facts* are being detailed, and they form the primary consideration. In neither of the cases cited does any part of the stress, or even sense, depend upon the act of “ seeing.”

Tibullus, we are told, used *viden' ut*, with the subjunctive; and it is with good reason that he does so.

“ Viden' ut felicibus extis
Significet placidos nuntia fibra deos. ”—*Tibull.* 2. 1. 25.

The poet is describing the ceremony of a *sacrum ambarvale*. He makes one of the rustics utter a

prayer to the gods for a rich harvest. In the course of it the rustic says,

“Tunc nitidus plenis confusus rusticus agris,
Ingeret ardenti grandia ligna foco.
Turbaque vernarum, saturi bona signa coloni,
Ludet et ex virgis exstruet arte casas.”

The victim had just been slain, and the rustic adds,

“Eventura precor, Viden’ ut felicibus extis
Significet placidos nuntia fibra deos.”

Observing the favourable appearance of the entrails, he says that his prayer is granted, and calls attention to the circumstance from which he draws the inference. He is not detailing an *independent* fact, but calls attention to it, as being the surety of the favour of the gods. I consider the words to be spoken to the priest, the *frater ambarvalis*; and the lines 27 and 28, which immediately follow, to be addressed to the attendants*,

“Nunc mihi fumosos veteris proferte Falernos
Consulis: et Chio solvite vincla cado.”

There remains one more instance from a poet to be considered,

“Sic certe, viden’ ut perneciter exsiluere.”
Catull. Carm. 60. 8.

Upon this passage the learned critic remarks, “Broukhusius produces an earlier and quite in-

* See *Virg. Georg.* 1. 343. &c.

disputable instance from Catullus, where an indicative follows *viden' ut*." It is, indeed, indisputable, and the metre saves it from mutilation. The poem is a nuptial song, in which the youths and virgins sing alternately. The latter, on seeing the bridegroom's train rise up, begin,

"Cernitis, innuptæ, juvenes? consurgite contra.
Nimirum Ætæos ostendit Noctifer ignes.
Sic certe. viden' ut perniciouser exsiluere?
Non temere exsiluere. canent quod visere par est.
Hymen O Hymenæe, Hymen ades O Hymenæe."

The fact, again, is the principal thing mentioned, and the words are not addressed to any particular persons, being sung by the chorus of virgins. The real subject is *juvenes*.

After this examination, I trust I may stand excused for withholding my assent to the assertion, that "the poets arbitrarily put the indicative or subjunctive after *video*, and *cerno* as an equivalent word." On the contrary, they seem to have been guided in their choice of these moods by the same rule as prose writers; the only difference which I am able to discover is, that the spirit of poetry, and (as we shall also find,) the colloquial style, admitted the introduction of certain parenthetical expressions, when particular attention was to be drawn to a fact.

It only remains for me to examine a few

cases, which Dr. Parr has adduced as exceptions, from Terence and Plautus.

“Age, sit, huc qua gratia
Te arcessi jussi, auscultat.”—*Ter. Eun.* 1. 2. 19.

Other readings give *agis*—*sis*,—and *sed*; but the remark which I have to make is, that the passage is not applicable to the subject before us. *Qua gratia te arcessi jussi*, is not the object of *auscultat*. This word is a separate sentence, and Phædria replies to it, *fiat*. I would therefore suggest an interrogative after *jussi*. We meet with a similar use of the word in the *Andrian*,

“Ausculta! paucis et quid ego te velim et tu quod quæris, scies.
C. Ausculto: loquere quid velis.”—*And.* 3. 3. 4.

The first-cited passage should have an interrogative after *jussi*.

“Viden' otium, et cibus quid facit alienus.”
Ter. Eun. 2. 2. 34.

There is another reading, *faciat*, but *facit* is to be defended as well on other grounds, as also, that the sentence is an exclamation of Parmeno, and addressed to no particular person.

“Nunc cujus jussu venio, et quamobrem venerim
Dicam.”—*Plaut. Prol. Amphit.* 17.

Upon this passage it is remarked, “that the rule is violated and preserved in the same sentence.” But I cannot imagine that Plautus would be guilty of such irregularity. It is to be observed,

then, that the two clauses are placed under different circumstances; and hence arises the difference of moods. The clauses are incomplete in construction. If the ellipsis be supplied in the former case, it will be seen, that the clause is descriptive of an antecedent, and therefore, according to the general usage of the language, the indicative mood is required. *Dicam quis sit cujus jussu venio.* The sense of the author would not be conveyed in English by, "I will tell you by whose command I come;" for Mercury does not rest satisfied with the simple assertion, "*Jovis jussu venio*," but proceeds to enter into particulars respecting the nature and character of Jupiter, and the mutual relation subsisting between him and the audience. The immediate object of *dicam*, therefore, is omitted. The latter clause is not merely descriptive, but is the pure predicate of a sentence, similar to "*Verum illud est, quamobrem hæc commemorarim.*"—*Cic. In Verr. Act. 2. 4. 60.* Now the latter sentence in Plautus, with the ellipsis supplied, is, *Quid sit, quamobrem venerim, dicam.* From this explanation it will be seen, that there is no deviation, in the case before us, from the general principles which regulated the use of the moods.

The next example is from the same prologue, and is confirmatory of the observations which I

have made upon the last. It is similar in construction to the former clause of that example, and the indicative mood is used.

“Nunc quam rem oratum huc veni, primum proloquar.”

Prolog. Amphit. 50.

The clause is merely descriptive. Had Mercury intended to have expressed, “I will first mention what is the object of my coming,” we have seen that he would have said, *Nunc quamobrem venerim, primum proloquar*. So, in like manner, if the sentence had been intended to express, “I will first mention what I am about to beg,” it would have been, “Nunc quid oraturus sim, primum proloquar.” But as the sentence stands in Plautus, the relative clause is merely descriptive, “I will first mention the circumstance,” (described by the clause,) “which I have come to beg.” The indicative mood, *veni*, is therefore right.

“Observatote, quam blande mulieri palpabitur.”

Plaut. Amphit. 1. 3. 9.

Mercury utters this sentiment to himself*, and, moreover, there are two distinct enunciations.

* From the verb being in the plural number, it may be inferred that Mercury addressed himself in some measure to the audience. This was not an uncommon practice, but still, I believe I may affirm, that the address was never made in so direct a form, that the audience were made the true subjects.

“Observe (*him*)” and “how fondly he is going to caress the woman.”

“Mane, mane, audi, dic, quid me æquum censes pro illa tibi dari.”

Plaut. Asinar. 1. 3. 76.

It agrees much better with the spirit of the passage to consider the latter part a question, and *dic* an independent sentence, as in a former example. “Stop, stop,—hear—speak, what do you consider,” &c. ?

“Eloquere utrumque nobis,

Et quid tibi est et quid velis nostram operam ut sciamus.”

Plaut. Cistell. 1. 1. 58.

The clauses in this example also are differently circumstanced: *quid* is the nominative in each, and its verb is expressed in the first, but omitted in the second clause. This is very evident, for no authority can be produced of *volo* being followed by two accusative cases. “Quid me vis?” is, *quid me vis facere*. If the ellipsis be supplied, it will be seen that there is no variation of mood; *quid est in quo velis nostram operam*. The clauses are really questions; and this style of speaking (as being more lively,) suits the subject better than to make the clause dependent upon *eloquere*. The introduction of *utrumque* seems to lead the hearer to expect the inquiries to be made in a direct form.

“Sed lubet scire, quantum aurum herus sibi demsit, et quid suo reddidit patri.”—*Plaut. Bacch.* 4. 4. 14.

Though I cannot admit that the indicative mood is wrong in this instance, yet I am unable to satisfy myself that it is right. I shall therefore proceed to the next example.

“Mea dicta ex factis nosce, rem vides, quæ sim et quæ fui ante.”

Plaut. Mostell. 1. 3. 42.

If this reading were genuine, it would certainly present an anomaly. But Schoppius reads, *hem, vide, quæ sim. At quæ fui ante!* This alters the matter, and reconciles the passage to the general principle. In favour of the reading, it may be observed, there is nothing in the play from which we can gather, that Philematium knew what Scapha had previously been.

“Circumspice dum, numquis est

Sermonem nostrum qui aucupet.”

Plaut. Mostell. 2. 2. 41.

There can be no objection to the clauses of this passage being taken independently of one another. *Circumspice* is more frequently constructed in this manner. Playtus has, “Circumspice dum te, ne quis assit arbiter Nobis: et quæso identidem, circumspice.”—*Trin.* 1. 2. 109. In the passage from the *Mostellaria*, *circumspice* is used in a similar manner; for Tranio repeats his direction, “Circumspice etiam.”

“Viden’, ut tremit atque extimuit

Postquam te aspexit.”

Plaut. Mil. Glor. 4. 6. 57.

R

In this the last example which I have to consider, *viden'* is to be taken by itself. The fact forms the principal part of the predication, and no stress can be laid on *vide*. Pyrgopolinices, moreover, had said in the fifty-first line, *ut me veretur*. It is in reference to the same circumstance, that Milphidippa utters the exclamation, *ut tremit, atque extimuit, postquam te aspexit*.

I have thus examined all the examples which the research of that most profound scholar, Dr. Parr, enabled him to compile, as deviations from the general principle of the Latin subjunctive mood. The result of the examination is, I trust, satisfactory; since the application of the true doctrine to these cases proves, that the mood in almost every instance is right. And the result is especially satisfactory in this;—the true doctrine accounts for the variation of moods which is found in the same sentence. It thus removes what has hitherto been considered an unconquerable stumbling-block, and rescues Latin poets from the charge, which has been so repeatedly brought against them, of sacrificing elegance of diction to the necessities of metre.

CHAPTER XI.

CONCLUSION.

I HAVE thus endeavoured to elucidate and establish by examples the true doctrine of the Latin subjunctive mood. It was originally my intention to have added a review of portions of different Latin classics, in which it would have been made to appear, that the doctrine satisfactorily accounted for the mood of every verb. The authors which I examined, were Cicero, Cæsar, Livy, Virgil, Horace, and Terence. But I cannot persuade myself that such review is at all necessary. The cases which I have examined in the preceding pages are so numerous and so various, that the induction seems to rest upon as broad and as solid a basis as the nature of the subject requires.

For it is to be observed, that the majority of the examples are not my own selection. I took several works in which the subject of the subjunctive mood has been treated of, and I have examined the cases which the authors of the treatises selected in confirmation of their own opinions. The examples were classed under a great variety of heads, but I trust that I have

been enabled to show, that all possess one common and distinctive property. I am not aware that I have omitted to notice any rule, or (I may add,) any important instance. I pursued the order in which the examples stood ; and if I have omitted any, it has only been to avoid a tedious repetition of the same remarks, as all that remained were of the same character as those which I had examined.

The course which has been adopted renders it almost impossible to imagine any class or body of examples to which the doctrine does not apply. It may therefore be concluded, that any isolated cases (in correct editions,) which do not answer to this test, are errors of transcribers, or inadvertencies on the part of the authors themselves. In regard to the number of these, I may also remark, that they are fewer, than what may be produced as exceptions under almost every single rule of other systems, which have been propounded for the direction of the Latin student.

Assuming, therefore, the doctrine to be established, I may observe, that it presents incalculable advantages to the Latin student. It removes what has ever been acknowledged to be a stumbling-block to his progress : a short practice in the application of the doctrine will enable him to decide on the proper mood of a verb, as

readily as he would fix on the right case of a noun. It possesses this advantage,—that it is especially easy to every person in the rendering his own language into Latin. For we naturally perceive more readily the proper connexion of the parts of a sentence in our own language, and this connexion determines the form in which the verb is to appear. A taste formed by the careful study of the best Latin classics will alone enable the student to determine, when it will add grace and spirit to his Latin, to express his subject in an oblique case ; but the doctrine of the subjunctive mood will teach him that no change, which can be effected in the dress of the true subject, can exercise any influence over the form in which the verb is to appear. If the clause is attached to the true subject, (in what form soever the subject may be,) he will know that the verb of such clause is to be expressed in the indicative mood. If, however, he finds that the clause is attached to the predicate, or is even the pure predicate itself, he will know that the Romans employed the subjunctive mood to mark it, and therefore will at once express his verb in the subjunctive mood.

In the application of this simple principle, he will distinguish, when a relative clause is introduced with the sole object of defining or describ-

ing an antecedent, in which case the indicative mood is used, as the clause has no connexion with the real predication. In like manner he will use the subjunctive mood, where a clause is attached to the predicate of a sentence, even though the whole sentence should itself form the subject of another. It does not come under my purpose to state the different advantages which the student and the advanced scholar may derive from a knowledge of the doctrine of the subjunctive ; but, thus much I may say, it will materially assist in showing an author's close meaning, and in marking the proper connexion and dependance of an argument or narrative.

One inference may be drawn from the subject, namely, that learners cannot be too soon habituated to the meaning of the words *subject*, *predicate*, and *copula*, or too much practised in making a proper logical division of the *terms* of a sentence.


A knowledge of logic, and a ready application of its formulæ, will certainly give the Latin student considerable advantages ; but, at the same time it is not to be supposed, that even a slight acquaintance with logic is absolutely necessary, for a right application of the doctrine. Nothing more is required than a knowledge of a few of its simplest definitions.

The right use of the subjunctive has hitherto been acknowledged to be a matter of extreme difficulty. It is, therefore, hoped, that the doctrine now set forth will, at least, throw some light upon the subject, and assist in clearing up a point, which has confessedly been "a scandal upon criticism."

THE END.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY RICHARD TAYLOR,
RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.



CORRIGENDA.

- Page 11, line 2, *for* and *read* et.
— 14, — 5, *insert a comma after merito.*
— 17, — 3, *for Vossius read* he.
— 19, — 25, *for was read* is.
— 32, note, last line but one, *erase comma after discentium.*
— 45, — last line, *for diligentias read diligentius.*
— 59, line 7, *insert a comma after personarum.*
— 87, — 16, *after opportuna supply* res.
— 89, — 6, *for a whole read* the whole.
— 90, — 16, and in several other pages, *for independant read* independent.
— 118, — 9, *insert a comma after esset.*
— 180, — 6, *for navi silla read* navis illa.

